Brian Berkey

Most people who engage in work are hired by an employer and paid a salary or an hourly wage. It is widely believed that, in virtue of being paid objectionably low wages and/or subjected to other poor conditions in their employment, many of these workers are wrongfully exploited. Exploitation is standardly understood to involve taking advantage of a vulnerability in order to obtain benefits. Wrongful exploitation of workers, then, involves wrongfully taking advantage of their vulnerability in order to benefit from their labor. The central question that accounts of the wrong of exploitation must answer, therefore, is what makes it the case that any particular instance of advantage being taken of workers’ vulnerability in order to benefit from their labor is wrongful. In this chapter, the author describes and discusses the most prominent answers to this question that have been defended in recent philosophical literature.

Most people believe that there is something particularly morally repugnant about terrorism. A number of philosophers have attempted to defend this widely held view by offering accounts of precisely what it is about terrorism that makes it morally distinctive. In this paper I raise some doubts about the accounts that have been defended by others, focusing in particular on Samuel Scheffler’s view. In light of the doubts that I raise about existing accounts, I suggest what must be done in order to arrive at an adequate account, and offer an outline of a view that seems to me promising. On the view that I suggest, terrorist acts reveal something of distinctive moral significance about the agents who perpetrate them, even if they are not in themselves morally worse than otherwise similar acts.

In recent years, there has been increased interest in a variety of ways that private actors, especially actors in the business world, broadly understood, can contribute to addressing important social problems and persistent injustices. In this essay, I aim to articulate and begin to answer what seem to me to be some of the most important and challenging normative questions arising with regard to social entrepreneurship as a mode of economic activity aimed at addressing social problems or promoting justice. I focus on questions about the relationship between the pursuit of social entrepreneurial activity, the satisfaction of obligations to promote justice, and claims to income and wealth produced by successful social entrepreneurial ventures. I argue that there are reasons to think that social entrepreneurial activity can be a way that individuals (attempt to) satisfy at least some of their obligations of justice, but note that there are moral risks involved in attempting to satisfy these obligations in this way. And I suggest that there are at least some reasons, including recognition of the grounds on which we might sometimes prefer that people in a position to take these risks do so, to think that only those who accept broader moral views that are very demanding can consistently deny that social entrepreneurs who successfully generate substantial profits are morally entitled to retain them.

In this paper, I argue that there is an inconsistency between the content of some of the labour-related human rights articulated in documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the obligations ascribed to various actors regarding those rights in the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), in particular those ascribed to corporations. Recognizing the inconsistency, I claim, can help us see some of the moral limitations of both familiar public responses to exploitative labour practices and influential philosophical accounts of the wrong of exploitation. In light of these limitations, I argue that there are reasons to accept a more expansive account of the human rights-related obligations of corporations than that found in the UNGPs, and in particular that we should accept that corporations have obligations to actively contribute to lifting people out of poverty.

Effective altruism is a growing social movement whose members are committed to directing at least some portion of their money, time, and/or other resources in the ways that available evidence suggests will do the most good. Although Singer and others did much to promote the movement and its central ideas in the years immediately following the publication of The Life You Can Save and the founding of many of the organizations noted earlier, effective altruism's public philosophy footprint began to grow more rapidly around 2015. It is an important example of how public philosophy can both contribute to shaping public discussion of important issues and play a key role in motivating action on the part of individuals.

Christian Barry and Garrett Cullity argue that there is a morally important distinction between offsetting by “sequestering” and offsetting by “forestalling.” They further claim that offsetting by sequestering will often make risk-imposing actions permissible, while offsetting by forestalling typically will not. In this article, I highlight some reasons to be skeptical about their view and suggest an alternative account of the conditions in which offsetting can make a risk-imposing action permissible. In addition, I note a significant implication of my argument for the ethics of greenhouse gas offsetting.

This chapter argues that in some cases of wrongful exploitation, individuals who are not parties to the relevant transactions are as seriously and as directly wronged as the exploited parties to those transactions. Section I presents two cases that provide intuitive support for this claim, and offers an initial explanation for it that relies on considerations that are similar to those that motivate the Nonworseness Claim. Section 2 describes some central components of an account of the wrong-making features of wrongful exploitation that is suggested by the argument in section 1, and suggests some reasons to find this type of account plausible. Section 3 notes what the arguments in sections 1 and 2 seem to imply with regard to the remedial duties of wrongful exploiters, contrasts this view with one that has recently been defended by Malmqvist and Szigeti, and argues that there are important reasons to prefer the former.

