Bradley Hillier-Smith

Rindermann et al.’s article concludes that certain refugees may have a lower IQ and as a result may not provide as significant an economic contribution to host states compared to the average citizen, and so may be an economic cost. This commentary first casts doubt on this conclusion. It then, and most importantly, demonstrates that even if this conclusion were true, it would be irrelevant insofar as it would have no moral or legal significance in mitigating or defeating obligations towards refugees. The commentary shows that any normative view that IQ and economic contributions can mitigate or defeat obligations to provide protection has unacceptable implications. The commentary then demonstrates that legal and moral obligations to refugees are in no part contingent on IQ and economic contributions and to suppose otherwise would simply represent a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature, grounds, and weight of obligations towards refugees. Hence, supposed IQ or economic contributions are entirely irrelevant to, and cannot undermine the strength of, refugees’ claims to protection nor states’ obligations to provide it.

This book appears at a time of intense debate on how states should respond to refugees: some philosophers argue states are not necessarily obligated to admit a single refugee, others argue states should continually admit refugees until the point of societal collapse. Some politicians argue for increasing refugee resettlement, others seek to prevent refugees from arriving at the border. Some countries provide expansive welcome schemes and have taken in over a million refugees, others have erected concrete walls and barbed wire fences. The Ethics of State Responses to Refugees provides an account of what an ethical response would be by developing an understanding of the moral duties that states have towards refugees. The first half of the book analyses state practices used in response to refugees, to understand the negative duties of states not to harm or violate the rights of innocent refugees. The second half analyses morally significant features of contemporary refugee displacement, to understand the positive duties of states to alleviate the distinctive harms and injustices that refugees face. The two halves together thereby outline the negative and positive duties of states towards refugees which together constitute the elements of an ethical response. The book then demonstrates this ethical response is not only urgently required but is also within reach.

Most theorists working on moral obligations to refugees conceive of western states as innocent bystanders with duties to aid refugees if they can do so at little cost to themselves. This paper challenges this dominant theoretical framing of global displacement by highlighting for the first time certain practices of western states in response to refugee flows such as border violence, detention, encampment and containment which may make us question whether states who engage in such practices are indeed innocent. This paper provides the first normative analysis of these practices by seeking to classify them as either doing or allowing harm and invoking the fundamental moral imperative central to core common moral commitments - not to harm innocent people - to suggest that certain western states are not merely failing to aid refugees and allowing harm to come to them, but are instead responding to their calls for aid by harming them.

Certain states in the Global North have responded to refugees seeking safety on their territories through harmful practices of border violence, detention, encampment and containment that serve to prevent and deter refugee arrivals. These practices are ostensibly justified through an appeal to a right to control borders. This paper therefore assesses whether these harmful practices can indeed be morally justified by a state’s right to control borders. It analyses whether Christopher Heath Wellman’s account of a state’s right to freedom of association, which represents the most restrictive account of a state’s right to control borders available in the literature, can extend to justify current harmful practices against refugees. If not, then no available justification will be able to do so, and thus contemporary harmful practices used against refugees cannot be justified by a state’s right to control borders.