Bouke van Balen

In response to the increasing interest in (designing for) human vulnerability within the field of responsible computing, we articulate the multi-dimensionality of the concept of vulnerability to deepen and enrich the conversations about the relationship between vulnerabilities and the design of assistive technologies. Drawing on different philosophical traditions and insights from critical disability studies, we introduce three perspectives on vulnerability–the individualist, relationalist, and enactivist perspectives–that each emphasize a different aspect of what it means to be vulnerable. We argue that, for engineers in the field of responsible computing, it is key to be able to adopt all three perspectives and explicitly and critically reflect upon what each perspective or combination of perspectives brings to the design context at hand. When used in conjunction, the three perspectives together can mitigate the risk of creating technological interventions that may aim to ameliorate vulnerabilities but instead exacerbate or create new ones. To move forward, we call for further reflections and practical considerations on how to best integrate the three perspectives on vulnerability into participatory design practices; how to distribute responsibilities within design teams to ensure that all perspectives are genuinely adopted and engaged with; and how to foster creative, out-of- the- box thinking for assistive technology design.

Recent developments in the domain of bi-directional Brain–Computer Interface (BCI) technology are directed at generating naturalistic sensory perceptual experiences for disabled people. I argue that conceptualizing and operationalizing “naturalness” in this context has profound impact on disabled people and their experiences. I ask (1) what does it mean to have a “natural” perceptual experience and (2) should the bi-directional BCI-community strive for naturalness in this context? Inspired by phenomenological and 4E-cognition approaches to perception, I argue that the terms “natural” and “naturalness” should not be used in this context because of (1) polysemicity and (2) an implicit bias favoring able-bodied perception over disabled perception. I offer the phenomenological concept of transparency as a positive alternative to denote the underlying goal of embodiment and effortless use. I cash out methodological ramifications of my argument for research in bi-directional BCIs and plea for a transdisciplinary dialogue between end-users, phenomenologists and neuroscientists.

Recent developments in the domain of communication Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) technology have raised questions about the ability for communication BCIs to read minds. How those questions are answered depends on how we theorize the mind and mindreading in the first place. Thus, in this paper, I ask (1) what does it mean to read minds? (2) can a communication BCI do this? (3) what does this mean for potential users of this technology? and (4) what is at stake morally in light of this? I show that current answers to these questions are conceptually unclear and committed to a Cartesian picture of the mind and its relation to the brain, questionably informing how debates about BCIs as mindreading devices are framed. I offer an alternative perspective on these questions by turning to an enactive perspective on mindedness. I argue that this perspective can offer conceptual as well as ethical clarification about what is at stake in the domain of communication BCIs. From this perspective, the concerns raised about BCIs as mindreading machines are demystified. Instead, concerns are raised about BCIs as enabling users to flourish as authentic communicators.