Bhikkhu Akiñcano

The concept of mindfulness within the contemporary mindfulness movement was the subject of a recent phenomenological critique. The present article confronts that critique in order to develop a phenomenologically viable interpretation of mindfulness that corresponds with how the word sati is used in the Pāli suttas. By clarifying the distinction between intentional objects and intentional acts, it can be shown that mindfulness was not originally conceived of as an exercise in focusing on a meditation object, but as reflexive self-awareness. Consequently, it is wrong to describe mindfulness as ‘bare attention’. Mindfulness was originally a philosophical enterprise, an attitude that can be cultivated only when one is attending to things while remaining aware of the broader context. Furthermore, an ordinary person (puthujjana) cannot cultivate what the Buddha called ‘right mindfulness’ (sammāsati). This is the province of the noble ones who have acquired the right view and are accomplished in virtue.

According to the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, mindfulness of the body involves seeing the body in a threefold way: ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā, and ajjhattabahiddhā. This article attempts to show how an investigation of bodily perception, following the approach adopted by the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, can serve as the basis for a philosophically grounded understanding of the Pāli words ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā. The interpretation that emerges is the distinction between “right here” and “out there”: two mutually dependent, internally related domains that are experienced as what Merleau-Ponty called the “chiasm” or the “intertwining.” This is different from the standard interpretations found in the Abhidhamma, the Pāli commentaries, the Visuddhimagga, and the instructions of most contemporary meditation teachers. It is hoped that the interpretation offered here can give some exposure to a movement within Theravāda Buddhism, initiated by Ñāṇavīra Thera but slowly gaining traction, characterized by a phenomenological reading of the Pāli sutta s.

The doctrine of impermanence found in the Pāli _sutta_s is commonly interpreted in a way that combines three distinct meanings: (1) things are constantly changing, (2) things have the nature to change and (3) things have the nature to appear and disappear. Adopting a phenomenological perspective, this article examines these different meanings in an attempt to clarify how the Pāli word _anicca_ should be understood. I argue that it is only in the third of these statements that the intended meaning of impermanence is found, and that this meaning pertains to ontology, not chronology. By framing the concept of impermanence with respect to the Buddha's ontology, we are able to think of it in terms of the time-independent, a priori structures of our experience, rather than as a temporal process of things changing over time. This atemporal (_akālika_) interpretation of impermanence lies at the very core of the Buddha's teaching but, as I demonstrate, it is expressed in a variety of ways. By clarifying the meaning of impermanence, as it was intended by the Buddha, it becomes possible to understand what freedom from suffering is and how it can be achieved.