Bogdana Stamenković Jajčević

The growing interest in astrobiology renewed the enthusiasm of contemporary scholars to explore the Earth Systems Science theories of the twentieth century and scholars who influenced the later development of astrobiology. Vladimir I. Vernadsky seems to be recognized as one such scholar. In this paper, I provide an analysis of one such theory, Vladimir I. Vernadsky’s theory of the biosphere, and explore his conception of evolution in nature. I begin my research with the presentation of Vernadsky’s conceptual framework by explaining the meaning of the term “biosphere” and identifying the fundamental assumptions of his holistic theory. Next, I turn to the analysis of the concepts of living and inert matter, questioning their distinction and mutual relations. Whilst the differences between living and inert matter should enable us to demarcate these two domains of the biosphere and distinguish them at the ontological and conceptual levels, it seems that such an objective remains unattainable for Vernadsky. I find the reason for this conclusion in Vernadsky’s endorsement of a specific relation of reciprocal causality between living and inert matter. As I show, the relation of reciprocal causality emphasises the causal activity of the living matter and unifies it with the inert matter of the biosphere, leading to the unique conception of the common evolution of the living and inert matter, i.e., the evolution of the biosphere. However, Vernadsky’s synthesis of living and inert matter causes certain difficulties in the theory, reflected in our inability to clearly differentiate between living and inert matter at the ontological and conceptual levels.

The growing interest in astrobiology renewed the enthusiasm of contemporary scholars to explore the Earth Systems Science theories of the twentieth century and scholars who influenced the later development of astrobiology. Vladimir I. Vernadsky seems to be recognized as one such scholar. In this paper, I provide an analysis of one such theory, Vladimir I. Vernadsky’s theory of the biosphere, and explore his conception of evolution in nature. I begin my research with the presentation of Vernadsky’s conceptual framework by explaining the meaning of the term “biosphere” and identifying the fundamental assumptions of his holistic theory. Next, I turn to the analysis of the concepts of living and inert matter, questioning their distinction and mutual relations. Whilst the differences between living and inert matter should enable us to demarcate these two domains of the biosphere and distinguish them at the ontological and conceptual levels, it seems that such an objective remains unattainable for Vernadsky. I find the reason for this conclusion in Vernadsky’s endorsement of a specific relation of reciprocal causality between living and inert matter. As I show, the relation of reciprocal causality emphasises the causal activity of the living matter and unifies it with the inert matter of the biosphere, leading to the unique conception of the common evolution of the living and inert matter, i.e., the evolution of the biosphere. However, Vernadsky’s synthesis of living and inert matter causes certain difficulties in the theory, reflected in our inability to clearly differentiate between living and inert matter at the ontological and conceptual levels.

This paper aims to determine whether Darwin’s theory of evolution was influenced by German Naturphilosophie. I start with a brief presentation of Naturphilosophie, a scientific and aesthetic approach that emphasizes the holistic understanding of the natural system and the interrelation of its parts. As I show, Naturphilosophen acknowledges the existence of a specific relation of reciprocal causality between various parts of nature, and recognize the valuable causal agency of life in the natural system. Moving forward, I analyze Darwin’s theory of evolution and identify the fundamental hypotheses of his conceptual framework. Since Naturphilosophen endorse a holistic conception of nature, and highlight the presence of reciprocal causality between its parts, I examine whether Darwin adopts any of these assumptions about the natural system. I turn to his understanding of the struggle for survival – a phenomenon that captures various relations between organisms and their environment. My analysis shows that Darwin recognizes the causal activity of the natural environment, but neglects the ability of organisms to modify their habitat for the sake of survival. Thus, he establishes the causal asymmetry between these two fundamental parts of his worldview. If that is the case, then Darwin’s theory does not represent a (fully) holistic worldview of nature, and the influence of Naturphilosophen on the formulation of his evolutionary theory is only partial.

This chapter explores Darwin’s conception of transitional forms and challenges his view on the problem of intermediate species. Starting with a brief historical introduction to the epistemological status of fossils before Darwin’s time, I proceed to the analysis of Darwin’s theory of evolution and identify three fundamental hypotheses that substantially influence his investigation of the fossil record. Although Darwin’s theory implies the necessary existence of transitional forms, he believes that the paleontological record remains incomplete due to lacking discovery of intermediate forms. I find several reasons for such a radical conclusion. I deconstruct his specific yet ambiguous conception of intermediate forms and show that, in addition to the fundamental assumptions of his theory, this conception is at the root of the emergence of the intermediate species problem. Further, I explicate how this problem arises at two distinct but connected levels of Darwin’s theory. Whilst at the first level it appears in the form of a vague interpretation of the intermediate form concept, at the second level this problem takes a form of a stringent requirement for classification of an organism as an intermediate form: the discovery of a complete chain of transitional forms that connects such an organism to at least one known species. Archaeopteryx lithographica could not satisfy such a requirement; actually, no organic form can. The problem of the intermediate species thus remains one of ‘the gravest difficulties’ for Darwin’s theory of evolution.

