Many political philosophers contend that citizens have a moral obligation to vote. Those who do not ignore important values, are wrongfully complicit in injustice, and undermine the foundations of democracy. Others argue that given the insignificance of individual ballots, voting is too costly to be rational, much less obligatory. This chapter develops an alternative account of civic ethics that avoids the unattractive features of both these positions. Citizens, it argues, do not have a duty to …
Read moreMany political philosophers contend that citizens have a moral obligation to vote. Those who do not ignore important values, are wrongfully complicit in injustice, and undermine the foundations of democracy. Others argue that given the insignificance of individual ballots, voting is too costly to be rational, much less obligatory. This chapter develops an alternative account of civic ethics that avoids the unattractive features of both these positions. Citizens, it argues, do not have a duty to vote. But this is not because voting is morally insignificant. Instead, it is because the act is non-unique. Rather than having a duty to go to the polls, citizens instead have a responsibility to do their share of _civic work_—a class of actions that includes but is not limited to voting. Many can satisfy this duty without casting a ballot. However, those who take this option do not float free of obligation; they must satisfy it in other forms. Our mistake, the chapter shows, has been treating voting as a distinct morally significant act rather than as one component of a complex joint project to which citizens bear responsibility. Rectifying this error makes possible a more nuanced and complete account of civic ethics, one that can unify previously discordant philosophical debates and speak to the complexity of real-world political institutions.
