•  23
    A Paradox Involving Representational States and Activities
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (2): 96-100. 2019.
    In this paper, I present a novel paradox that pertains to a variety of representational states and activities. I begin by proving that there are certain contingently true propositions that no one can occurrently believe. Then, I use this to develop a further proof by which I derive a contradiction, thus giving us the paradox. Next, I differentiate the paradox from the Liar Paradox, and I show how a common response to the different variations of the Liar Paradox fails to avoid the type of paradox…Read more
  •  2687
    Knowing That P without Believing That P
    Noûs 47 (2): 371-384. 2013.
    Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing tha…Read more
  •  732
    Inherent emotional quality of human speech sounds
    with Maia Pujara, Richard C. Wolf, and Michael Koenigs
    Cognition and Emotion 27 (6): 1105-1113. 2013.
    During much of the past century, it was widely believed that phonemes--the human speech sounds that constitute words--have no inherent semantic meaning, and that the relationship between a combination of phonemes (a word) and its referent is simply arbitrary. Although recent work has challenged this picture by revealing psychological associations between certain phonemes and particular semantic contents, the precise mechanisms underlying these associations have not been fully elucidated. Here we…Read more