Bradley C. Dart

This paper investigates the epistemic and moral untrustworthiness of artificial intelligence (AI) as a mediator of Islamic knowledge in an online environment characterized by misinformation, polarization, and systemic bias. The structure of digital media – shaped by cognitive biases, network centralization, and profit-driven algorithmic design – amplifies distortions of truth through mechanisms of engagement, surveillance, and media logic. These processes generate an attention economy that rewards divisive or sensational content, fostering echo chambers and reinforcing societal prejudices. When this system is coupled with machine learning models trained on biased data, it produces AI outputs that replicate Islamophobic associations and propagate misinformation about Muslims. The paper distinguishes between epistemic trust, appropriate for limited cognitive functions of AI, and moral or religious trust, which requires virtue, intention, and accountability – qualities AI inherently lacks. Using the Islamic tradition’s emphasis on personal transmission of knowledge, moral character, and verified scholarly authority, the study contrasts interpersonal chains of trust with algorithmic systems governed by opaque data and economic incentives. Consequently, while AI may serve as an epistemic tool for accessing vetted information, it is unfit to function as a moral or religious authority. The paper concludes by advocating for enhanced digital literacy, algorithmic transparency, community-based factchecking, and the development of an Islamically grounded ethics of technology. Such measures aim to mitigate epistemic harm, resist algorithmic authority in religious matters, and reaffirm the centrality of human scholarship and divine revelation in the transmission of Islamic knowledge.

The enthusiasm of the elderly for intellectual challenges, discussion, and collaborative learning in philosophy classes is noticeable. Philosophy has distinctive value in senior adult education because older learners are motivated less by credentials or careerism than by worldview examination, existential insight, and practical wisdom. This explains why seniors often respond with unusual seriousness and vigor when philosophy is taught through dialogue and practical inquiry rather than as a purely technical academic subject. Drawing on teaching experience in lifelong learning courses and on gerontological models of aging, this article shows how philosophy addresses concerns that are particular to the later stages of life. This justification for philosophy classes extends to all who intend on living a reflective and meaningful life into old age, although there is a need for age-dependent pedagogical considerations.

Peirce and Dewey were generally more concerned with the process of scientific activity than purely mathematical work. However, their accounts of knowledge production afford some insights into the epistemology of mathematical postulates, especially definition and axioms. Their rejection of rationalist metaphysics and their emphasis on continuity in inquiry provides the pretext for the pragmatic a priori – hypothetical and operational assumptions whose justification relies on their fruitfulness in the long run. This paper focuses on the application of this idea to the epistemology of definitions and an account of progress in mathematics, although it has broader implications for the study of conceptual change and the function and basis of presuppositions in the sciences.