Brian Kogelmann

There is a growing sense that representative democracy is in crisis, leading to renewed interest in alternative institutional designs. One popular proposal—what I call legislative sortition —says we should replace elected legislators with randomly selected citizens. While legislative sortition has drawn both numerous supporters and critics, one objection has received little attention: that ordinary citizens’ lower cognitive abilities, relative to elected officials, will diminish the quality of governance. This paper articulates and evaluates this concern, distinguishing between several versions of it. I argue that some forms of the objection are implausibly strong, but that a suitably qualified version can be defended. Although this does not provide a decisive reason to reject legislative sortition, it meaningfully shapes how we should assess its promise.

Public reason theorists argue that coercive state action must be justified to those subject to such action. Doing so requires citizens to give only those reasons that all can accept. These reasons, the chapter argues, include scientific and social scientific considerations. One ineliminable and arguably salutary property of the modern administrative state is that the coercive policies it produces can be justified only on the basis of extremely complex scientific and social scientific considerations. Many of these considerations are neither understood by most ordinary citizens nor agreed upon by experts. This means that the overwhelming majority of citizens do not accept the reasons justifying coercive administrative policies. As a result, public reason is inconsistent with the administrative state. There are deep implications to this result: if public reason is inconsistent with the administrative state, then it is also inconsistent with forms of social organization that presuppose it. This, the chapter argues, includes egalitarianism, which many proponents of public reason also endorse. Public reason theorists thus must choose: justification through public reason, or distributive equality?

This paper examines the argument that prosecutors should consider public perceptions when deciding to prosecute political figures. This was a popular argument marshalled to criticize the many prosecutions of former and current United States president Donald J. Trump. Using the tools of analytic philosophy, I construct what I think is the most compelling version of this argument. The argument is not obviously wrong but does encounter problems. I raise what I think are two decisive objections against it. I conclude that prosecutors need not worry about perceptions of political motivation when deciding to charge political figures.

Zoning severely limits what individuals can do with their private property. There is also empirical evidence that zoning contributes to the housing affordability crisis. There are good reasons to be skeptical of zoning, yet it is ubiquitous. What (if anything) can justify this widespread yet dubious practice? I critically examine one argument in this paper. The argument says zoning is justified because it facilitates autonomy. After a charitable reconstruction of the argument, I present what I think is a decisive objection to it. While the autonomy defense of zoning ultimately fails, the analysis provides insight into a related topic: gentrification. Many articulate what's wrong with gentrification by arguing that it inhibits autonomy. Reflections on zoning and autonomy show that this claim must be curtailed and common remedies to the problem of gentrification reconsidered.

This paper examines the tension between creative destruction—an inherent feature of capitalist economies—and the ideal of autonomy. Creative destruction is vital for economic growth, but it undermines the conditions necessary for autonomy by disrupting individuals’ ability to plan their lives. This creates a dilemma: we must either abandon the ideal of autonomy or economic growth. The paper explores potential regulatory strategies to mitigate the impact of disruptive innovation on life plans, but argues these ultimately fail. It then proposes a novel conception of autonomy consistent with capitalist creative destruction. With artificial intelligence poised to initiate unparalleled creative destruction, understanding this dilemma and potential solutions is crucial from an ethical perspective. The paper contends its revised conception of autonomy offers a path forward amidst transformative technological change.

Our world has been and still is plagued by oppressive social and political systems. Why do these systems persist or why did they persist for as long as they did? Initially developed by Karl Marx, ideology explanations point to distorted beliefs among the oppressed. Favored by social scientists, collective action explanations point to an inability among the oppressed to coordinate resistance. This paper is about how to resolve the debate. Several philosophers look for a conclusive resolution, trying to show that one of the hypotheses is fatally flawed, so the alternative must be embraced. These resolutions fail, I argue. Instead, we should decide which hypothesis best explains persistent oppression on a case-by-case basis through empirical investigation. I call this piecemeal resolution. After introducing and defending the piecemeal approach, I sketch an empirical strategy.