Bonginkosi Shozi

In 2021, the WHO Expert Advisory Committee on Developing Global Standards for Governance and Oversight of Human Genome Editing (the ‘Committee’) published its policy recommendations. It proposes, inter alia, a set of nine values and principles to inform the governance of human genome editing (HGE) and makes recommendations regarding how HGE can be regulated. While these proposals contain valuable contributions to the discourse on the global governance of HGE, they also contain elements that call for heightened attention to the risks of the technology, and a countervailing focus on the potential benefits of the technology is missing. The Committee ostensibly prioritises restricting HGE technology in the interest of society as a collective but, in doing so, neglects to consider the interests and rights of individuals. In this article, we suggest that this approach is imbalanced insofar as it fails to give sufficient weight to the promise of this technology in considering the regulation of risks and disregards the importance of the fundamental liberties underlying the use of HGE in its discussion of values and principles that should guide governance. How this is problematic is illustrated with reference to the Committee's openness to using patents as HGE governance tools and its blanket rejection of ‘eugenics’. It is concluded that while the Committee makes some sensible recommendations on global governance, the Committee's approach of emphasising restrictions on HGE without also giving weight to the value of an open and liberal policy space is not something that liberal democratic states ought to follow.

In a recent public engagement study on heritable human genome editing (HHGE) conducted among South Africans, participants approved of using HHGE for serious health conditions—viewing it as a means of bringing about valuable social goods—and proposed that the government should actively invest resources to ensure everyone has equal access to the technology for these purposes. This position was animated by the view that future generations have a claim to these social goods, and this entitlement justified making HHGE available in the present. This claim can be ethically justified in the Ubuntu ethic (deriving from South Africa) as it (a) emphasizes the interests of the community, and (b) espouses a metaphysical conception of the community that transcends the present generation and includes past and future generations. On this basis, a compelling claim can be made on behalf of prospective persons in favor of equal access to HHGE.

Over the past few years, developments in the science of precise editing of human genomes using CRISPR-Cas9 have led many countries that lack specific laws in this area, such as South Africa, to contemplate legal reform. Thaldar et al. recently published five principles to guide legal reform in SA on heritable genome editing. In a similar vein, concerns about the global impact of human germline genome editing have led to calls for a global regulatory mechanism. This is what the World Health Organization has tried to achieve with the recently published ‘Draft governance framework for human genome editing’. In this article, we compare the policies proposed by the draft framework to the current SA legal position, as well as the five guiding principles. The article concludes that SA law is in need of reform in order to meet the global standards that the draft framework seems to be moving towards.

WHO in 2019 established the Advisory Committee on Developing Global Standards for Governance and Oversight of Human Genome Editing, which has recently published a Draft Governance Framework on Human Genome Editing. Although the Draft Framework is a good point of departure, there are four areas of concern: first, it does not sufficiently address issues related to establishing safety and efficacy. Second, issues that are a source of tension between global standard setting and state sovereignty need to be addressed in a more nuanced fashion. Third, it fails to meaningfully engage with the extent to which the conceptualisation of human dignity may justifiably vary between jurisdictions. Fourth, the meaning of harm to the interests of a future person requires clarity. Provided these four areas of concern can be addressed, the future of the global governance of human genome editing may hold promise.

In the wake of the advent of genome editing technology CRISPR-Cas9 (clustered regularly interspaced palindromic repeat (CRISPR)-associated protein 9), there has been a global debate around the implications of manipulating the human genome. While CRISPR-based germline gene editing is new, the debate about the ethics of gene editing is not – for several decades now, scholars have debated the ethics of making heritable changes to the human genome. The arguments that have been raised both for and against the use of genetic technologies in human reproduction reiterate much of the arguments made in the pre-CRISPR debate. As such, it is instructive for South Africa to reflect on these arguments now, in considering our position on the regulation of the use of this novel biotechnology. There are two dominant schools of thought in this area, bioliberalism and bioconservatism. Bioconservatives raise concerns about the risks of genetic manipulation, and argue that it ought to be limited or prohibited to avert these risks to human health and human nature. Bioliberal scholars are more open to the prospect of genetic manipulation, because of its potential utility. In this article, I conclude that in liberal democracies such as our own, bioliberal arguments ought to be seriously considered when formulating policy on human genome editing because of the extent to which they resonate with our Constitutional values and human rights. I further suggest that there is a need for an enquiry into the relevance of African perspectives on the ethical questions that arise concerning germline genome editing.