Bojana Radovanovic

Each of us makes a number of decisions, from the less important to those with far-reaching consequences. As members of different groups, we are also actors of group decision making. In order to make a rational decision, a choice-making procedure must satisfy a number of assumptions of rationality. In addition, when it comes to group decisions, those procedures should also be?fair.? However, it is not possible to define a procedure of choice-making that would transform individual orders of alternatives based on preferences of perfectly rational individuals into a single social order and still meet conditions of rationality and ethics. The theory of deliberative democracy appeared in response to the impossibility of Social Choice theory. The basic assumption of deliberative democracy is that individuals adjust their preferences taking into account interests of the community. They are open for discussion with other group members and are willing to change their attitudes in order to achieve common interests. Ideally, group members come to an agreement during public discussion. Still, this concept cannot completely over?come all the difficulties posed by the theory of social choice. Specifically, there is no solution for strategic and manipulative behavior of individuals. Also, the concept of deliberative democracy faces certain problems particular to this approach, such as, to name but a few, problems with the establishment of equality of participants in the debate and their motivation, as well as problems with the organization of public hearings.

Humani razvoj je?proces povecavanja stvarnih sloboda koje ljudi uzivaju?. Shodno tome, povecanje mogucnosti izbora bi trebalo da bude cilj javnih politika koje u fokus stavljaju humani razvoj. Prilikom procene nivoa humanog razvoja, njegovog poredjenja sa dostignucima drugih zemalja, kao i analize razlicitih predloga prakticnih politika, donosioci odluka se moraju oslanjati na precizne pokazatelje nivoa humanog razvoja. Posto bruto domaci proizvod ne moze posluziti ovoj svrsi, javila se potreba za adekvatnijom merom i formiran je indeks humanog razvoja. Cilj ovog rada je da utvrdi da li indeks humanog razvoja odrazava osnovna nacela koncepta humanog razvoja. Argumenti predstavljeni u okviru ovog rada upucuju na zakljucak da HDI ne odrazava u potpunosti sve ideje humanog razvoja. Buduci da je koncept humanog razvoja mnogo siri nego sto to bilo koji pojedinacni indikator moze da predstavi, nivo humanog razvoja bi trebalo ocenjivati pomocu nekoliko razlicitih indikatora. PR Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 47009: European integrations and social and economic changes in Serbian economy on the way to the EU i br. 179015: Challenges and prospects of structural changes in Serbia: Strategic directions for economic development and harmonization with EU requirements

This paper discusses the relations between three forms of altruism: behavioural, evolutionary and motivational. Altruism in a behavioural sense is an act that benefits another person. It can range from volunteering to a charity and helping a neighbour, to giving money to a non-profit organisation or donating blood. People often dedicate their material and nonmaterial resources for the benefit of others to gain psychological, social and material benefits for themselves. Thus, their altruistic acts are driven by egoistic motivation. Also, the final goal of an altruistic act may be the increase in the welfare of a group or adherence to a certain moral principle or a social norm. However, at least sometimes, the welfare of others is the ultimate goal of our actions, when our altruistic acts are performed from altruistic motivation. In evolutionary sense, altruism means the sacrifice of reproductive success for the benefit of other organisms. According to evolutionary theories, behaviour which promotes the reproductive success of the receiver at the cost of the actor is favoured by natural selection, because it is either beneficial for the altruist in the long run, or for his genes, or for the group he belongs to. However, altruism among people emerges as a distinctly human combination of innate and learned behaviours. Not only do we benefit the members of our own group, but we are capable of transcending our tribalistic instincts and putting the benefit of strangers at our own personal expense as our ultimate goal.

This paper focuses on Sen?s concept of contrapreferential choice. Sen has developed this concept in order to overcome weaknesses of the rational choice theory. According to rational choice theory a decision-maker can be always seen as someone who maximises utility, and each choice he makes as the one that brings to him the highest level of personal wellbeing. Sen argues that in some situations we chose alternatives that bring us lower level of wellbeing than we could achieve if we had chosen some other alternative available to us. This happens when we base our decisions on moral principles, when we act out of duty. Sen calls such action a commitment-based action. When we act out of commitment we actually neglect our preferences and thus we make a contrapreferential choice, as Sen argues. This paper shows that, contrary to Sen, a commitment-based action can be explained within the framework of rational choice theory. However, when each choice we make can be explained within the framework of rational choice theory, when in everything we do maximisation principle can be loaded, then the variety of our motives and traits is lost, and the explanatory power of the rational choice theory is questionable.

This paper focuses on Kant?s moral theory and how it can guide our actions in philanthropy. Philanthropy is usually defined as a voluntary action aimed at relieving suffering and improving the quality of lives of others. It has been argued that, within the framework of Kant?s theory, it is our duty to be beneficent, sacrificing a part of our welfare for others. The duty of beneficence is a wide one. Interpreters of Kant disagree on what the wide duty of beneficence requires. While a few argue that it only requires that we provide help sometimes, others hold that the duty of beneficence should be seen as more demanding, particularly in cases of emergency when help is urgently required. We are morally obliged to promote the happiness of others, but the duty of beneficence does not tell us whose happiness and how much of our resources to give. Other than emergency cases, in fulfilling the duty of beneficence, we can prioritize the ends of those near and dear to us who concern us more. Moreover, on condition that we are not indifferent to others, it is morally permissible to prioritize our ends. Finally, the paper argues that it is not always straightforward what kind of action is required in helping someone in need, and that beneficence in Kantian terms is not limited to the philanthropic sector.