Björn Freter

Matthew McManus, The Political Theory of Liberal Socialism. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2025. ISBN: 9781032647241, 246pp. Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò, Against Decolonisation: Taking African Agency Seriously. London: Hurst, 2022. ISBN: 9781787386921, 270 pp. Beatrice Okyere-Manu and Léocadie Lushombo (eds), African Women's Liberation Philosophies, Theologies, and Ethics. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024. ISBN 9783031391330, xix +301pp. (e-book PDF). Prakash Kashwan and Aseem Hasnain, Decolonizing Environmentalism: Alternative Visions and Practices for Environmental Action. London: Bloomsbury, 2025. ISBN: 9781350335493, 216pp.

This contribution will outline some important aspects of Sophie Bọsẹdé Olúwọlés groundbreaking work on Yorùbá oral philosophy. Using the Yorùbá story ‘The Toothless Queen’ as a vehicle, we will outline her understanding of oral philosophy as philosophy proper and investigate her radically inclusive, non-absolutist, anti-nihilist conception of philosophy as well as the fundamental onto-epistemological axioms of Yorùbá thought. We will especially focus on Olúwọlés radical and revolutionary philosophical approach to rationality and rational conjectures. We will finish our paper with Olúwọlés’ reflections on some of the obstacles that must be overcome to make her revolution a reality in the global philosophical community, that is, the pain of letting theories, ideas, and principles dear to us go.

The following “Good Practices” document was developed by the Women in Philosophy / Demographics in Philosophy group under the directorship of Nicole Hassoun, with substantial contributions from co-directors, advisory board members, and collaborators from 2018 to 2024. It is the result of extensive feedback and discussion from many sources including: two large panel discussions at Pacific APA meetings in 2018–2019; email queries to a large number of journal editors and department heads from 2019 to 2023; the creators of the British Philosophical Association’s Good Practice Scheme;1 referees and editors at Ethics which published a portion of it in 2022; blog readers at the Blog of the APA, Daily Nous, and The Splintered Mind; several committees of the American Philosophical Association; and numerous informal exchanges with members of the profession. In 2023, a version of it was endorsed by the APA’s Committee on Inclusiveness in the Profession. One thing that has become clear over the course of many discussions is that almost every thoughtful reader will find something to object to in the document—some positions expressed too strongly or not strongly enough, some recommendations overly detailed or insufficiently detailed, some underrepresented groups given too much relative focus or too little relative focus. This document is the compromise result of many hands, and we hope that philosophers who are broadly supportive of diversity and inclusion will find value in it even if those compromises haven’t all landed exactly where they prefer.

Most of the existing histories of Western philosophy are to be considered incomplete and even incorrect because of an inherent andro*-superiorist bias. The (epistemic) violence of this exclusion has been irrefutably demonstrated by mostly female* philosophers. This study analyzes the nature of the misogyn*y of the male* philosophers and suggests new concepts to describe this (epistemic) violence more precisely, namely the concept of superiorism and the superhuman fallacy. Superiorism is understood as an inability and/or unwillingness to accept the Other. Superiorism arises when the fallacy is committed, i.e. when a normative difference between human beings is introduced. In the final section, the practice of desuperiorization is outlined. Desuperiorization is to be understood as the philosophical practice allowing us to develop the capability and willingness to accept otherness sui generis. To desuperiorize philosophy means to consciously and practically unwant all privileges which derive from the pseudo-superiority of the male* human being.

Aribiah David Attoe’s Groundwork for a New Kind of African Metaphysics is a bold, courageous, passionate, and controversial book. It is erudite, well-informed, well-written, and at times even poetic. It combines the scholarship of Western and African philosophers in elegantly yet naturally flowing language. The book is bold because it aspires, as the title states, to be a groundwork for a new (African) metaphysics, thus claiming to solve those problems which previous metaphysicians of both African and Western origin have been unable to resolve. This is where the book becomes somewhat controversial, which is hardly a surprise.