In this paper, we argue that if a set of plausible conditions obtain, then driving a standard vehicle rather than riding in an autonomous vehicle (AV) will become analogous to driving drunk rather than driving sober, and therefore impermissible. In addition, we argue that a ban on the production, sale, and purchase of new standard vehicles would also become justified. We make this case in part by highlighting that the central reasons typically offered in support of state-mandated vaccination will also support mandating AV use. Finally, we discuss some of the implications of our argument for the obligations of vehicle-producing firms.

On at least most accounts of what global justice requires, those living in severe poverty around the world are unjustly disadvantaged. Remedying this unjust disadvantage requires (perhaps among other things) that resources currently possessed by well-off people are deployed in ways that will improve the lives of the poor. In this article, I argue that, contrary to the claims of some critics, well-off individuals’ effective altruist giving is at least among the appropriate responses to global injustice. In addition, I suggest that effective altruist giving will often be among the best ways for such people to satisfy obligations that they have in virtue of being beneficiaries of global injustice. The argument that I offer for this conclusion has at least two important implications: first, critics of effective altruism who claim that it is incompatible with taking global injustice sufficiently seriously are mistaken; and second, effective altruists have reason to reject the non-normative accounts of the movement’s core commitments that have been advocated by some prominent proponents.

This chapter provides an overview of the most prominent debates about the moral significance and implications of poverty among those who accept a broadly utilitarian account of poverty’s most morally important dimensions. The first section outlines the central features of utilitarian moral theory and describes the basic features of a broadly utilitarian account of poverty’s moral significance. The next section examines the various accounts of the moral obligations of the affluent to contribute to alleviating poverty that have been defended by those who accept broadly utilitarian accounts. The central issue in these discussions is how demanding the obligations of the affluent are, and in particular how much of their wealth they are obligated to sacrifice in order to aid those in poverty. The third section focuses on the recent debate about whether obligations to donate more rather than less effectively – that is, in ways that produce more rather than less good – can plausibly be understood as merely conditional obligations. The central issue in these discussions is whether the broadly utilitarian requirement to do more good rather than less for those in poverty with a given set of resources can be defended independent of a commitment to potentially demanding unconditional obligations to provide aid. A brief conclusion ends the chapter.

In this paper, I raise some doubts about Nicole Hassoun's account of the obligations of states, pharmaceutical firms, and consumers with regard to global health, presented in Global Health Impact. I argue that it is not necessarily the case, as Hassoun claims, that if states are just, and therefore satisfy all of their obligations, then consumers will not have strong moral reasons, and perhaps obligations, to make consumption choices that are informed by principles and requirements of justice. This is because there may be justice-based limits on what states can permissibly and feasibly do both to promote access to existing drugs for all of those who need them, and to promote research and development for new drugs that could treat diseases that primarily affect the global poor. One important upshot of my argument is that there can be reasons for organizations like the Global Health Impact Organization to exist, and to do the kind of work that Hassoun argues is potentially valuable in our deeply unjust world, even in much less unjust worlds in which states and firms largely, or even entirely, comply with their obligations.

According to relational egalitarians, the fundamental value that grounds requirements of justice is egalitarian social relationships. Hierarchical authority relations appear to be a threat to relational equality. Such relations, however, are pervasive in our working lives. Contemporary workplaces, then, seem to be potential sites of substantial injustice for relational egalitarians. This presents us with a challenge: the view that justice requires that individuals relate as equals appears difficult to reconcile with the view that it is permissible for firms to be organized with hierarchical authority structures, and yet both claims seem independently plausible. This chapter argues that these claims can be reconciled, but only if we reject the widely accepted Rawlsian “institutionalist” view that principles of justice apply to the institutions of the basic structure of society, but do not apply directly to the conduct of agents within those institutions.

In recent years, Ingrid Robeyns and several others have argued that, whatever the correct complete account of distributive justice looks like, it should include a Limitarian requirement. The core Limitarian claim is that there is a ceiling – a limit – to the amount of resources that it is permissible for any individual to possess. While this core claim is plausible, there are a number of important questions about precisely how the requirement should be understood, and what its implications are regarding the obligations of various agents, that have not been adequately addressed in the discussions thus far. In this paper, I focus on questions about the relationship between the grounds for the Limitarian requirement and its role in generating obligations of justice for different agents. I argue that the plausible grounds for the requirement are incompatible with the widely accepted view, deriving from John Rawls, that the principles of justice apply directly to the institutions of what Rawls calls the “basic structure of society,” but do not apply directly to the conduct of individuals and other possible agents acting within that structure. If my argument succeeds, then Limitarians must accept that if the grounds that they have offered in defense of Limitarian policy interventions are compelling, then individuals are obligated to voluntarily direct any resources that they possess above the threshold in ways that will promote the same goals that justify Limitarian policies.

