Bin Liu

I argue that conventionalism is a promising doctrine by defending it against the following four major objections. (1) Quine’s objection to truth by convention. (2) Quine’s objection regarding the definition of analytic, and regarding the distinction between the analytic and synthetic. (3) The objection from the necessary a posteriori. (4) The contingency problem. Some of the objections apply to analytic propositions, whereas some of them apply to necessary a posteriori propositions. I take Ayer’s doctrine as a typical version of Traditional Conventionalism. I develop my Revised Conventionalism about analytic propositions based on Ayer’s doctrine. The main revisions I argue for include that analytic propositions are a model constructed from our use of language, and that the necessity of analytic propositions can be given up. I take Sidelle’s doctrine as a typical version of Neo-Conventionalism. I develop my Revised Conventionalism about necessary a posteriori propositions based on Sidelle’s view. The main revision I argue for is that purportedly unrestricted necessary a posteriori propositions are only restrictedly necessary. I argue that my Revised Conventionalism can withstand the above four major objections. Conventionalism opens up a new line of thought for resolving philosophical problems. That is, conventionalism proposes explanations by virtue of our use of language, rather than by virtue of objective reality or by the nature of our thought. Given my defence of conventionalism, it follows that we can use the conventionalist line of thought to resolve a wide range of philosophical problems.

Context: Some scholars have put forward constructivist world models in which the purported external world is constructed from experience (i.e., there is a constructive relation between them. However, scholars disagree about whether experience is generated by the brain and results from the perception of the purported external world (i.e., whether there are generative relations and perceptual relations. Problem: Do we need to maintain perceptual relations or generative relations in a constructivist world model? Method: I propose a world model where our world is composed of a large number of screen creatures, and this is compared with the world model in the irrealist virtual world theory. There is a constructive relation in both world models, but only the second world model contains generative and perceptual relations. I provide reasons to doubt that the world model in the irrealist virtual world theory can provide sufficient reasons for involving generative or perceptual relations. Results: We should accept the world model composed of screen creatures as the model of our world; we do not need to retain perceptual or generative relations in a constructivist world model. Implications: This article points out that perceptual relations stem from a misunderstanding of certain correlations between experiences. This will generate some new ideas when considering the mind-matter problem. Constructivist content: This article discusses how to deal with generative and perceptual relations using constructivist world models.

Context: There is still no detailed defence of Goodman’s starmaking constructivism against the objection Boghossian presented in his 2006 book, Fear of Knowledge. Problem: I defend Goodman’s constructivism against the problem of stuff raised by Boghossian, that is, that constructivism requires unconstructed stuff and thus cannot explain all features in the world. Method: I argue that there is a way out for constructivists when they face the problem of stuff. Constructivists can choose to accept a constructivist-friendly worldview and the problem of stuff does not hold in this worldview. Goodman already provides hints for such a worldview in his works. I articulate the worldview in detail and argue that it does not have obvious faults. Results: I show that starmaking constructivism does not have the problem of stuff at least under a certain tenable worldview. Implications: The constructivist-friendly worldview and related novel ideas could be used to defend starmaking constructivism against other objections in Boghossian’s book and is helpful in answering other philosophical questions such as the mind-matter problem and modality. Constructivist content: This article may contribute to reviving Goodman’s starmaking constructivism.

I argue that conventionalists should construe a posteriori necessity as restricted necessity. I take Sidelle’s defence of the conventionalist explanation of a posteriori necessity against the contingency problem as the starting point. Sidelle construes a posteriori necessity as unrestricted necessity and then argues that a posteriori necessity is to be considered under a fixed convention and is thus irrelevant to the contingent nature of our linguistic conventions. I offer a different solution to the contingency problem. I argue that conventionalists should construe a posteriori necessity as restricted necessity based upon a use-based meta-semantic picture. Restricted necessity is contingent in a broader sense and does not conflict with the contingency of conventions. My solution allows conventionalists to explain a posteriori necessity as restricted necessity. I show that the realist’s arguments for a posteriori necessity are unconvincing in regard to real modal features and a posteriori necessity as unrestricted necessity. We thus have good reason to continue to accept a posteriori necessity as restricted necessity under the conventionalist explanation.