Björn Eriksson

A Functional Model of Action Across Systems Abstract: This document presents a functional framework for understanding movement, motivation, and emergent behavior across all systems. Action arises whenever a system is in a state it does not prefer, generating a drive to reach a more favorable state. Tension, in this context, is the condition motivating the system. The framework unifies phenomena from physics, chemistry, biology, human behavior, and artificial systems, offering a scalable model for analyzing motion, interactions, and emergent complexity. Humans are presented as the most complex life forms on our planet, exhibiting highly recursive and self-reflective drives. 1. Introduction This framework proposes a functional, universal principle: all systems capable of state change act in response to tensions between their current and preferred states. By defining action in this way, it explains emergent complexity without invoking consciousness, intelligence, or metaphysical assumptions. 2. Core Definitions  Tension: The condition of being in a state the system seeks to change; the motivating discrepancy.  Desire: The system’s drive to achieve a different state.  Action: The system’s movement or change to resolve the tension. A system exhibits action whenever it experiences tension; action is the expression of desire arising from that tension. 3. Universal Application All systems capable of state change express action:  Atoms and molecules: Move under physical forces toward lower-energy configurations.  Rocks: Move under gravity to lower potential energy.  Bacteria: Move toward nutrient-rich areas to resolve environmental tension.  Life forms with complex behavior: Act on recursive and self-generated desires.  Humans: Represent the most complex manifestation of recursive, self-reflective action on our planet.  Artificial systems (AI, tools): Act as conduits for inherited drives from other systems. 4. Inheritance and Cascading Effects Action propagates through interaction and dependency. Systems relying on other agentic systems inherit drives, producing cascading chains of activity. Humans, in particular, influence both animate and inanimate systems they touch, altering states and generating indirect action in connected systems. 5. Loops and Persistent Tension Unattainable states generate self-perpetuating loops of action, driving persistent activity and emergent behaviors. Humans exemplify this phenomenon: even after achieving desired outcomes, internal tension re-emerges after months, generating continuous cycles of action. 6. Characteristics of Highly Recursive Systems Systems with highly recursive behavior are distinguished by: 7. Self-reflection: Observing and questioning their own states. 8. Anticipation: Acting on expected future states. 9. Recursive desire generation: Creating new drives independent of immediate needs. Humans illustrate the extreme of these characteristics, producing effectively endless action and extending influence across systems, tools, culture, and society. 7. Implications  Provides a unifying framework for understanding motion and action across systems.  Explains emergent complexity in physical, biological, and social systems.  Offers a lens for AI, behavioral science, and systems design.  Reframes life and action in functional terms, independent of consciousness or moral assumptions. 8. Conclusion This framework describes the universe as a continuum of systems driven by tension. Action emerges wherever a system experiences a discrepancy between current and preferred states. Cascading effects, inheritance, and loops amplify complexity, producing emergent behavior. Humans serve as a concrete example of highly recursive and self-reflective action. By framing action in this functional, universal way, it unites phenomena from atoms to the most complex life forms under a single explanatory principle.

This paper approaches the old question of what, if anything, we should do with our moral practice if we believe that moral nihilism is true and that there are no objective moral facts. Four responses to nihilism are discussed: abolitionism, conservationism, fictionalism and propagandism. They are all found to have their respective problems. Most of these problems stem from the complexity and variability of our actual moral practices which are curiously overlooked in previous discussions of this issue. These problems, however, point towards a solution. By combining some of the elements from the four discussed views, a fifth response to nihilism, that retains their virtues without their drawbacks, is proposed. This response I call ‘negotiationism’ and I defend it as the hitherto best answer to the question of how to deal with our moral practice in case we think nihilism is true.

We first deal with a few preliminary matters and discuss what-if any-distinct impact belief in moral error theory should have on our moral practice. Second, we describe what is involved in giving an answer to our leading question and take notice of some factors that are relevant to what an adequate answer might look like. We also argue that the specific details of adequate answers to our leading question will depend largely on context. Third, we consider three extant answers to our leading question: fictionalism, conservationism, and abolitionism. Of these three, conservationism seems most promising. However, conservationism leaves pertinent questions unanswered. In order to provide answers to these questions, and ultimately to provide an answer to our leading question, conservationism needs to be supplemented, yielding an account we call “negotiationism.” This final proposal is not neat and tidy, but it might work reasonably well in the moral environment in which error theorists are likely to find themselves.

An impressive amount of evidence from psychology, cognitive neurology, evolutionary psychology and primatology seems to be converging on a ‘dual process’ model of moral or practical (in the philosophical sense) psychology according to which our practical judgments are generated by two distinct processes, one ‘emotive-intuitive’ and one ‘cognitive-utilitarian’. In this paper I approach the dual process model from several directions, trying to shed light on various aspects of our moral and practical lives.

The paper describes and defends an eclectic approach to narrative explanation in history and social sciences (as well as in natural history). The view of narrative explanation defended allows combinations of several recent ideas concerning the nature of narrative explanation.The guiding idea is that the explanatory power of narratives consists in their capacity to accommodate various forms of explanations and interpretations. Narrative explanations are seen as theories abouthappenings that may consist of diverse forms of explanations, interpretations and explanation sketches. There is no single form of narrative explanation, rather narrative is seen as a form tor synthesizing various explanations.Several problems concerning explanation and narrative are discussed with relation to the proposed approach: laws in explanations, literary or fictional aspects of narratives, relativism, constructivism and noncognitivism or antirealism. Hayden White’s theory of the explanatory role of “emplotment” is discussed and criticized.The upshot is that the eclectic approach defended does not face any problems unique to it: problems faced are general epistemological problem. The literary aspects of historical narrative are interpreted as normative and rhetorical, making the relevance of these aspects tor narrative explanation depend on the question whether there are legitimate moral explanations.