Brian Julian

This commentary argues that, in contrast to the view of Professor Gonzalez, Aristotle’s account of final causation is not very helpful for addressing contemporary concerns. Aristotle presents it as a type of cause, but, when one considers Aristotle’s distinction between facts and explanations, a final cause is better viewed as simply a fact. It is true that organisms show an internal directedness towards an end, but one can still ask why this is the case. Because of its limitations, Aristotle’s account of final causes is not a third ontological region between materialism and intelligent design, but its lack of explanation leaves it open to attack from either side.

The definition of soul in De Anima ii 1 is usually thought to be inadequate, since Aristotle ends the chapter by saying the account has been sketched in outline and begins ii 2 by explaining the proper way to define. I argue instead that this is Aristotle’s considered definition of soul. I do so by examining the transitional material between ii 1 and ii 2, explaining the meaning of ‘in outline’ and how the examples of proper definitions that show the cause—squaring in De Anima and thunder from Posterior Analytics—correspond to the definition of soul given in ii 1.