Brandon Smith

Eudaimonism is a richly complex ethical tradition. To distinguish eudaimonism from other ethical approaches and to demonstrate the diversity of eudaimonistic accounts, I outline five key distinctions: (i) form vs. content, (ii) weak vs. strong eudaimonism, (iii) perfectionism vs. non-perfectionism, (iv) intellectualism vs. materialism, and (v) dogmatism vs. non-dogmatism. This analysis escapes the traditional focus on eudaimonism through a predominantly Aristotelian lens. It also offers a rich conceptual framework for understanding the historical development of eudaimonism and the dialogue between ancient, early modern, and modern eudaimonists.

This paper offers a comprehensive outline of Spinoza’s account of pleasure or joy (laetitia). On the one hand, Spinoza defines pleasure as an increase in perfection qua self-affirmative power (E3defaff2). On the other hand, Spinoza describes blessedness (beatitudo), the highest happiness (summa felicitas), as both a form of pleasure (E5p36s/G II 303) and perfection qua self-affirmative power itself (E5p33s/G II 301). It is however unclear how a pleasure can be both an increase in perfection and perfection per se. This deviation from his original definition of pleasure has led many scholars to conclude that Spinoza is committed to a dual account of pleasure, with some pleasures being transitional and others non-transitional in nature. But on what philosophical grounds can Spinoza expand his account of pleasure to include non-transitional pleasure qua perfection per se? What underlying essence do increases in perfection and perfection per se share that classifies them both as pleasures? Ultimately, I will argue that an increase in perfection and blessedness as a state of perfection in itself can both be considered pleasures (albeit of different kinds) insofar as Spinoza understands pleasure fundamentally as an attribute-neutral affection (affectio) which expresses the promotion of self-affirmative power. This dual account of pleasure is grounded in an important distinction between the force of existing (existendi vim) and non-transitional pleasure possessed by both God qua substance and individuals qua finite modes of substance and the striving (conatus) and affects (affectus) that are possessed by only individuals as beings with limitations and fluctuating power.

This paper explores three questions concerning Democritus’ moral philosophy. First, do Democritus’ moral claims constitute a genuine ethical theory (the Theory Question)? Second, if so, is Democritus’ ethical framework part of the eudaimonistic tradition of his contemporaries and successors, namely Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics (the Eudaimonism Question)? Third, if Democritus is an eudaimonist, is there a necessary relationship between his ethics and the other areas of his philosophy (the Strength Question)? I argue that Democritus is an eudaimonist, but only in the weak sense.

The Search for Mind-Body Flourishing in Spinoza’s Eudaimonism explores the ethical tradition of eudaimonism, which considers happiness or flourishing (a) partly objective or naturalistic, (b) partly subjective or affective, (c) structurally stable, and (d) the highest good. It examines the insights of Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, and Spinoza concerning the respective roles of pleasure, virtue, and mind and body in living an eudaimonistically happy life. Spinoza offers an especially rich account of happiness, in opposition to the intellectualism of his fellow eudaimonists, through his argument for non-reductive mind-body identity, which entails that flourishing is equally intellectual and physical in nature.

In this paper I aim to undermine Stoic and Neo-Stoic readings of Benedict de Spinoza by examining the latter’s strong agreements with Epicurus (a notable opponent of the Stoics) on the nature and ethical role of pleasure in living a happy life. Ultimately, I show that Spinoza and Epicurus are committed to three central claims which the Stoics reject: (1) pleasure holds a necessary connection to healthy natural being, (2) pleasure manifests healthy being through positive changes in state and states of healthy being per se, and (3) pleasure is by nature good. The Stoics reject these three claims due to their views on pleasant sensations as preferred moral indifferents and passionate pleasures as diseases of the soul, views which Spinoza (due to the abovementioned commitments) is strongly opposed to, thereby placing him (at least on the subject of pleasure) outside the realm of merely following or improving on Stoic doctrines. From this comparative analysis we also gain deeper insight into both Spinoza’s engagement with ancient Greek philosophy and the value of Epicureanism and Spinozism in helping us achieve and maintain happiness in the present day, particularly with respect to the benefits and harms of bodily and mental pleasures.

This article explores Spinoza's distinctive contribution to the eudaimonistic tradition, which considers happiness (eudaimonia) to be the highest good. Most (if not all) ancient eudaimonists endorse some sort of hierarchy between mind and body, where one is always dependent on, or subordinate to, the other. In particular, many of them endorse ethical intellectualism, where mental things are considered more valuable than bodily ones. I argue that Spinoza, in contrast, considers mind and body ontologically and ethically identical and equal, thereby bringing something new to this ethical tradition.

In this paper I defend an eudaimonistic reading of Spinoza’s ethical philosophy. Eudaimonism refers to the mainstream ethical tradition of the ancient Greeks, which considers happiness a naturalistic, stable, and exclusively intrinsic good. Within this tradition, we can also draw a distinction between weak eudaimonists and strong eudaimonists. Weak eudaimonists do not ground their ethical conceptions of happiness in complete theories of metaphysics, epistemology, or psychology. Strong eudaimonists, conversely, build their conceptions of happiness around an overall philosophical system that extends far beyond ethics, while nevertheless being directed at the promotion of a happy life. I will show that Spinozistic happiness is not only naturalistic, stable, and exclusively intrinsically good, but that Spinoza is also a strong eudaimonist because his ethical account of happiness is incomprehensible without appeal to metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological doctrines. As well, I will explain how the apparent subjective and relativistic features of Spinoza’s ethics do not undermine the eudaimonistic reading, because both Spinoza and the ancient eudaimonists grant that the beliefs/feelings of the subject play a necessary (but insufficient) role in happiness as the highest good.

In this essay, I evaluate four central metaethical readings of Spinoza’s moral philosophy in the literature: unqualified anti-realism, qualified anti-realism, qualified realism, and unqualified realism. More specifically, I discuss the metaethical readings of Charles Jarrett (unqualified anti-realism), Matthew Kisner (qualified anti-realism), Jon Miller (qualified realism), and Andrew Youpa (unqualified realism), each of which captures core aspects of this debate. My conclusions are that (1) Spinoza is neither an unqualified anti-realist nor an unqualified realist and (2) Spinoza’s ethical framework represents a qualified synthesis of realist (naturalistic) and anti-realist (affective) features.