Few would deny that some central questions in business ethics are normative. But there has been, and remains, much skepticism about the value of traditional philosophical approaches to answering these questions. I have three central aims in this chapter. The first is to defend traditional philosophical approaches to business ethics against the criticism that they are insufficiently practical. The second is to defend the view that the appropriate methodology for pursuing work in business ethics is largely continuous with the appropriate methodology in moral and political philosophy more broadly. And the third is to offer a brief characterization of how we should think about the substance of business ethics, in light of my arguments about its proper aims and methodology.

Despite the increased attention that has been paid in recent years to the significance of animal interests within moral and political philosophy, there has been virtually no discussion of the significance of animal interests within business ethics. This is rather troubling, since a great deal of the treatment of animals that will seem especially problematic to many people occurs in the context of business, broadly construed. In this chapter, I aim to extend the growing concern that our normative theories should be animal-friendly to business ethics. I consider whether several popular theoretical approaches in business ethics are consistent with taking animal interests to bear on the decisions that business managers are obligated to make. I do not argue for the claim that we should reject any theory in business ethics that cannot count animal interests as providing reasons that are relevant to the moral status of managerial conduct (though I think that this is true). Instead, I proceed on the assumption that many will find this claim plausible, and argue that those who do have reason to doubt that many of the prominent theoretical approaches defended in the business ethics literature are acceptable. My main aim, then, is to show that those who believe that the correct theory in business ethics must be animal-friendly, at least in the limited sense of counting animal interests as relevant to the moral status of managerial conduct in a plausible way, will need to look beyond the main competing theories that occupy present discussions.

In On Trade Justice, Risse and Wollner defend an account of trade justice on which the central requirement, applying to both states and firms, is a requirement of non-exploitation. On their view, trade exploitation consists in ‘power-induced failure of reciprocity’, which generates an unfair distribution of the benefits and burdens associated with trade relationships. In this paper, I argue that while there are many appealing features of Risse and Wollner’s account, their discussion does not articulate and develop the unified picture of states’ and firms’ obligations that they aim to provide as clearly as it might have. In particular, it is, I claim, unclear exactly how they understand the relationship between the fairness-based requirements that apply to states and those that apply to firms. I argue that there are two types of accounts that they might accept: a transactional account and a structural account. I offer reasons to think that there are reasons to prefer a structural account. In addition, I note some of the key implications of accepting such an account, and suggest that if Risse and Wollner accept these implications and revise other aspects of their view accordingly, the result is a plausible and unified account of what trade justice requires.

The Covid-19 pandemic has caused significant economic hardships for millions of people around the world. Meanwhile, many of the world’s richest people have seen their wealth increase substantially during the pandemic, despite the significant economic disruptions that it has caused on the whole. It is uncontroversial that these effects, which have exacerbated already unacceptable levels of poverty and inequality, call for robust policy responses from governments. In this paper, I argue that the disparate economic effects of the pandemic also generate direct obligations of justice for those who have benefitted from pandemic windfalls. Specifically, I argue that even if we accept that those who benefit from distributive injustice in the ordinary, predictable course of life within unjust institutions do not have direct obligations to redirect their unjust benefits to those who are unjustly disadvantaged, there are powerful reasons to hold that benefitting from pandemic windfalls does ground such an obligation.

It is widely believed that just societies would be characterized by some combination of democratic political institutions and market-based economic institutions. Underlying the commitment to the combination of democracy and markets is the view that certain normatively significant outcomes in a society ought to be determined by democratic processes, while others ought to be determined by market processes. On this view, we have reason to object when market processes are employed in ways that circumvent democratic processes and affect outcomes that ought to be determined democratically. In this paper, I argue that Waheed Hussain’s recent account of the conditions that must be met in order for the use of market power in pursuit of social change to avoid conflict with democratic values is objectionably narrow, and offer an alternative account that avoids the problems that undermine his account without abandoning the requirement that democratic values be properly respected. The central feature of my account that makes this possible is a broader conception of democratic processes that includes public deliberation and debate aimed at shaping informal social norms and practices.

