•  4
    Philosophers dispute whether an effect can be earlier than its cause (i.e. whether backwards causation can occur). For example, could a trainwreck cause a psychic to have earlier knowledge of it? Max Black tried to show backwards causation to be impossible but he failed to do so, or so I will argue. Nonetheless, his famous article can still teach us something important about certain cases of backwards causation.
  •  8
    Anscombe On ‘I’
    Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189): 507-511. 1997.
    I examine the main arguments of Elizabeth Anscombe’s difficult but fecund paper ‘The First Person’. Anscombe argues that the first‐person singular is not a device of reference, and, in particular, that it is not a device of indexical reference. Both arguments fail, but in ways that we can learn from.
  •  453
    _Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness_ is about persons and personal identity. What are we? And why does personal identity matter? Brian Garrett, using jargon-free language, addresses questions in the metaphysics of personal identity, questions in value theory, and discusses questions about the first person singular. Brian Garrett makes an important contribution to the philosophy of personal identity and mind, and to epistemology
  •  90
    Santayana’s Treatment of Teleology
    Overheard in Seville 28 (28): 1-10. 2010.
    Santayana's epiphenomenalism is best understood as part of his thinking about teleology and final causes. Santayana makes a distinction between final causes, which he rejects, and teleology, which he finds ubiquitous. Mental causation is identified with a doctrine of final causes which he argues is an absurd form of causation. Thus mental causes are rejected and Santayana embraces epiphenomenalism.
  •  109
    Response to Goldstein
    Analysis 72 (4): 742-744. 2012.
    In ‘The Sorites is disguised nonsense’ Analysis (2012) 77: 61–5 L Goldstein attempts to show that some of the conditionals in any Sorites argument are nonsensical, and hence no Sorites argument can be sound. I give four reasons why this is not the case
  •  134
    Non-reductionism and John Searle’s The Rediscovery of the Mind
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1): 209. 1995.
  •  51
    Farts have not received the metaphysical attention they deserve. Bill Capra has opened the batting in his recent study of this ubiquitous rectal phenomenon. Spurred on by his sterling effort, JJ and I have added our own two bob's worth, disagreeing with much of what Bill says, and defending the buttocks-first conception of farts.
  •  16
    Héritabilité causale et propriétés émergentes
    Philosophiques 27 (1): 139-159. 2000.
    Sur la base de ce qu’il a appelé « le principe d’héritabilité causale », Jaegwon Kim a soutenu que les propriétés réalisables de façons multiples ne constituent pas des sortes causales scientifiques. Mon principal objectif est de répondre aux arguments de Kim contre le physicalisme non réductionniste. Je défends l’idée qu’il existe plus de pouvoirs causaux que les seuls pouvoirs causaux physiques. Cela n’a rien de surprenant puisqu’il existe plus de particuliers que le nombre total de particules…Read more
  •  83
    Davidson on causal relevance
    Ratio 12 (1): 14-33. 1999.
    Davidson argues that mental properties are causally relevant properties. I argue that Davidson cannot appeal to ceteris paribus causal laws to ensure that these properties are causally relevant, if he wishes to retain his argument for anomalous monism. Second, I argue that the appeal to supervenience cannot, by itself, give us an account of the causal relevancy of mental properties. I argue that, while mental properties may indeed 'make a difference' to the causally efficacious properties of eve…Read more
  •  63
    Constitution, Over Determination and Causal Power
    Ratio 26 (2): 162-178. 2013.
    Kim's exclusion argument threatens to show that irreducible constituted objects are epiphenomenal. Kim's arguments are examined and found to be unconvincing; that a constituted cause requires its constituent to be a cause is not an adequate reason to reject the causation of the constituted object (event or property-instance). However, I introduce and argue for, the Causal Power Uniqueness Condition (CPUC). I argue that CPUC and the causal closure of the physical, implies that constituted objects…Read more
  •  35
    Best‐candidate theories and identity: Reply to Brennan
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 31 (1). 1988.
    This note criticizes Andrew Brennan's attempt to defend best?candidate theories of the identity of artefacts over time against certain now familiar objections. Adoption of a mereological conception of individuals does not, in itself, provide the means for a satisfactory response to objections of Wiggins and Noonan (some of which are anyway ill?focused). The way forward consists in recognizing that the consequences of best?candidate theories which have been thought objectionable (in particular, c…Read more
  •  9
    Bermúdez on Self–Consciousness
    Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210): 96-101. 2003.
    I argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of self–consciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self–consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, ‘the simple theory’, is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self–consciousness and ‘I’–thoughts.
  •  354
    Anscombe on `I'
    Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189): 507-511. 1997.
    I examine the main arguments of Elizabeth Anscombe’s difficult but fecund paper ‘The First Person’. Anscombe argues that the first‐person singular is not a device of reference, and, in particular, that it is not a device of indexical reference. Both arguments fail, but in ways that we can learn from
  •  73
    A Further Reply to Noonan
    Analysis 47 (4). 1987.
  •  167
    Vagueness and identity
    Analysis 48 (3): 130. 1988.
    The thesis that there can be vague objects is the thesis that there can be identity statements which are indeterminate in truth-value (i.e., neither true nor false) as a result of vagueness (as opposed, e.g., to reference-failure), "the singular terms of which do not have their references fixed by vague descriptive means". (if this is "not" what is meant by the thesis that there can be vague objects, it is not clear what "is" meant by it.) the possibility of vague objects should not be taken, in…Read more
  •  30
    Ismael on the Paradox of Predictability
    Philosophia 49 (5): 2081-2084. 2021.
    In this discussion note we argue, contrary to the thrust of a recent article by Jenann Ismael, that resolving the paradox of predictability does not require denying the possibility of a natural oracle, and thus stands in no need of the response that she proposes.
  •  42
    Possible worlds and identity
    Philosophical Books 27 (2): 65-72. 1986.
  •  81
    On the Epistemic Bilking Argument
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3): 139-140. 2015.
    The standard bilking argument is well-known and attempts to prove the impossibility of backwards causation. In this discussion note, I identify an epistemic bilking argument, which has not received sufficient attention in the literature, and indicate how best to respond to it. This response involves a parity argument based on a forwards causation case
  •  116
  •  7
    Elementary Logic
    Routledge. 2012.
    Elementary Logic explains what logic is, how it is done, and why it can be exciting. The book covers the central part of logic that all students have to learn: propositional logic. It aims to provide a crystal-clear introduction to what is often regarded as the most technically difficult area in philosophy. The book opens with an explanation of what logic is and how it is constructed. Subsequent chapters take the reader step-by-step through all aspects of elementary logic. Throughout, ideas are …Read more
  •  329
  •  1
    Persons and human beings
    Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España]. forthcoming.
  •  102
    Black on Backwards Causation
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3): 230-233. 2014.
    In this discussion paper I argue that Max Black's well-known bilking argument does not succeed in showing the impossibility of backwards causation
  •  31
    Some Remarks on Backwards Causation
    Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71 (4): 695-704. 2015.
    Resumo Neste texto, o autor concentra-se em dois artigos históricos: o de Max Black “Why cannot an effect precede its cause”? e o de Michael Dummett “Bringing about the Past”. O autor irá mostrar onde falha o “bilking argument” de Black, contra a possibilidade da causalidade invertida. Por conseguinte, o autor irá concordar com Dummett, na possibilidade de um agente actuar a fim de que algo possa ocorrer no passado, contudo, discordando da argumentação de Dummett face a um desafio céptico, que t…Read more
  •  35
    Identity and extrinsicness
    Mind 97 (385): 105-109. 1988.