•  6
    Attitudes and ascriptions in Stalnaker models
    Linguistics and Philosophy 1-23. forthcoming.
    What role, if any, should centered possible worlds play in characterizing the attitudes? Lewis :513–543, 1979) argued that, in order to account for the phenomena of self-location :474–497, 1977, Noûs 13:3–21, 1979), the contents of the attitudes should be taken to be centered propositions. Stalnaker Assertion: New philosophical essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, Context, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), however, has argued that while centered worlds are needed to characterize …Read more
  • The Act and Object of Judgment (edited book)
    Routledge. forthcoming.
  •  5
    Knowledge, Safety, and Questions
    Filosofia Unisinos 17 (1): 58-62. 2016.
    Safety-based theories of knowledge face a difficulty surrounding necessary truths: no subject could have easily falsely believed such a proposition. Failing to predict that ill-grounded beliefs in such propositions do not constitute knowledge, standard safety theories are therefore less informative than desired. Some have suggested that the subjects at issue could easily have believed some related false proposition; but they have given no indication as to what makes a proposition related. I sugg…Read more
  •  18
    Alethic Pluralism and the Role of Reference in the Metaphysics of Truth
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (1): 116-135. 2017.
    In this paper, I outline and defend a novel approach to alethic pluralism, the thesis that truth has more than one metaphysical nature: where truth is, in part, explained by reference, it is relational in character and can be regarded as consisting in correspondence; but where instead truth does not depend upon reference it is not relational and involves only coherence. In the process, I articulate a clear sense in which truth may or may not depend upon reference: this involves distinguishing se…Read more
  •  13
    The Tarskian Turn. Edited by Leon Horsten
    Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252): 629-632. 2013.
  •  8
    Deriving the Norm of Assertion
    Journal of Philosophical Research 39 75-85. 2014.
    Frank Hindriks has attempted to derive a variant of Timothy Williamson’s knowledge rule for assertion on the basis of a more fundamental belief expression analysis of that speech act. I show that his attempted derivation involves a crucial equivocation between two senses of ‘must,’ and therefore fails. I suggest two possible repairs; but I argue that even if they are successful, we should prefer Williamson’s fully general knowledge rule to Hindriks’s restricted moral norm.
  •  23
    On representational content and format in core numerical cognition
    Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2): 119-139. 2017.
    Carey has argued that there is a system of core numerical cognition – the analog magnitude system – in which cardinal numbers are explicitly represented in iconic format. While the existence of this system is beyond doubt, this paper aims to show that its representations cannot have the combination of features attributed to them by Carey. According to the argument from abstractness, the representation of the cardinal number of a collection of individuals as such requires the representation of in…Read more
  •  65
    In this thesis, Semantics, Meta-Semantics, and Ontology, I provide a critique of the method of truth in metaphysics. Davidson has suggested that we can determine the metaphysical nature and structure of reality through semantic investigations. By contrast, I argue that it is not semantics, but meta-semantics, which reveals the metaphysically necessary and sufficient truth conditions of our claims. As a consequence I reject the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment. In Part I, chapter 1, I …Read more
  •  193
    Knowledge is normal belief
    Analysis 73 (1): 69-76. 2013.
    In this article, I offer a new analysis of knowledge: knowledge, I claim, is normal belief. I begin with what I take to be the conceptual truth that knowledge is epistemically justified, or permissible, belief. I then argue that this in turn is simply doxastically normal belief, first clarifying what is meant by this claim, and then providing reasons to think that normal belief, so understood, must be true and safe from error, making it a good candidate for knowledge
  • Relativism and Monadic Truth (review)
    Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 13. 2010.
  •  20
    What Is Semantic Content?
    In Erich Rast & Luiz Carlos Baptista (eds.), Meaning and Context, Peter Lang. pp. 2--187. 2010.
  •  37
    What is Meaning? (review)
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4): 485-503. 2011.
  •  60
    Deriving the Norm of Assertion
    Journal of Philosophical Research 39 75-85. 2014.
    Frank Hindriks has attempted to derive a variant of Timothy Williamson’s knowledge rule for assertion on the basis of a more fundamental belief expression analysis of that speech act. I show that his attempted derivation involves a crucial equivocation between two senses of ‘must,’ and therefore fails. I suggest two possible repairs; but I argue that even if they are successful, we should prefer Williamson’s fully general knowledge rule to Hindriks’s restricted moral norm.
  •  4
    Response to Hindriks and Kooi
    Journal of Philosophical Research 39 93-99. 2014.
  •  357
    Indexical Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon
    Erkenntnis 78 (6): 1317-1336. 2013.
    Stewart Cohen’s New Evil Demon argument raises familiar and widely discussed concerns for reliabilist accounts of epistemic justification. A now standard response to this argument, initiated by Alvin Goldman and Ernest Sosa, involves distinguishing different notions of justification. Juan Comesaña has recently and prominently claimed that his Indexical Reliabilism (IR) offers a novel solution in this tradition. We argue, however, that Comesaña’s proposal suffers serious difficulties from the per…Read more
  •  27
    Forms of Thought, by E. J. Lowe
    Mind 123 (492): 1205-1208. 2014.
  •  88
    Speech Acts: Natural or Normative Kinds? The Case of Assertion
    Mind and Language 29 (3): 336-350. 2014.
    There are two views of the essences of speech acts: according to one view, they are natural kinds; according to the other, they are what I call normative kinds—kinds in the (possibly non-reductive) definition of which some normative term occurs. In this article I show that speech acts can be normative but also natural kinds by deriving Williamson's account of assertion, on which it is an act individuated, and constitutively governed, by a norm (the knowledge rule), from a consideration of the na…Read more
  •  446
    Counter Closure and Knowledge despite Falsehood
    Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257): 552-568. 2014.
    Certain puzzling cases have been discussed in the literature recently which appear to support the thought that knowledge can be obtained by way of deduction from a falsehood; moreover, these cases put pressure, prima facie, on the thesis of counter closure for knowledge. We argue that the cases do not involve knowledge from falsehood; despite appearances, the false beliefs in the cases in question are causally, and therefore epistemologically, incidental, and knowledge is achieved despite falseh…Read more
  •  44
    The Knowledge Rule and the Action Rule
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (4): 552-574. 2014.
    In this paper I compare Timothy Williamson's knowledge rule of assertion with Ishani Maitra and Brian Weatherson's action rule. The paper is in two parts. In the first part I present and respond to Maitra and Weatherson's master argument against the knowledge rule. I argue that while its second premise, to the effect that an action X can be the thing to do though one is in no position to know that it is, is true, its first premise is not: the data do not support the claim that whenever X is the …Read more
  •  8
    Critical Notice
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4): 575-594. 2011.