This paper aims to examine Kant's views on evolution of organized beings and to show that Kant's antievolutionary conclusions stem from his study of natural history and variability of organisms. Accordingly, I discuss Kant's study of natural history and consider whether his conclusion about impossibility of knowledge about such history expands on the research of history of organized beings. Moving forward, I examine the notion of variability in Kant's philosophy, and show that his theory of organized beings relies on the preformationist conception of variability that provides limited insight into the history of organisms. I explain that Kant's endorsement of preformationism is conditioned by a lack of knowledge about the mechanism that successfully explains adaptation and transmutation of organisms leading towards the creation of new species. Finally, I sumarize the following reasons for Kant's rejection of the hypothesis of evolution: lack of cognitive ability to discover all changes of natural phenomena in different periods of time and adoption of preformationist conception of variability of organized beings. I finish off with a discussion about mechanical inexplicability of organisms and find a third reason Kant believes that the idea of evolution is only "a daring adventure on the part of reason".

This paper provides epistemological support for one of Hume’s numerous critiques of the teleological arguments for God’s existence. Hume explores the following question: can we explain the observed harmony of the universe without appealing to the work of an intelligent creator? The answer, presented through the character of Philo, appears to be positive. I will try to defend this position. Following Hume’s theory of space, and exploring the relation between ideas of the whole and relation, I will show the universe can be seen as finite space with definite numbers of parts which are spatially and causally interconnected. Because all changes occur on the basis of Hume’s principle of causation, we can say the harmony of the universe is established and maintained precisely because of the changes happening on the basis of causation. If this is the case, the role of the intelligent creator appears to be redundant.

Numerous authors have examined the influence of other thinkers on Darwin’s formulation of some of the key concepts of the theory of evolution. Amongst those, Alexander von Humboldt often stands out – a scholar who, following his intention to explain the interconnection of various parts of the natural system, seems to tackle the question of evolution but does not offer an explicit answer. In this article, I examine Humboldt’s thoughts on evolution and the origin of species and evaluate his contribution to Darwin’s theory of evolution. First, I analyse and explicate the fundamental assumptions and goals of Humboldt theory, and compare them to Darwin. Moving forward, I highlight the similarity of their methods, and argue that Humboldt and Darwin conduct similar investigation of fossil record and geographical distribution of species. Finally, I show that Humboldt acknowledges essential elements of Darwin’s theory of evolution: evidence given by fossil records, struggle for survival and relation between natural environment and living organisms. Humboldt, however, concludes we cannot know the evolution of species. I explain this stance, and contend that theories of Humboldt and Darwin turn out to be more similar than they seem, yet their different conclusions regarding the evolution of species stem from different initial assumptions underlying their respective frameworks.

The aim of this paper is to analyse Alexander von Humboldt's views on the theory of evolution and tackle the following question: Can Humboldt be considered an evolutionist? I seek to show that Humboldt acknowledges three essential Darwinian elements of the theory of evolution: fossil records, the geographical distribution of species and the struggle for survival. Further, Humboldt recognises a special relation between the natural environment and organic life, and understands it in light of his naturalistic holism. This holism reveals the unity of organic and inorganic nature and highlights the agency of organic life whilst allowing it to create and preserve the adaptive conditions in the natural environment. Accordingly, I argue that Humboldt believes some kind of evolutionary process happens in nature. However, due to the immense influence of Kant’s transcendental study and the rigid utilisation of the empirical method, Humboldt concludes that we cannot acquire knowledge of the exact course of the evolutionary process. This, however, does not imply Humboldt discredits the theory of evolution.

This paper aims to show that Sosa’s theory of knowledge based on safety condition can provide a convincing response to the problem of philosophical skepticism. With regard to that, it is divided in three sections. The first section is dedicated to presenting the form of skeptical argument and few options we encounter when skeptic rises the challenge in the form of the so-called radical alternatives. The second section consists of the presentation of Sosa’s theory and safety condition, as well as its differences and similarities with Nozick’s sensitivity condition and Dretske’s condition of conclusive reason. Finally, the third section evaluates Sosa’s theory in the light of Comesana’s counterexample. After the careful analysis of the hypothetical situation, it is shown that Comesana overlooks one important moment when he fixes the initial set of circumstances, which allows a successful defense of Sosa’s analysis of knowledge and safety condition.