Care, I suspect, is initiated with an appeal. Something appeals to me which becomes a matter of concern. In accordance with this concern, I develop a volition: I want that which promotes the thriving—even to the smallest extent—of that which has appealed to us, regardless of how I may establish what that entails. Eventually I take practical action: I act according to my volition. Immediately after this has taken effect, as the case may be, I release the source of the appeal from my care.The phenomenology of care seems to us to be of eminent importance for health care ethics. To denote professional caring, the term nursing is used. The professional care-giver purposefully exposes him/herself to an appeal, making him/herself receptive to such an appeal and reliably allowing the appeal to become a concern. A fundamental principle of nursing ethics thus appears to us to be: to make known one’s receptiveness to an appeal—in a particular situation at a particular time—and to process this appeal reliably such that it becomes a concern. This encompasses the professionalism of care at its initiation.I believe that a precise phenomenology of care will provide a definition of the professional care that is nursing and an ethics of nursing for the care-giving professions.

In this contribution, we will analyse the inquiry (ሐተታ, ḥāteta), written by Ethiopian scholar, Zera Yaqob, ዘርአ፡ያዕቆብ, Seed of Jacob (Sumner, 1976: 4, I). His philosophy resists a division into the basic disciplines customary in Western philosophy, his arguments, as we wish to propose with caution, combine metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology in a way that is almost impossible to separate. We will thus not be able to identify purely epistemological principles in his philosophy. However, since Zera Yaqob is deeply concerned about truth, we still find profound philosophical insights about knowledge and being and their relationship to one another. We will finish our reconstruction of some of the main ideas of the inquiry, (ሐተታ, ḥāteta), with some rather critical notes on some of the hidden premises and their seemingly superioristic implications.

The dyadic relation between a person in need and a person who provides help is one of the core elements of care. Nonetheless, identifying core elements of care alone cannot supply simple solutions to the challenges that are rooted in the ambivalences and tensions of the notion of care in healthcare. Care practices are extensive, situated, and complex. Questions concerning ambivalences and tensions within care include: Can care practices include coercion? Is care compatible with exclusion? Can it be passive or invisible? Can it be incorporated into standardised and regulated routines? Can care and its vocabulary be adjusted to clinical procedures and medical terminology?

The violence which colonialism brought into reality must not only be processed by those who suffered from it, but also by those who committed it. We claim that this process of becoming decolonial has two parts: Africans can engage in continued adseredition – derived from the Latin expression, reditio ad se, to come back to oneself – and the Western world has to desuperiorize its self-understanding and actions. To demonstrate this, this chapter juxtaposes two texts: the 1956 Congolese Manifesto of Conscience Africaine and, 2017 The New European Consensus on Development. The Manifesto exemplifies the African commitment to its own liberation, while the superioristic understanding of development permeates the neo-liberal solutions which the New Consensus offers. Philosophically speaking, development is a non-issue in its superiorist understanding for African philosophers. It is a philosophical issue solely because the Western world continues to impose itself on Africa. The author argues that for the West, it is time to write a Manifesto of the Western Conscience in which the West studies itself and initiates a new philosophical Enlightenment that would force its praxis to adhere to its moral theories and foster an Africa-centric approach to development.

We attempt to determine friendship as a normative practice. At its inception stands the twofold positing of an ought-to-be and an ought-to-do. In the normative practice of friendship, our heightened vitality manifests itself: we understand normativity in general as wanting more than simply to be there. Friendship is a normative positing and thus belongs to the metaphysical sphere of reality. With friendship, by freely taking practical action, we initiate something and connect that which had previously been unconnected. Within this connection we can find relief from our existential strain, and, furthermore, we can enjoy the normative ecstasy of being.

This Handbook provides in one volume rich, comprehensive and rigorous coverage of specific subject areas and thematic concerns in the ever-evolving academic discipline of African philosophy. This Handbook is unique in its focus on central and emerging areas within African philosophy such as Afro-communitarian philosophy, ethics, epistemology, social and political philosophy, existentialism, philosophy of religion, gender philosophy, philosophy of education, phenomenology, transhumanism, African philosophy futures, and philosophy of the non-human. The thirty-two chapters in this Handbook explore the rich textual and non-textual forms of philosophical knowledge in Africa and adequately represent the broad and diverse scope of African philosophy, showing the richness and depth of the philosophical tradition. This reference work is indispensable to students and researchers in African philosophy, comparative philosophy and world philosophies.

