Brad Hooker

A paper by Roger Crisp published a few years ago contained arguments that seemed to imply that having deep personal relationships does not constitute an element of well-being. The lesson to draw from that paper of Crisp’s, according to a recent paper of mine, is that one’s having a deep personal relationship does constitute an element of one’s well-being on condition that one’s affection for the other person is merited. Crisp’s paper earlier in this issue of Ratio responds to my arguments. Here I reply to new questions that Crisp poses or provokes.

In his important recent book, *Ethics and the Global Financial Crisis: Why Incompetence is Worse than Greed* (2015), Boudewijn de Bruin argues that a key element of the global financial crisis of 2007-8 was a failure of epistemic (i.e. knowledge-based) virtue. To improve matters, then, de Bruin argues we need to focus on the acquisition and exercise of epistemic virtues, rather than to focus on a more ethical culture for banking per se. While this is an interesting suggestion and it is indeed very plausible that an increased focus on proper knowledge-related behaviour will be part of a solution, we are sceptical both about de Bruin’s overarching theoretical claims and about his practical suggestions for change. Instead we argue that change in this sector is best promoted by reconceiving of the relationship between financial institutions and the societies they serve, and that this is fundamentally not an epistemic but a moral issue.

Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer’s wonderful book, The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics, contains a wealth of intriguing arguments and compelling ideas. The present paper focuses on areas of continuing dispute. The paper first attacks LazariRadek’s and Singer’s evolutionary debunking arguments against both egoism and parts of common-sense morality. The paper then addresses their discussion of the role of rules in utilitarianism. De Lazari-Radek and Singer concede that rules should constitute our moral decision procedure and our public morality. This paper argues that, if no one should be blamed for complying with the optimal decision procedure and optimal public rules, there are strong reasons to accept that these same rules determine what is morally permissible from what is morally wrong.

Deep personal relationships involve deep mutual understanding and strong mutual affection. This paper focuses on whether having deep personal relationships is one of the elements of well-being. Roger Crisp put forward thought experiments which might be taken to suggest that having deep personal relationships has only instrumental value as a means to other elements of well-being. The different conclusion this paper draws is that having deep personal relationships is an element of well-being if, but only if, the other people involved have qualities that merit affection for these people.

Derek Parfit’s _On What Matters_ endorses Kantian contractualism, the normative theory that everyone ought to follow the rules that everyone could rationally will that everyone accept. This chapter explores Parfit’s argument that Kantian contractualism converges with rule-consequentialism. A pivotal concept in Parfit’s argument is the concept of impartiality, which he seems to equate with agent-neutrality. This chapter argues that equating impartiality and agent-neutrality is insufficient, since some agent-neutral considerations are silly and some are not impartial. Perhaps more importantly, there is little realistic prospect of Kantian contractualism converging with rule-consequentialism unless the same impartial reasons drive rule selection in the two theories.

This paper starts by explaining what rule-consequentialism holds. Then the paper identifies how rule-consequentialism differs from other consequentialist theories. Further clarification of rule-consequentialism is achieved by considering objections to this theory, such as objections concerning collapse, rule-worship, incoherence, and utopianism (excessive idealization). The final section considers arguments for rule-consequentialism, including arguments drawing on the divine command theory, consequentialism, contractualism, the search for reflective equilibrium, and the idea that morality is a social practice with a consequentialist purpose.

Mental states (beliefs, emotions, moods, desires, etc.) towards things can fit or fail to fit those things. Perhaps actions can fit or fail to fit the situations in which they are done. This paper explores whether having fitting mental states and doing fitting actions can constitute additions to a person’s well-being. The paper first discusses the desire-fulfilment theory of well-being. Then the paper considers hedonistic theories of well-being and criticises the recent proposal from Rossi and Tappolet that well-being consists only in fitting happiness. Then the paper turns to the objective list theory of well-being and Badhwar’s Aristotelian theory. In this context, the paper considers Bruno-Niño’s recent argument for fitting attitudes as a part of well-being. Finally, the paper explores whether, on the objective list theory and Badhwar’s theory, doing fitting actions constitutes an element of well-being. The upshots are that fittingness is not an element of well-being according to some theories of well-being and that it is an element of well-being either contingently or necessarily according to other theories of well-being.

Most of us believe morality requires us to help the desperately needy. But most of us also believe morality doesn't require us to make enormous sacrifices in order to help people who have no special connection with us. Such self‐sacrifice is of course praiseworthy, but it isn't morally mandatory. Rule‐consequentialism might seem to offer a plausible grounding for such beliefs. Tim Mulgan has recently argued in Analysis and Pacific Philosophical Quarterly that rule‐consequentialism cannot do so. This paper replies to Mulgan's arguments.

What are appropriate criteria for assessing a theory of morality? In Ideal Code, Real World, Brad Hooker begins by answering this question, and then argues for a rule-consequentialist theory. According to rule-consequentialism, acts should be assessed morally in terms of impartially justified rules, and rules are impartially justified if and only if the expected overall value of their general internalization is at least as great as for any alternative rules. In the course of developing his rule-consequentialism, Hooker discusses impartiality, well-being, fairness, equality, the question of how the 'general internalization' of rules is to be interpreted by rule-consequentialism, and the main objections to rule-consequentialism. He also discusses the social contract theory of morality, act-consequentialism, and the question of which moral prohibitions and which duties to help others rule-consequentialism endorses. The last part of the book considers the implications of rule-consequentialism for some current controversies in practical ethics.