Bo Chen

© 2016 American Chemical Society.Hydrostatic pressure applied using diamond anvil cells has been widely explored to modulate physical properties of materials by tuning their lattice degree of freedom. Independently, electrical field is able to tune the electronic degree of freedom of functional materials via, for example, the field-effect transistor configuration. Combining these two orthogonal approaches would allow discovery of new physical properties and phases going beyond the known phase space. Such experiments are, however, technically challenging and have not been demonstrated. Herein, we report a feasible strategy to prepare and measure FETs in a DAC by lithographically patterning the nanodevices onto the diamond culet. Multiple-terminal FETs were fabricated in the DAC using few-layer MoS2 and BN as the channel semiconductor and dielectric layer, respectively. It is found that the mobility, conductance, carrier concentration, and contact conductance of MoS2 can all be significantly enhanced with pressure. We expect that the approach could enable unprecedented ways to explore new phases and properties of materials under coupled mechano-electrostatic modulation.

Background and Objective Pulsed dye laser is a commonly used treatment for Port Wine Stain birthmarks. However, deeper components of PWS are often resistant to PDL. Deeper penetrating lasers, including the long pulsed Neodymium:Yttrium Aluminum Garnet laser have been used, but carry greater risk. This study evaluates the distinct blood vessel thermal responses to visible and near infrared lasers using animal and numerical models. Study Design/Materials and Methods Blood vessels in the rodent dorsal skin chamber were irradiated by a 595 nm PDL and a long-pulsed 1,064 nm Nd:YAG laser. Laser-induced immediate and 1-hour post-structural and functional changes in the vessels were documented. Numerical simulations were conducted using a 1,000 μm depth SD mouse skin fold to simulate experimental conditions. Results PDL irradiation produced immediate blood vessel hemorrhage. Modeling indicated this occurs due to preferential heating of the superior parts of large blood vessels. Nd:YAG irradiation resulted in blood vessel constriction; modeling indicated more uniform heating of vessel walls. Conclusion PDL and Nd:YAG lasers result in distinct tissue responses. This supports different observable clinical treatment end points when using these devices. Vessel constriction associated with the Nd:YAG may be more difficult to observe and is one reason this device may carry greater risk. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Background: Malaria around the China-Myanmar border is a serious health problem in the countries of South-East Asia. An. minimus is a principle malaria vector with a wide geographic distribution in this area. Malaria is endemic along the boundary between Yunnan province in China and the Kachin State of Myanmar where the local Anopheles community and the malaria transmission vectors have never been clarified. Methods. Adult Anopheles specimens were collected using CDC light traps in four villages along the border of China and Myanmar from May 2012 to April 2013. Morphological and molecular identification of mosquito adults confirmed the species of Anopheles. Blood-meal identification using the female abdomens was conducted using multiplex PCR. For sporozoite detection in An. minimus, sets of 10 female salivary glands were pooled and identified with SSU rDNA using nested PCR. Monthly abundance of An. minimus populations during the year was documented. The diversity of Anopheles and the role of An. minimus on malaria transmission in this border area were analyzed. Results: 4,833 adult mosquitoes in the genus Anopheles were collected and morphologically identified to species or species complex. The Anopheles community is comprised of 13 species, and 78.83% of our total specimens belonged to An. minimus s.l., followed by An. maculatus and the An. culicifacies complex. The quantity of trapped An. minimus in the rainy season of malaria transmission was greater than during the non-malarial dry season, and a peak was found in May 2012. An. minimus fed on the blood of four animals: humans, cattle, pigs and dogs. 1,500 females of An. minimus were pooled into 150 samples and tested for sporozoites: only 1 pooled sample was found to have sporozoites of Plasmodium vivax. Conclusion: Anopheles is abundant with An. minimus being the dominant species and having a high human blood index along the China-Myanmar border. The sporozoites in An. minimus were determined to be Plasmodium vivax with a 0.07-0.7% infection rate. © 2013Yu et al.; licensee BioMed Central Ltd.

