Blake Hestir

In the Sophist, the Stranger maintains that just as forms and kinds weave, statement involves ‘weaving’ words and signifying something. This view uniquely treats statement as an activity and casts forms as the ultimate ground for meaning. Statement is analogous to, say, seeing which emerges within the realization of the visual capacity in relation to objects. I argue that any statement as such is an activity of stating rather than something separate from the stating. What is central to this view is Plato’s appeal to an externalist conception of meaning, located with kinds and forms. To this extent, his view is more parsimonious than some contemporary views since it requires no appeal to tertiary entities like propositions to explain how statements express something meaningful. A statement is a unique sort of activity dependent as much on the world as on the speaker. Plato’s view is refreshingly innovative and sophisticated, broadly suggesting a way of reimagining the nature of meaning in terms of activity in the world.

I argue that in Plato's _Sophist, the account of true and false statement which emerges within the discussion of not being and falsehood neither entails nor outwardly suggests any of the traditional characterizations of a correspondence "theory" of truth. On the contrary, what emerges is a minimalistic "conception" of truth which requires neither positing the existence of facts nor formulating an explanatory definition of truth. I make comparisons with Aristotle's discussion of truth in the _Categories and _De Interpretatione, and I offer reasons why one should not expect to find the emergence of a "theory" of truth in the _Sophist

What is the nature of truth? Blake Hestir offers an investigation into Plato's developing metaphysical views, and examines Plato's conception of being, meaning, and truth in the Sophist, as well as passages from several other later dialogues including the Cratylus, Parmenides, and Theaetetus, where Plato begins to focus more directly on semantics rather than only on metaphysical and epistemological puzzles. Hestir's interpretation challenges both classical and contemporary interpretations of Plato's metaphysics and conception of truth, and highlights new parallels between Plato and Aristotle, as well as clarifying issues surrounding Plato's approach to semantics and thought. This book will be of interest to scholars and students of ancient Greek philosophy, metaphysics, contemporary truth theory, linguistics, and philosophy of language.

Aristotle famously proclaims at Metaphysics Г.7, 1011b26–27: To men gar legein to on mê einai ê to mê on einai pseudos, to de to on einai kai to mê on mê einai alêthes, . . . Aristotle is inclined to think of this as a definition of truth and falsehood;1 we are inclined to wonder what he means by it. Perhaps a reasonable approximation in English would amount to something like: Tdf: For to state [of] that which is [that] it is not or [of] that which is not [that] it is [is] false, and [to state of] that which is [that] it is and [of] that which is not [that] it is not [is] true. Many have considered this to be the expression of a correspondence theory of truth, and so it is tempting to ..