Brian Bowles

This study develops a Heideggerian thesis on the significance of Dasein's bodiliness. In Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, Heidegger claims that bodiliness secures the ground for the full being of the human. I situate this thesis squarely within die Sache selbst for Heidegger. Die Sache selbst concerns the issue of how being itself is engendered in human understanding. From as early as 1921, Heidegger explicitly understands his central topic in terms of ki&d12;nh siv. That is, the emergence of being in conjunction with the ontological structure of the human being is ultimately intelligible as a kind of movement. The 1924 thesis makes sense ultimately insofar as bodiliness itself is understood as the ontological movement---the original being-moved or pa&d12;qov ---that allows entities to appear within the domain of human concerns. After examining Heidegger's retrieval of several key Aristotelian concepts, I interpret bodiliness as the always already operative being-pulled-out-ahead-of-itself by its own essential lack. Entities are first able to be present to Dasein because Dasein is opened in this way. Thus, bodiliness on my reading is die Sache selbst. My interpretation of Heidegger's thesis also forms the interpretive starting point for a rereading of Geworfenheit and Gewesenheit as concepts of bodiliness. As Dasein's original pa&d12;qov, bodiliness in Sein und Zeit would go by the name die gewesene Geworfenheit: the a priori or always already operative thrown-open-ness that first allows being to emerge to human understanding.

Is there a crisis of sense in the world? Does it even make any sense to talk of either “sense” or a “world” that does or does not have any sense? According to Jean-Luc Nancy in The Sense of the World, it is no longer possible to speak of a “crisis of sense.” Such a way of formulating the problem of the sense of the world belongs to the past. “Today, we are beyond this: all sense has been abandoned”. A crisis of sense implies a loss of sense in the world that can be regained or replaced, whereas an abandonment of sense rejects this entire setup. In this brilliant and exciting work, Nancy endeavors to elaborate this abandonment, which is not only an abandonment of sense, but also and at the same time an exposure to sense. In over thirty short but extremely insightful sections, Nancy articulates the double meaning of this abandonment through reflections on a number of thinkers and topics. He not only gathers up and focuses the strands of the respective problematics he is engaging, but he also inaugurates new, fruitful strands along which to pursue the questions and problems of sense facing us in our concrete existence.

Nietzsche's perspectivism can be seen as a two-leveled cure for dogmatism. On the one hand, perspectivism amounts to the dismissal of the metaphysical world and the acknowledgement of the esential incompleteness of all knowledge insofar as knowledge is only and always perspectival. On the other hand, perspectivism is an affirmation of the central role the affects play in all interpretations of the world; consequently, it presents itself as a summary rejection of the notion of disinterested contemplation or knowledge. Nietzsche's theory of interpretation results in a transcendental-experimental philosophy able to liberate humankind from the stagnating, destructive effects of dogmatism. A perspectival account of knowledge implies not only an aesthetic aspect, but also a therapeutic one.