Błażej Mzyk

Truthmaking non-maximalism usually assumes that some truths do not have truthmakers. I suggest, however, that non-maximalism can be understood more specifically, and that different types of non-maximalism can be distinguished. To do so, I refer to two positions. The first is deflationary truthmaking, some of whose proponents assume that no truths have truthmakers. The second distinguishes between truths that do not have truthmakers but depend on being, and truths that do not have truthmakers and moreover do not depend on being. Given the combinations of these positions, I propose a new classification indicating the positions available to a non-maximalist. I argue that one of these positions is particularly worth adopting because of its advantages over the other options.

In recent years there has been a lot of skepticism about the existence of facts. It seems that one of the last places for their application is in truthmaking theory. In this paper I discuss two approaches to the use of facts in truthmaking. The first, categorial, holds that facts are entities that belong to one of three ontological categories (true propositions, truth of propositions, instantiations of universals).The second, deflationary, holds that a fact is merely a functional concept denoting any entity that performs a truthmaking function. I argue that in the face of significant criticism of categorial facts as truthmakers, a defender of facts may resort to the deflationary concept. Nevertheless, even in this case we can do without facts as truthmakers.

W artykule dokonano przeniesienia kategorii niedookreślenia świata przedstawionego w literackim dziele sztuki, opisanej przez Romana Ingardena, na rzeczywistość realną. Wykorzystano w tym celu fenomenologiczne przeciwstawienie faktów i sensów, obecne głównie w późnych pracach Edmunda Husserla. W rezultacie uzasadniono, iż rzeczywistość tak jak utwór literacki jest niedookreślona i domaga się wypełnienia. Podobnie jak czytelnik w akcie konkretyzacji uzupełnia miejsca niedookreślenia tekstu, tak człowiek dookreśla rzeczywistość wyznaczaną przez fakty poprzez nadawanie im sensów. W ten sposób tworzy własny świat partykularny.

For many years there has been a debate in truthmaking theory between proponents of the substantive and deflationary approaches. Substantivists about truthmaking maintain that we need entities called truthmakers, while deflationists of truthmaking argue that the asymmetric form of the T-schema is sufficient. In contrast to incompatibilists, who argue that one should adopt only one of these approaches, I propose a compatibilist theory of truthmaking in which the two approaches complement each other through the distribution of different functions of truthmaking. I find that this helps to solve the problem of truthmaking of certain contentious truths, such as negative truths.