This article summarizes and evaluation of pragmatism from the classical to the contemporary evolution of the new pragmatism, and its main representative of the thinking, clear, concise evaluation of cut misses the mark. The authors compared the respected classical pragmatism, especially Peirce's ideas, such as his concern for truth, respect for evidence of intellectual integrity and honesty to explore the stress, and the false reasoning and hate dishonest argument, and so on. The new pragmatism is more of a variety of criticism, especially for Richard • Richard Rorty's idea that he corrupted the scientific spirit of classical pragmatism, is representative of vulgar pragmatism. The author is an internationally renowned philosopher and logician, is also an expert on American pragmatism, a former international Peirce Society. In addition to English, this article has been translated into Spanish, Portuguese, Danish published. A historical survey of American Pragmatism, in both its classical and its contemporary manifestations, with a special focus on the transmutation of Pragmatism from the reformed, scientific philosophy developed by CS Peirce to the revolutionary, literary post-philosophy urged by Richard Rorty.

Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence will be the twenty-first century logic development of the main power source, and in the twenty-first century will largely determine the face of logic. At least in the early twenty-first century, logic will focus on the following topics: how to deal with common sense reasoning in the logic of Eph coordination, non-monotonic and fault tolerance factors? how to make robots with human intelligence and creativity, as established from the empirical evidence used to guide future action in the induction of judgments can be wrong? how the knowledge representation and knowledge reasoning, in particular, is based on the existing knowledge base and between the cognitive subject knowledge and the reasoning? how contextual factors, combined with a variety of natural language understanding and reasoning, so that intelligent robots to employing natural language for successful communication with people? . . . . And so on

This paper examines the conceptions of logic from Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein and Ayer, and regards the six philosophers as the representatives of logical exceptionalism. From their standpoints, this paper refines the tenets of logical exceptionalism as follows: logic is exceptional to all other sciences because of four reasons: (i) logic is formal, neutral to any domain and any entities, and general; (ii) logical truths are made true by the meanings of logical constants they contain or by logicians' rational insight to consequence relations; (iii) logical truths are analytical, a prior and necessary, so not‐revisable; and (iv) logical laws are normative for how to correctly think. However, logical exceptionalism has encountered difficult open problems: What are logical constants? How to justify basic laws of logic? How are logical laws accessible to us? How to explain the reasonability of rival logics and select from them? How to explain the universal applicability of logical laws? How to explain the normativity of logical laws for correct thinking? This paper concludes that logical anti‐exceptionalism is more hopeful to successfully answer these questions than logical exceptionalism.

Naturalism is the dominant characteristic of W. V. Quine’s philosophy. The current study presents a more comprehensive and sympathetic clarification of Quine’s naturalized epistemology (NE hereafter), and vindicates its main positions by critically responding to the three objections to Quine’s NE: it is the replacement of traditional epistemology (TE hereafter), it is viciously circular, and it is devoid of normative dimension, and to Williamson’s three charges to naturalism (mainly Quine’s brand), finally concludes that the three objections and Williamson’s three charges to Quine’s NE are mainly perhaps caused by misreading or misinterpretation, so all of them failed, and that there are still illuminating, reasonable, and valuable insights in Quine’s NE, which are worthy of further development.

In his Knowledge and Belief (1962), Hintikka establishes his system of epistemic logic with the KK (Knowing that One Knows, in symbols, Kp→KKp) principle (KK for short). However, his system of epistemic logic and the KK principle are grounded upon his strong notion of knowledge, which requires that knowledge is infallible, that is, it makes further inquiry pointless, and becomes ‘discussion-stopper’; knowledge implies truth, to wit, cognitive agents will not be mistaken in their knowledge; cognitive agents will be ‘perfect logicians’, i.e. they have infinitive capability of logical inference. Hintikka calls the argument for KK from the strong notion of knowledge as the ‘transcendental argument’ for KK. Obviously, the strong notion of knowledge is far away from our ordinary conception of knowledge; based on such a strong sense of knowledge, epistemic logic has met the problem of logical omnipotence, and is difficult to apply in our ordinary cognitive practice. Moreover, there is no close connection of the KK principle with internalism or externalism.

