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76A comment on McCallAnalysis 72 (2): 293-295. 2012.Storrs McCall claims to have a novel solution to the age-old problem of the incompatibility of free will and God's omniscience. His solution is based on the thesis of the supervenience of truth on being. I argue that this thesis plays no role in solving the ancient conundrum
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2Gerhard Preyer and Frank Siebelt, eds., Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 22 (5): 356-358. 2002.
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3Johnston on fissionSorites 15 (December): 87-93. 2004.In this discussion paper, I evaluate some arguments of Mark Johnston's which appear in his articles «Fission and the Facts» and «Reasons and Reductionism» . My primary concern is with his description of fission cases, and his assessment of the implications of such cases for value theory. In particular, Johnston advances the following three claims:Rejecting the intrinsicness of identity is an arbitrary response to the paradox of fission;Fission cases involve indeterminate identity;Contra Parfit, …Read more
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1Personal IdentityDissertation, University of Oxford (United Kingdom). 1988.Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;In this thesis I argue that we ought to accept some version of the Analysis view--the view that the identity of a person over time can be analysed in terms of physical and/or psychological continuities. I also argue that there is no sense in which we ought to be ontological reductionists about persons--a person is an essentially embodied, irreducible, entity whose identity over time is analysable in terms of physic…Read more
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Peter Carruthers and Peter K. Smith, eds., Theories of Theories of Mind (review)Philosophy in Review 16 319-322. 1996.
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William J. Fitzpatrick, Teleology and the Norms of Nature (review)Philosophy in Review 21 419-422. 2001.
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1Cartesianism and the Private Language ArgumentSorites 14 57-62. 2002.In this paper, I argue that neither the #257 argument nor the #258 argument in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations undermines the coherence of the Cartesian Model, according to which a sensation word, such as `headache' or `tickle', gets its meaning in virtue of an act of `inner' association or ostensive definition. In addition, I argue against the standard assumption that the diarist's language of #258 is logically private
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21Neil Levy , Consciousness and Moral Responsibility . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 34 (5): 240-242. 2014.
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1Persons and human beingsLogos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España]. forthcoming.
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1Peter Carruthers and Peter K. Smith, eds., Theories of Theories of Mind Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 16 (5): 319-322. 1996.
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3William J. Fitzpatrick, Teleology and the Norms of Nature Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 21 (6): 419-422. 2001.
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Jens Harbecke, Mental Causation: Investigating the Mind's Powers in a Natural WorldPhilosophy in Review 29 (6): 415. 2009.
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260Jens Harbecke, Mental Causation: Investigating the Mind's Powers in a Natural World Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 29 (6): 415-418. 2009.
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16John Foster , A World For Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 30 (6): 397-399. 2010.
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70Douglas Ehring , Tropes: Properties, Objects and Mental Causation . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 33 (4): 279-281. 2013.
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56Neil Levy , Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 33 (3). 2013.
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34Dana Kay Nelkin , Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 33 (1): 60-62. 2013.
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31Causal relevance and the mental : towards a non-reductive metaphysicsDissertation, Mcgill University (Canada). 1996.My aim in this thesis is to explain how a non-reductionist metaphysics can accommodate the causal relevance of the psychological and of the special sciences generally. According to physicalism, all behavior is caused by brain-states; given "folk-psychology", behavior is caused by some psychological state. If psychological states are distinct from brain states, then our behavior is overdetermined and this, it is claimed, is unacceptable. I argue that this consequence is not unacceptable. I claim …Read more
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18Lampert on the Fixity of the PastOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 31 (1): 90-93. 2024.
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11Anscombe On ‘I’Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189): 507-511. 1997.I examine the main arguments of Elizabeth Anscombe’s difficult but fecund paper ‘The First Person’. Anscombe argues that the first‐person singular is not a device of reference, and, in particular, that it is not a device of indexical reference. Both arguments fail, but in ways that we can learn from.
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115Response to GoldsteinAnalysis 72 (4): 742-744. 2012.In ‘The Sorites is disguised nonsense’ Analysis (2012) 77: 61–5 L Goldstein attempts to show that some of the conditionals in any Sorites argument are nonsensical, and hence no Sorites argument can be sound. I give four reasons why this is not the case