Through the vehicle of Nicolas Sarkozy’s so-called “Dakar Address” we will analyse the West’s persisting lack of insight into the need for a Western decolonization. We will try to identify the dangers that come from this refusal, such as the abidance in colonial patterns, the enduring self-understanding as superior com-pared to Africa, and the persisting unwillingness to accept the colonial guilt. Decolonization has to be understood as a two-fold business. Decolonization is over-coming endured and perpetrated violence. It is not only important that the colonial oppressed regain strength, it is equally important that the perpetrator of colonial violence understand their excess of violence and work on effecting its return impossible. We explain how Western thinking remains dangerous and untrustwor-thy if it refuses its own decolonization. Finally, we will draw attention to a fundamental pattern of Western thought that clashes with the fundamental values of the West: contempt. In a final step we suggest how this contempt can be overcome through desuperiorisation and the establishment of elative ethics.

There is a fundamental flaw in the Eurocentric epistemological foundation. Counter to the overwhelming ethos of the Enlightenment this epistemological bedrock shockingly does not seem to be an epistemology of the human being, but only of the white human being. I, as Western scholar, have to relativize my epistemological heritage, because it does not take into account the diversity of the human being. I will briefly explore the racist views of Voltaire, Hume and Kant and I will argue that Western philosophy needs to (re)analyze its epistemological tradition with regards to the way the racist views of its protagonists corrupted their philosophical work. I suggest contextualization of the philosophical tradition and its desuperiorisation in order to foster ethical philosophical dialogue amongst global scholars.

Vermutlich ist nahezu jeder Tierethiker schon aufgefordert worden, sich nicht darüber mitzuteilen, wie es in moderner Massentierhaltung zugeht, denn das verdürbe doch die Möglichkeit, Fleisch weiterhin zu genießen. Diese Aufforderung ist reichlich merkwürdig. Denn sie kommt eigentlich zu spät. Der Mensch, der nicht mehr weiter über die Massentierhaltung hören will, hat offenkundig schon genug gehört, um zu wissen, dass eine erneute, eine tiefere Vergegenwärtigung eine ihm liebgewonnene Praxis verderben würde: Es ist mithin die (durch den Tierethiker nur bemerkbar gemachte) höchste eigene Erkenntnis, die seinen Fleischgenuss bedroht. Es scheint als versuche hier ein Mensch, eine Erkenntnis und das dieser Erkenntnis nachlaufende Drängen in ihrem Sinne praktisch zu werden, wieder unerkannt zu machen. Mit diesem Ansinnen will ein Mensch, der eine Grenze überschritten hat, die er, wie er selbst erkannt hat, nicht hätte überschreiten sollen – woher auch immer diese Erkenntnis stammt – dennoch überschreitbar machen will. Dieser Mensch will den Zwang, der doch aus ihm selbst herauskommt, nicht kennen, nicht begreifen. Das Begriffene und das aus dem Begriffenen den Menschen selbst unmittelbar ergreifende Tunwollen wird zu annihilieren versucht. Das ist im wörtlichen Sinne ein Nihilismus, eine Selbstverstümmelung des eigenen Denkens und des eigenen Herzens. Gegen diesen Nihilismus möchten wir für den Veganismus argumentieren als (eine mögliche) praktische Konsequenz, die höchste eigene Abscheu gegen das Töten und zugleich sich selbst ernst zu nehmen; der Veganismus wird damit als ein Anti-Nihilismus begriffen

In the so-called modern age, a transition can be observed in Western thought regarding this issue of tolerance. A perceptible shift can be seen in the understanding of tolerance as mere endurance to attempts to conceive of tolerance as a kind of well-grounded acceptance. It is regrettable, however, that this change in thinking has often remained hypothetical rather than heuristic. This certainly has to do with the fact that most of the time only large-scale theological, philosophical, or political projects were negotiated. In this case, as is often happens, the directly concerned individual, the concrete person in the course of the demonstration efforts, was lost. We want to counter this loss with our study. In our investigation, which is based on a phenomenological reflection, we want to examine tolerance and respect as an existential problem couched within an individual. We wish to consider a person who desires to be tolerant and respectful; a person who accepts tolerance and respect as an existential task.

Goethe’s religiousness is characterised by a plethora of critically and productively adopted elements. Our study will concentrate on the adopted elements from the field of philosophy and from the “New Testament”. Goethe is most of all concerned with the sacred that is present in the origin of all things, and with the continual celebration of this sanctity. Goethe's Religiosität zeichnet sich durch eine Vielzahl von kritischen und produktiven Aneignungen aus. Unsere Studie konzentriert sich auf die Aneignungen aus der Philosophie und dem "Neuen Testament". Es geht Goethe um das Heilige, das im Ursprung aller Dinge liegt und um die andauernde Feier dieses Heiligen.