Traditional correspondence theory of truth with the concept of fact encounters many serious difficulties, main one of which is that it is too difficult to explain clearly the concept of ‘fact’ and how propositions ‘correspond’ to facts. This does not mean that we should abandon the traditional correspondence theory of truth and turn to some other type theories of truth. In order to guarantee the objectivity of truth, any reasonable theory of truth must adhere to the core insight of the traditional correspondence theory: it is not something in our language, nor in our mind, but something in the external world, that make the propositions we use to describe the states of affairs in the world either true or false. It is entirely possible to formulate a new correspondence theory of truth without the concept of fact but still adhering to the core insights mentioned above of the traditional correspondence theory. New correspondence theory of truth has its own metaphysical and epistemological assumptions, and also its assumption in the philosophy of language. Because of the generativity of language, in defining the concept of truth, the new correspondence theory of truth must resort to Tarskian recursive procedure. First, it gives the semantic value of the components of a proposition, defines the truth of its atomic propositions, then gradually defines the truth of its more and more complex propositions and finally of the whole proposition. Coherence is the intrinsic element of truth. The concept of truth is by no means trivial and insignificant; on the contrary, it is very substantive. The pursuit of truth is our mission.

There are two versions of the correspondence theory of truth: the object-based correspondence theory and the fact-based correspondence theory. Some scholars have put forward their objections to my rejection of the concept of a fact and their defence of that concept. But their arguments are not cogent, since they haven’t clarified the relation between facts and propositions, haven’t successfully argued for the necessity and feasibility of introducing the concept of a fact, and haven’t provided an acceptable standard of identity for facts. Under the framework of the fact-based correspondence theory, a “negative fact” is usually introduced to explain the falsehood of an affirmative proposition and the truth of a negative proposition. But, after careful analysis, we find that the positing of negative facts is the result of the concurrence of three factors: the positive states of objects, the expectations of cognitive subjects, and certain kinds of inferences, Thus, negative facts at most have a sort of inferential “existence” without independent ontological status. The positing of negative facts has been criticized for many reasons, such as the ontological inflation of negative facts, the supervenience of negative facts on positive facts, the imperceptibility of negative facts, and the lack of causal force of negative facts. Many replies to these criticisms have been put forward, such as the dilemma argument, the self-defeating argument, and the role-making of negative facts: constitution (e.g. hole-making), causation (event-making), chance-making, and truth-making. However, these replies can also be reasonably rejected. The final conclusion of this article is that, in order to account for the falsehood of an affirmative proposition and the truth of a negative proposition, we can appeal to the object-based correspondence theory of truth without appealing to the concept of a fact, let alone the concept of a “negative fact”.

The debate on the yan-yi relation was carried out by Chinese philosophers collectively, and the principles and methods in the debate still belong to a living tradition of Chinese philosophy. From Yijing (Book of Changes), Lunyu (Analects), Laozi and Zhuangzi to Wang Bi, "yi" which cannot be expressed fully by yan (language), is not only "idea" or "meaning" in the human mind, but is also some kind of ontological existence, which is beyond yan and emblematic symbols, and unspeakable. Thus, the debate on the yan-yi relation refers firstly to metaphysics, secondly to moral philosophy, and then to epistemology and philosophy of language. Guided by this view, this paper recalls the source of the debate on the yan-yi relation to Yijing and Lunyu, distinguishes four meanings of "yi" in Chinese philosophy, and reconstructs three arguments. These arguments are the "yan cannot express yi fully" argument, "forget yan once you get yi" argument, and "yan can express yi fully" argument. Finally, this paper exposes and comments on those principles, methods and the general tendency shown in the debate from the following five aspects: starting point, value-preference, methodology, texts (papers and books), and influences

This article outlines the history of logic in China from 1949 to 2019. Firstly, it presents a rough picture of Chinese logic before 1949 using broad brushstrokes. Secondly, it divides the whole process of development into two stages. In the first 30 years from 1949 to 1979, Chinese logic made some achievements, but also went along some detours, and its overall situation was unsatisfactory. In the latter 40 years from 1979 to 2019, due to Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening up, many Chinese logicians went abroad for academic visits or to study degrees in foreign universities or research institutes, gradually became familiar with and even integrated into the international mainstream of logic teaching and research, and ushered in the great flourishing of logic in China we see today. Finally, it draws four lessons from this process of development, as follows. 1) Let politics and academia live in peace, by respecting and adhering to the idea of academic freedom. 2) Academic advances cannot be achieved in isolation from the world, so we should fully embrace the international academic community, while insisting on our own independent thinking. 3) We should always adhere to the policy of “letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend”, so that different academic viewpoints and tendencies can be improved and developed in their mutual collision. 4) We should culti- vate academic self-confidence, gradually make the change from pure follow-up learning to original work in some fields of logic.

