Brendan Hogan

The topic of naturalism has been at the heart of philosophical pragmatism since the beginning of the 20th century. The interest in philosophical naturalism in recent decades has led to reformulations of earlier pragmatic insights from this origin, such as Hilary Putnam's position of 'liberal naturalism' . Richard J. Bernstein's final work, 'The Vicissitudes of Nature : from Spinoza to Freud' provides a historical survey of naturalism in major philosophical figures including the topic of this paper, Karl Marx. The relationship between pragmatism and Marxism is fraught, marked with misunderstandings on both sides. In this article, I argue that Bernstein's engagement with Marx over his career clarifies the close relationship of pragmatism and Marx's naturalism especially at the level of philosophical anthropology. In important ways, Bernstein demonstrates the common social and political emphases of both Dewey and Marx with respect to humans-in-nature. His articulation of Marx's naturalism as involving a "dialectical historical transaction" between humans and non-human nature is in important ways the fruition of a dialogue between Marx and Dewey begun five decades ago in his Praxis & Action.

ABSTRACT The fact of pluralism has set a number of practical and theoretical problems for political theorists. One of the most serious difficulties is the question of the criteria for judgment. What critical standards are available when encountering a society's practices that are different from one's own? One strategy for dealing with this is to separate out questions of ethics from questions of morality. We argue that this is a particularly unfruitful conceptual strategy. Rather our position is that the concept of real interests is already operant within the practices of judgment that constitute a community, or a form of life. Our strategy is to first explore the possibility of immanent normative critique of interests expressed in forms of life using Wittgenstein and Dewey in light of Rahel Jaeggi's Critique of Forms of Life (2018). Properly understanding how these standards of immanent critique work dissolves the problem of how to apply these to external contexts. While Jaeggi's is an excellent contribution to the discourse on critique and justification, we find that there are commitments in her idea of “immanent critique” that require reformulation with respect to the question of real interests.

Roberto Frega’s Pragmatism and the Wide View of Democracy reformulates the question of democracy posed by our current historic conjuncture using the resources of a variety of pragmatic thinkers. He brings into the contemporary conversation regarding democracy’s fortunes both classical and somewhat neglected figures in the pragmatic tradition to deal with questions of power, ontology, and politics. In particular, Frega takes a social philosophical starting point and draws out the consequences of this fundamental shift in approach to questions of democratic and political theory. This turn to social philosophy as a theoretically more sufficient conceptual vocabulary, extended in detail by Frega, raises questions regarding the work that a social ontology does in clarifying the role of economic and political approaches to democracy that are worth further exploration. Likewise, the practical proposals for moving beyond methodological nationalism with respect to forming publics for the sake of problem-solving, while providing a clarifying and fresh starting point, are still too beholden to models of agency and expressions of coordinated action that themselves are the very fruit of those systems which undermine democratic power in the first instance.

The methodological foundations of any scientific discipline are shaped by the goals towards which that discipline is aiming. While it is almost universally accepted that the goals of explanation and prediction of natural and non-human phenomena have been met with great success since the scientific revolution, it is almost just as universally accepted that the social sciences have not even come close to achieving these goals. This raises the question addressed in this paper, namely, what is economics, and social science more broadly speaking, for? What is their aim, and how is it similar and dissimilar to that of the natural sciences as we have come to classify them? I take up this question from a pragmatic perspective in this paper, setting economics within the wider context of social inquiry. Specifically, I turn to Hilary Putnam and John Dewey as exemplars of the pragmatic critique of any economics that sees its goals in line with those of the natural sciences, that is, as aiming for explanation and prediction according to governing laws of human behaviour. NB: this is a preprint that underwent some minor edits.

John Dewey attempted a pragmatic aufhebung of the disparate methodological aims of social science-explanation, understanding, and critique- in his 1938 Logic: the theory of Inquiry. There, in his penultimate chapter ‘Social Inquiry’, Dewey performed a trademark implementation of his deflation of absolutistic and universalistic pretensions in intellectual and theoretical discourse, in this case with respect to any one approach to social science. This deflation--as elsewhere in his analogous treatments of epistemology, ethics, and the theory of action-- involved the reconstruction of the claims of the naturalist, interpretivist, and critical schools of social science into one overall pattern of social inquiry. This recasts the different and seemingly irreconcilable aims of these schools into a series of steps in a practice. That these claims, then, simultaneously stand independently but in varying degrees of tension with, and support of, each other is a hallmark of pragmatism’s embrace of pluralism in intelligent problem solving. Dewey’s discussion of interpretation needs supplementation from his broader philosophical commitments in order to see the full sense of both the compatibility and the incompatibility of his theory with philosophical hermeneutics.

John Dewey and Ludwig Wittgenstein offer devastating critiques of the dominant model of human action that each inherited in their own time. Dewey, very early in his philosophical career, ostensibly put the stimulus–response mechanical understanding of action to rest with his “reflex-arc” concept article. Wittgenstein famously redescribed action as moves within language games that interconnect to constitute an interpretively open-ended form of life. In each case, these fundamental insights serve as heuristics, guiding our intellectual activity with regard to understanding our practices, and as reminders in approaching problems. Several scholars have interpreted Dewey and Wittgenstein as allies in a grand project of...

A pragmatic social science offers a media res in relation to hermeneutical and critical theoretical models of social scientific inquiry that is more than the sum of these parts, methodologically speaking, because pragmatism wants to draw as well on other methods in social science, such as rational choice and functionalism as moments of a ‘scientific’ account of human action. That is, simply because the fixation of one aspect of human action is the rule in these schools, it does not vitiate their accounts and conclusions entirely. They serve as hypotheses to be tested, and if fruitful revised in their meaning and consequences. By employing pragmatic social scientific inquiry in the spirit of those reforms attempted by interpretive and critical philosophy of social science, we make progress towards loosening the methodological habits of social science.