Extremism about Demands is the view that morality is significantly more demanding than prevailing common-sense morality acknowledges. This view is not widely held, despite the powerful advocacy on its behalf by philosophers such as Peter Singer, Shelly Kagan, Peter Unger, and G.A. Cohen. Most philosophers have remained attracted to some version of Moderation about Demands, which holds that the behavior of typical well-off people is permissible, including the ways that such people tend to employ their economic and other resources. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that proponents of Extremism have not taken sufficiently seriously the central convictions that motivate the Moderate view. This dissertation offers an improved defense of Extremism about Demands. At its center is an argument that appeals dialectically to requirements of justice that Moderates themselves already implicitly accept. Specifically, I claim that any plausible set of Moderate moral principles will, when applied to a world like ours, yield demands on typical well-off people that far exceed the demands of common-sense morality. My argument has two cruxes. The first is the idea that our concern for justice is at least partially grounded in a concern for individuals’ interests, broadly construed. The other is a principle that I call Injustice entails Obligations, which says that we are collectively subject to requirements of justice that, if fully complied with, would ensure the transition from current injustice to a just state of affairs. Any view that is compatible with both the interest-based view of (part of) our concern for justice and Injustice entails Obligations will, I argue, require sacrifices from typical well-off people that substantially exceed what prevailing common-sense morality requires of them. Moderates typically emphasize the idea that each person has an important interest in pursuing the projects, plans, relationships, and commitments that are most important to her. But they also believe that acceptable Moderate principles will properly balance this idea with the idea that from a properly impartial perspective everyone, and everyone's interests, are equally morally important. Because Moderates accept the latter idea, they are already committed to thinking that in a just world, everyone would have a sufficient minimum share of society’s resources. I argue that even if we limit our focus to distributive justice in a single society such as the United States, and even if we assume that distributive justice requires only a sufficient minimum, the extent to which the status quo must be transformed in order for justice to be achieved is still too great to be compatible with Moderate demands on typical well-off people. There are a number of ways to try to argue that Moderate principles and Injustice entails Obligations are compatible with Moderation about Demands. For instance, it might be argued that all or nearly all of the demands to sacrifice in order to promote justice can be assigned to the super-rich, rather than to typical well-off people. Or it might be argued that the sacrifices of a single well-off person cannot be required because they amount to a mere “drop in the bucket” relative to what needs to be done in order to fully achieve justice. I show that such arguments fail. The argument that I consider in greatest detail derives from John Rawls’s view that the principles of justice apply to the institutions of the “basic structure of society,” and do not apply directly to the conduct of individuals. If this “Institutionalism” is right, then it cannot be the case that individuals are obligated to promote justice directly in the way that I suggest they are. Furthermore, it might seem that a view that assigns all of the burdens of promoting justice to the basic structure satisfies the imperative to transition from injustice to justice, since if the relevant institutions were to begin doing everything that the Rawlsian view says they ought to be doing, the requirements of justice would be met. I argue, however, that there is no understanding of Institutionalism on which it is itself consistent with the following desiderata: Moderate principles, and the associated interest-based view of (part of) the ground of our concern for justice; Injustice entails Obligations; and Moderate demands. So, Institutionalism cannot make Moderate principles and Injustice entails Obligations compatible with Moderate demands. Moderate principles and Injustice entails Obligations, then, remain incompatible with Moderation about Demands. Since there are compelling reasons to accept both Moderate principles and In justice entails Obligations, I conclude that we must reject Moderation about Demands. The obligations that justice places on typical well-off people are substantially more extensive than is acknowledged by prevailing common-sense morality.

In a recent article in this journal, David Faraci argues that the value of fairness can plausibly be appealed to in order to vindicate the view that consensual, mutually beneficial employment relationships can be wrongfully exploitative, even if employers have no obligation to hire or otherwise benefit those who are badly off enough to be vulnerable to wage exploitation. In this commentary, I argue that several values provide potentially strong grounds for thinking that it is at least sometimes better, morally speaking, for employers to hire worse-off people at intuitively exploitative wages than to hire better-off people at intuitively fair wages. Rather than suggesting that hiring badly off people at intuitively exploitative wages is permissible, however, I suggest that this gives us reason to think that employers can be obligated to hire worse-off people rather than better-off people and to pay them nonexploitative wages.