• PhilPapers
  • PhilPeople
  • PhilArchive
  • PhilEvents
  • PhilJobs
  • Sign in
PhilPeople
 
  • Sign in
  • News Feed
  • Find Philosophers
  • Departments
  • Radar
  • Help
 
profile-cover
Drag to reposition
profile picture

Brendon Hammer

Australian National University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    4
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
  •  News and Updates
    4

 More details
Australian National University
Research School of Chemistry
PhD, 1987
Email (login required)
Areas of Specialization
Theories of Consciousness
Philosophy of Mind
Metaphysics
Other Academic Areas
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Theories of Consciousness
Metaphysics
Time
Ontology
Qualia
Science, Logic, and Mathematics
2 more
  • All publications (4)
  •  1923
    Deconstructing the Physical World
    Some metaphysics are provided showing that what is commonly called ‘the physical world’ can be deconstructed into three ‘levels’: a single, unified ‘noumenal world’ on which everything supervenes; a ‘phenomenal world’ that we each privately experience through direct perception of phenomena; and a ‘collective world’ that people in any given ‘language using group’ experience through learning, using and adapting that group’s language. This deconstruction is shown to enable a clear account of qualia…Read more
    Some metaphysics are provided showing that what is commonly called ‘the physical world’ can be deconstructed into three ‘levels’: a single, unified ‘noumenal world’ on which everything supervenes; a ‘phenomenal world’ that we each privately experience through direct perception of phenomena; and a ‘collective world’ that people in any given ‘language using group’ experience through learning, using and adapting that group’s language. This deconstruction is shown to enable a clear account of qualia and of how people can hold some things to be physically real even when it is clear no one can ever directly experience those things as phenomena. It is further shown to enable a single, internally consistent, largely empirically supported conceptual framework – a ‘metacosmology’ – able to encompass not only the physical world as people conceive of it for everyday purposes, and as scientists conceive of it for scientific purposes, but also people’s first person phenomenal experience of a physical world and, prospectively, the mechanisms by which such first person, conscious experiences can be generated.
    Philosophy of Physical ScienceNature of ScienceQualia and MaterialismPhilosophy of Language, MiscPhi…Read more
    Philosophy of Physical ScienceNature of ScienceQualia and MaterialismPhilosophy of Language, MiscPhilosophy, MiscellaneousMind-Body Problem, GeneralThe Nature of Perceptual Experience, MiscMetaphysics, MiscEpistemology, MiscPhysicalism about the Mind, Misc
  •  666
    Deconstructing the Physical World: The Substructure of Language: Cojoint Complexes, Reflexive Pointing and the Stroop and Reverse Stroop Effects
    This is an End Note to 'Deconstructing the Physical World: The Substructure of Language' (DPWSL) that validates key concepts introduced in DPWSL by demonstrating how they can be used to build a model able to describe, explain and predict the Stroop effect, the reverse Stroop effect and other Stroop-related effects, which are an array of empirically reproducible effects widely studied in cognitive psychology.
    Theories of ReferenceCognitive PsychologyPsychological ExplanationPsychological LawsPsychology
  •  773
    Deconstructing the Physical World: The Substructure of Language
    This is Appendix B to the note, Deconstructing the Physical World (DPW). This appendix extends DPW to provide a set of new conceptual tools able inter alia to deliver a systematic, well-structured and highly novel set of insights into: core aspects of how language learning and use might work; what precisely is going on in inverted qualia thought experiments and in relation to the knowledge argument; and how incorporating differentiated forms of qualia into some fundamental ideas about language l…Read more
    This is Appendix B to the note, Deconstructing the Physical World (DPW). This appendix extends DPW to provide a set of new conceptual tools able inter alia to deliver a systematic, well-structured and highly novel set of insights into: core aspects of how language learning and use might work; what precisely is going on in inverted qualia thought experiments and in relation to the knowledge argument; and how incorporating differentiated forms of qualia into some fundamental ideas about language learning and use can help more clearly define what we mean when we refer to such things as ‘concepts’ and ‘imagination’.
    MetaphysicsPsychologySemanticsLinguisticsOther Areas of LinguisticsCognitive Sciences, MiscThe Conte…Read more
    MetaphysicsPsychologySemanticsLinguisticsOther Areas of LinguisticsCognitive Sciences, MiscThe Contents of Perception, MiscThe Experience of Objects
  •  687
    Deconstructing the Physical World: Relationship to Russellian Monism
    This is Appendix A to the note: Deconstructing the Physical World (DPW). It shows how the conceptual framework developed in DPW relates to Russellian Monism (RM) and that it can accrue RM’s benefits while defeating the combination problem that challenges many RMs.
    Philosophy of Mind, MiscRussellian MonismPhilosophy of Physical Science, MiscellaneousPhysicalism ab…Read more
    Philosophy of Mind, MiscRussellian MonismPhilosophy of Physical Science, MiscellaneousPhysicalism about the Mind, MiscZombies and the Conceivability ArgumentMind-Body Problem, GeneralQualia and Materialism
PhilPeople logo

On this site

  • Find a philosopher
  • Find a department
  • The Radar
  • Index of professional philosophers
  • Index of departments
  • Help
  • Acknowledgments
  • Careers
  • Contact us
  • Terms and conditions

Brought to you by

  • The PhilPapers Foundation
  • The American Philosophical Association
  • Centre for Digital Philosophy, Western University
PhilPeople is currently in Beta Sponsored by the PhilPapers Foundation and the American Philosophical Association
Feedback