Philosophy is a cognitive enterprise. In multiple senses, it is continuous with other sciences (including natural sciences, social sciences, and Humanities). (1) As far as its subject matter is concerned, like other sciences, philosophy is also a part of the overall efforts of human beings to understand the world in which we live. (2) In terms of their methodologies, there is no substantive difference between philosophy, common sense, and science. Just as scientific methodology is the refinement of common-sense methodology, philosophical methodology is also the refinement and summary of common sense and scientific methodologies. (3) In terms of their utilities, philosophy and science are both designed to help people live better in the world, and to lead a decent and dignified life, especially a meaningful and valuable life. (4) It is the correct attitude and practice of dealing with the relationship between philosophy and the history of philosophy to study and enter philosophy through the history of philosophy, to critically reflect on the previous philosophical theories, to open up new fields, to use new methods, and to put forward new theories to develop philosophy. (5) The following two assertions about philosophy and science are just taken for granted, and specious: science relies on observation and experiment, and philosophy resorts to interpretation and understanding, while science focuses on "what is" and philosophy focuses on "what it should be".

There are two problematic assumptions in Kripke’s semantic argument against descriptivism. Assumption 1 is that the referential relation of a name to an object is only an objective or metaphysical relation between language and the world; it has nothing to do with the understanding of the name by our linguistic community. Assumption 2 is that descriptivism has to hold that, if name a has its meaning and the meaning is given by one description or a cluster of descriptions, the description should supply a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for determining what a designates; and that it is possible for us to find out such a setof conditions. Emphasizing the sociality, intentionality, conventionality and historicity of language and meaning, this paper rejects Assumption 1, and argues that Assumption 2 is an unfair interpretation of descriptivism, and it is not necessary for descriptivists to hold Assumption 2. This paper finally concludes that Kripke’s semantic argument against descriptivism fails

Kripke's epistemic argument against descriptivism is reconstructed as follows. Premise 1: if descriptivism is correct, then “N is the F” should be knowable a priori; Premise 2: in fact, “N is the F” is not knowable a priori; Conclusion: descriptivism is wrong. This article accepts P2 of the argument as true, but rejects P1 by arguing for the evolution of language and the growth of meaning; so it concludes that the argument fails. It also criticizes Kripke's conception of “a priori,” and interprets why “N is the F” is not knowable a priori. Sometimes this article uses materials from Chinese ancient philosophers, for example, Xunzi and later Moists, to support its arguments

The debate on the yan-yi relation was carried out by Chinese philosophers collectively, and the principles and methods in the debate still belong to a living tradition of Chinese philosophy. From Yijing, Lunyu, Laozi and Zhuangzi to Wang Bi, "yi" which cannot be expressed fully by yan, is not only "idea" or "meaning" in the human mind, but is also some kind of ontological existence, which is beyond yan and emblematic symbols, and unspeakable. Thus, the debate on the yan-yi relation refers firstly to metaphysics, secondly to moral philosophy, and then to epistemology and philosophy of language. Guided by this view, this paper recalls the source of the debate on the yan-yi relation to Yijing and Lunyu, distinguishes four meanings of "yi" in Chinese philosophy, and reconstructs three arguments. These arguments are the "yan cannot express yi fully" argument, "forget yan once you get yi" argument, and "yan can express yi fully" argument. Finally, this paper exposes and comments on those principles, methods and the general tendency shown in the debate from the following five aspects: starting point, value-preference, methodology, texts, and influences.

There are two problematic assumptions in Kripke’s semantic argument against descriptiv­ism. Assumption 1 is that the referential relation between a name and its bearer is only a metaphysical relation between language and the world; it has nothing to do with our public linguistic practice. Assumption 2 is that if name N has its meaning and the meaning is given by one description or a cluster of descriptions, the description(s) should supply the necessary and sufficient condition for determining what N designates; it is possible for us to find out such a condition for fixing the referent of N. Emphasizing the sociality, conventionality and historicity of language and meaning, this paper criticizes Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, and concludes that Kripke’s semantic argument fails.