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14Lampert on the Fixity of the PastOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 31 (1): 90-93. 2024.
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11Backwards Causation and Max Black's Abominable ConjunctionThink 23 (66): 33-35. 2024.Philosophers dispute whether an effect can be earlier than its cause (i.e. whether backwards causation can occur). For example, could a trainwreck cause a psychic to have earlier knowledge of it? Max Black tried to show backwards causation to be impossible but he failed to do so, or so I will argue. Nonetheless, his famous article can still teach us something important about certain cases of backwards causation.
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183What is This Thing Called Metaphysics?Routledge. 2003.Why is there something rather than nothing? Does God exist? Does time flow? What are we? Do we have free will? What is truth? Metaphysics is concerned with ourselves and reality, and the most fundamental questions regarding existence. This clear and accessible introduction covers the central topics in metaphysics in a concise but comprehensive way. Brian Garrett discusses the crucial concepts in a highly readable manner, easing the reader in with a look at some important philosophical problems. …Read more
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116Tim, Tom, Time and Fate: Lewis on Time TravelAnalytic Philosophy 57 (3): 247-252. 2016.In his well-known time travel story, David Lewis claims that there is a sense in which Tim can go back in time and kill his Grandfather and a (more inclusive) sense in which he cannot. Lewis describes Tim’s predicament as semi-fatalist, but holds that this does not compromise Tim’s freedom or his ability to kill Grandfather. I argue that if semi-fatalism is true of Tim, it is true of everyone, and that this is a troubling conclusion.
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38Some Remarks on Backwards CausationRevista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71 (4): 695-704. 2015.Resumo Neste texto, o autor concentra-se em dois artigos históricos: o de Max Black “Why cannot an effect precede its cause”? e o de Michael Dummett “Bringing about the Past”. O autor irá mostrar onde falha o “bilking argument” de Black, contra a possibilidade da causalidade invertida. Por conseguinte, o autor irá concordar com Dummett, na possibilidade de um agente actuar a fim de que algo possa ocorrer no passado, contudo, discordando da argumentação de Dummett face a um desafio céptico, que t…Read more
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101On the Epistemic Bilking ArgumentThought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3): 139-140. 2015.The standard bilking argument is well-known and attempts to prove the impossibility of backwards causation. In this discussion note, I identify an epistemic bilking argument, which has not received sufficient attention in the literature, and indicate how best to respond to it. This response involves a parity argument based on a forwards causation case
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143Non-reductionism and John Searle’s The Rediscovery of the MindPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1): 209. 1995.
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74Letting Rip: Rebutting Capra on the metaphysics of fartsThink 21 (62): 19-22. 2022.Farts have not received the metaphysical attention they deserve. Bill Capra has opened the batting in his recent study of this ubiquitous rectal phenomenon. Spurred on by his sterling effort, JJ and I have added our own two bob's worth, disagreeing with much of what Bill says, and defending the buttocks-first conception of farts.
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38Ismael on the Paradox of PredictabilityPhilosophia 49 (5): 2081-2084. 2021.In this discussion note we argue, contrary to the thrust of a recent article by Jenann Ismael, that resolving the paradox of predictability does not require denying the possibility of a natural oracle, and thus stands in no need of the response that she proposes.
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77Dummett on Bringing About the PastPhilosophia 44 (1): 113-115. 2016.In ‘Bringing about the Past’ Michael Dummett attempted to defend the coherence of the idea of bringing about the past. I agree that bringing about the past is conceptually no more problematic than bringing about the future, but argue, against Dummett, that there is no need to restrict the scope of an agent’s knowledge in order to make sense of intentionally bringing about past events
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208Causal Essentialism versus the Zombie WorldsCanadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1): 93-112. 2009.David Chalmers claims that the logical possibility of ‘zombie worlds’ — worlds physically indiscernible from the actual world, but that lack consciousness — reveal that consciousness is a distinct fact, or property, in addition to the physical facts or properties.The ‘existence’ or possibility of Zombie worlds violates the physicalist demand that consciousness logically supervene upon the physical. On the assumption that the logical supervenience of consciousness upon the physical is, indeed, a …Read more
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21Defending Non‐Epiphenomenal Event Dualism 1Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (3): 393-412. 2000.
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99Santayana’s Treatment of TeleologyOverheard in Seville 28 (28): 1-10. 2010.Santayana's epiphenomenalism is best understood as part of his thinking about teleology and final causes. Santayana makes a distinction between final causes, which he rejects, and teleology, which he finds ubiquitous. Mental causation is identified with a doctrine of final causes which he argues is an absurd form of causation. Thus mental causes are rejected and Santayana embraces epiphenomenalism.
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133What the History of Vitalism Teaches Us About Consciousness and the "Hard Problem"Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3): 576-588. 2006.Daniel Dennett has claimed that if Chalmers' argument for the irreducibility of consciousness were to succeed, an analogous argument would establish the truth of Vitalism. Chalmers denies that there is such an analogy. I argue that the analogy does have merit and that skepticism is called for
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21Neil Levy , Consciousness and Moral Responsibility . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 34 (5): 240-242. 2014.
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1Peter Carruthers and Peter K. Smith, eds., Theories of Theories of Mind Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 16 (5): 319-322. 1996.
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248Jens Harbecke, Mental Causation: Investigating the Mind's Powers in a Natural World Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 29 (6): 415-418. 2009.
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2Gerhard Preyer and Frank Siebelt, eds., Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 22 (5): 356-358. 2002.
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16John Foster , A World For Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 30 (6): 397-399. 2010.
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70Douglas Ehring , Tropes: Properties, Objects and Mental Causation . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 33 (4): 279-281. 2013.
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56Neil Levy , Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 33 (3). 2013.
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33Dana Kay Nelkin , Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 33 (1): 60-62. 2013.
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
20th Century Philosophy |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |