Blas Radi

One of the most interesting elements of the Epistemic Injustice framework proposed by Miranda Fricker, and its successive re-appropriations, is its social perspective and non-ideal methodological approach, which finds it philosophically fruitful to begin with a thorough examination of current injustices in concrete societies. However, when it comes to mitigating epistemic injustices, the author appeals to the individual exercise of cognitive virtues. This article will show that such response implies an individualistic and idealistic turn that collides with the initial commitments of the epistemic injustice framework and affects its normative dimension. In addition, it will highlight how the epistemology of ignorance can collaborate with a more realistic diagnosis of epistemic dysfunctions.

In this written dialogue, four trans philosophers remix and expand on a panel discussion held at the 2025 Thinking Trans // Trans Thinking Conference that explored the pressing issue of trans philosophy’s methods, building on an ongoing discussion in the literature. The panel and this text represent an extended and ongoing discussion between the authors. The authors are committed to neither methodological uniformity nor systematicity. Nevertheless, their embrace of pluralism leads to notable convergences regarding the basic sense that trans philosophy has a political dimension, the notion of philosophical rigor, and the need for reflexivity about trans philosophy’s methods.

The aim of this paper is to assess Robin McKenna’s proposal of non-ideal epistemology, which he presents as the epistemological equivalent of Charles Mills’ non-ideal theory. To this end, I begin by reconstructing McKenna’s proposal. The reconstruction unfolds in three steps. First, I provide a general characterization, followed by an exploration of what the author considers to be the key aspects of his proposal, and finally, an instance of application. From there, I systematize a set of criticisms that question whether this proposal maintains a meaningful continuity with Mills’ non-ideal theory. Finally, I introduce the work of Heidi Grasswick, which provides a relevant point of contrast for the discussion on non-ideal epistemology.

La elaboración del dossier temático de la revista Aletheia sobre memorias y experiencias de identidades de género disidentes en Argentina se constituyó en una oportunidad para cuestionar y evidenciar problemáticas que recorren y estructuran los debates sobre el tema en el ámbito académico-universitario. Dichas reflexiones se encuentran condensadas en este escrito, un texto dialógico producto de un intercambio reflexivo entre el autor y las coordinadoras del dossier. Blas es profesor de filosofía, becario doctoral (CONICET) y activista de Derechos Humanos. Es docente de Gnoseología de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Buenos Aires y co-coordinador de la Cátedra Libre de Estudios Trans. Este escrito es el producto de conversaciones conjuntas, entrecortadas, pausadas, de preguntas y respuestas construidas a lo largo de los últimos meses. Un diálogo que pretende abrir nuevos interrogantes sobre cómo entendemos, construimos y habitamos los espacios académico-universitarios, qué estrategias se despliegan en la pretendida búsqueda de políticas de inclusión y cuáles son sus limitaciones de las que no podemos escapar. Ello nos conduce a repensar cómo entendemos el género y las identidades.

Despite a recent wave in global recognition of the rights of transgender and gender-diverse populations, referred to in this text by the umbrella label of trans*, international law continues to presume a cisgender binary definition of gender — dismissing the lived realities of trans* individuals throughout the world. This gap in international legal recognition and protection has fundamental implications for health, where trans* persons have been and continue to be subjected to widespread discrimination in health care, longstanding neglect of health needs, and significant violations of bodily autonomy.

This paper explores disagreements due to active ignorance as a kind of deep di-sagreement. It recovers Fogelin’s notion of “deep disagreement”, which stressed the limits of argumentation to build consensus and to dissipate deep disagree-ments; and it discusses his contention that deep disagreements cannot be sol-ved through rational resolution. The paper examines a disagreement that has practical implications and involves subjects asymmetrically situated in a web of power relations and builds on that case to conclude that disagreements due to ignorance are not impervious to rational resolution. Specifically, it argues that practices of “epistemic activism” (Medina 2019) count as rational and reasona-ble mechanisms of resolution of deep disagreements due to active ignorance.

Este trabajo investiga las capacidades epistémicas de las instituciones democráticas a través de una evaluación de tres modelos epistémicos de democracia: el Teorema del Jurado de Condorcet, el Teorema ‘Diversidad supera Habilidad’ y el modelo experimentalista de Dewey. El modelo de Dewey es superior a los demás en su capacidad de modelar las funciones epistémicas de tres características constitutivas de la democracia: la diversidad epistémica de los participantes, la interacción de la votación con el debate y los mecanismos de retroalimentación como las elecciones periódicas y las protestas. Considera que la democracia es una institución para reunir información ampliamente distribuida sobre problemas y políticas de interés público mediante la participación de conocedores epistémicamente diversos. Las normas democráticas de libre discurso, disenso, retroalimentación y rendición de cuentas funcionan para garantizar el aprendizaje colectivo y con base experimental a partir de las diversas experiencias de los diferentes conocedores. Ilustro estos puntos con un estudio de caso de grupos forestales comunitarios en el Asia meridional, cuyas capacidades epistémicas se han visto perjudicadas por la supresión de la participación de las mujeres.

In addition to opening a fertile field for inquiry in analytical social epistemology, Miranda Fricker’s work has provided powerful conceptual tools that merge descriptive capacity and political potency. For this reason, over the last fifteen years, the conceptual repertoire introduced by the author has been well received in both academic and political arenas. At times, the concepts of both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice acquire excessive dimensions in the literature, and this undermines, on the one hand, their analytical precision and, on the other, their usefulness. In this paper I argue against Fricker’s structural parallelism thesis and defend an independent treatment of each of these concepts. On this basis, to counteract the hyperinflation of the concept of hermeneutic injustice, I proceed with an exercise of conceptual precision. To this end, I identify the conditions that make hermeneutic injustice both unjust and hermeneutic. Finally, I present theoretical and practical reasons to encourage the rigorous use of these concepts.