This reflection on the topic of emancipation stems from an ongoing project in tune with a wider development in pragmatic philosophy. Specifically, the project aims to piece together some of the consequences of pragmatism’s reconstruction of the tradition of philosophical inquiry, from the angle of human imagination. More recently this project has taken a different direction, in light of our critical situation under intensifying anti-democratic forces in the US, but also in many parliamentary democracies. Emancipation from forces that undermine democratic transformation is arguably a goal that anyone gathering under the banner of pragmatism shares. The use of the pronoun ‘our’ in modifying ‘critical situation’ above is intended. It points to the scope of the problem. The problematic situation of ‘intensifying anti-democratic forces’ that sets the agenda for pragmatic inquiry is most aptly termed ‘neoliberal global hegemony’. Neoliberalism is a much-used technical term and its meaning is hotly contested. For the purposes of this paper, then, I would like to lift out several features common to almost all parties in the contest to provide a definition. This description will then be employed for the purposes of determining the character of the contemporary social context in which emancipatory practices take place. Second, by tying this description of the ‘background’ of our practices to the primacy of practical reason thesis, and specifically the role of imagination in practical reason, the pragmatic conception of agency comes into relief. A pragmatic conception of this social context of agency, the contemporary neoliberal imaginary, contributes to articulating prospects for emancipatory practice in a non-abstract sense. An example of experimentalist democratic practices of emancipation responding to crises generated by neoliberal practices is provided by recent efforts in worker co-operatives in Argentina.

John Dewey’s lifelong labor to articulate an alternative account of logic from the ‘abstract thought’ predominant in discussions of logic culminates in his 1938 Logic: the theory of inquiry. In this text Dewey argues that all inquiry involves the instantiation of a general pattern of inquiry. Articulating the role of imagination in the general pattern of inquiry is crucial to illuminating the practical character and theoretical scope of this activity. Specifically, the agency of the inquirer as a future-directed, project-oriented organism highlights the imaginative dimension to problem solving. In addition, Dewey’s theory of concepts as hypotheses whose meaning is practically and experimentally tested and reconstructed is deeply indebted to imagination. This is due to the fact that ideas, concepts, and meanings are not understood from the perspective of speculative or theoretical reason, but rather circumscribed within the practical problem solving context, what Dewey calls ‘the situation’ , in which all activity of human being takes place. The meaning of our concepts and scientific achievements is then constantly available for revision. This revision is a practical affair, giving the pragmatic version of ‘the primacy of practical reason’ an overarching scope to intellectual activity. This paper extends these insights regarding the general pattern of inquiry into Dewey’s comments on social science in the penultimate chapter of the 1938 Logic, ‘Social Inquiry’. The result is that Dewey’s pragmatic reconstruction of imagination is fundamental to inquiry, agency, and understanding human agency. The consequences for a pragmatic philosophy of social science will be sketched briefly in conclusion.

ABSTRACT Pragmatism as a theoretical enterprise has been criticized since its inception for not having a coherent account of the role of power and violence in human affairs as well as a moral justification and criteria for marshaling arguments in favor of democracy. In this essay I approach recent developments in pragmatic democratic theory with those persistent criticisms in mind. Rather than lacking justificatory resources and underthematizing the role of violence and asymmetrical power relations, Robert Talisse's and James Bohman's works, respectively, demonstrate the epistemological depth and power of updating pragmatism as a theory of situated and critical political inquiry. However, each could be extended by utilizing a more robust description of the problematic situation polities currently face. Specifically, I turn to Dewey for guidance in how our pragmatic epistemological and evaluative practices might incorporate the facts of our problematic situation. I do this in terms of the power structures of economic processes both in terms of contract and in terms of the intellectual discourses that attempt to scientifically describe these processes.

ABSTRACT The question concerning the connection of scientific inquiry to democratic praxis is central to both Antonio Gramsci and John Dewey. They share a common philosophical origin in Hegel and are essentially both in the tradition of Left Hegelian thought. Likewise, their respective analyses of the forces obstructing democratic emancipation were sharply focused on the distortions of social life caused by economic agents cooperating under hugely unequal power relations. As Gramsci wrote from his prison cell from 1929 to 1937 in Italy, Dewey went through his most fruitful philosophical period in the United States, including his writings on politics and democracy. They both found targets of critique by diagnosing the pathologies of public life resulting from the power of private capital interests in collusion with a co-opted representative body, the authoritarian crimes and attendant culture of fascism, and the theoretical rigidity of the Soviet Marxists. In addition, true to their Hegelian roots, they marshaled their critiques of the abstractions of liberalism and its attendant moral and economic theory by insisting on the embedded, cultural, and historically deep contexts in which emancipatory practice need take place.

James Bohman’s Democracy across borders: from demos to demoi is a rich and deep text. It is also deceptively short in length in comparison to those authors he engages and compactly reconstructs. Bohman puts forward strong normative arguments for a ‘reconstructed’ ideal of transnational democracy and provides models for realizing these ideals that also aim to meet standards of practicability. Bohman articulates the minimum necessary conditions for any democratic ideal in terms of freedom from domination and freedom to initiate and engage in efficacious democratic deliberation across the borders of currently existing political communities. The argument charts a novel democratic ideal in terms of the global deliberative situation that is fundamentally different from the authors he discusses in light of existing facts about globalization, institutions, and the pluralism of demoi. In these comments I will focus on two main areas.