Bruce Milem

I argue for a new conception of atheism as a practice of self-interpretation. Though atheism is usually conceived as a metaphysical view about the existence of God, I argue that this conception is flawed for two reasons: first, this view of atheism is based on a limited conception of God and does not apply to certain “alternative concepts of God”; second, deflationary accounts of existence entail that atheist denials of God’s existence cannot be absolute but only relative to particular frameworks or language games. I suggest instead that atheism should be seen as the practice of deliberately refusing to use words such as “God” in one’s interpretation of oneself.

Some writers have described human beings as participating in the universe waking up or serving as the means by which the universe comes to know itself. In this paper I argue that this idea can be given a straightforward explanation with minimal metaphysical commitments. As long as one grants that the universe has a kind of unity and that human beings are conscious, it is possible to see human beings as vehicles for the universe's consciousness and knowledge of itself. I also argue that this idea can be useful for atheists because it can satisfy what Thomas Nagel calls ‘the yearning for cosmic reconciliation’ (2010: 3) better than secular humanism can.

At first glance, atheism seems simple to define. If atheism is the negation of theism, and if theism is the view that at least one god exists, then atheism is the negation of this view. However, the common definitions that follow from this insight suffer from two problems: first, they often leave undefined what “god” means, and, second, they understate the scope of the disagreement between theists and atheists, which often has as much to do with the fundamental character of reality as with the existence of one being in it. Some writers address the second problem by reinterpreting atheism as the logical consequence of particular metaphysical views, such as naturalism or physicalism, which are then taken as the true meaning of atheism. These interpretations, though more satisfactory in some respects, can result in concepts of atheism that are unclear or too narrow, and they often still leave “god” undefined. In this paper, I propose that atheism be defined as the proposition that reality is solely an impersonal order. Theism is the proposition that reality is not solely an impersonal order, being either a personal order, that is, an order founded by at least one person, or an impersonal order plus at least one transcendent person. A god is a person who is not subject to the laws governing that order and thus transcends it. I explain these definitions and briefly discuss some of their implications. First I survey prior definitions of atheism to display the problems they raise.

[We present below a preliminary translation of an ancient Greek manuscript, recently discovered by Dr. __________, containing two variations on the myth of Sisyphus. The document is in fragments, with gaps at the beginning and partway through.… [Upon] his capture, Sisyphus was brought before the council of the gods, who were informed of all his crimes. After withdrawing from the chamber for many hours, they returned to sentence Sisyphus to his fate. He was doomed to roll a rock up a hill, watch it roll back to its starting place, and begin again, and to repeat this for all eternity. He would do this alone, without the comfort of company, in perpetual dark. He would not need sleep, food, or drink, and so would not...

I argue that Meister Eckhart's distinctive use of language in his German sermons deliberately reflects his theological view. Instead of being straightforward statements of doctrine, Eckhart's sermons use paradox, wordplay, and imagery to engage their interpreters dialectically and bring them to the perspective Eckhart hopes to instill. This perspective centers on God's simultaneous distinction and indistinction from creatures, including the soul. Knowing God requires becoming aware of one's own contingency as a creature in time, which exists only because it receives its being from God with every moment. For Eckhart, Christian practice does not mean to achieve eternal salvation or mystical union with the divine. Rather, it confesses and proclaims the soul's recognition of its ontological dependence on God. Through close readings of four sermons, I show how Eckhart's language reveals his ontological and practical views, which in turn determine how he speaks. His sermons present complex verbal images of God, the soul, and their relationship

In this paper, I discuss four theories of negative theology. The first theory, which I call the "metaphysical" theory, grounds negative theology in God's role as the cause of all. The second theory interprets negative theology as an expression of desire for something unknown. The third theory justifies negative theology on the basis of an extraordinary or mystical experience. The fourth theory explains negative theology as an act of renunciation motivated by concern about self-interest in one's devotion to God.

In Faith, Reason and the Existence of God, Denys Turner defends the possibility of proving God’s existence on Christian and philosophical grounds. He responds to Kantian objections by developing a theory of reason derived from Thomas Aquinas. Turner’s work shifts the debate about God’s existence to the problem of determining which concept of reason is correct. I argue that this problem is extremely difficult and perhaps insoluble, because it requires using reason to resolve a dispute about reason. Consequently, Turner’s claims cannot be accepted without reservation.

This article explores the tension between Meister Eckhart's frequent claim that the human soul is an image of the divine and his equally frequent claim that God is beyond description and language. Through a reading of German Sermon 16b, I argue that Eckhart emphasizes the image's immediate ontological relationship to its source and downplays the image's similarity to this source. The soul as an image of God reveals God not through its nature as a soul but through the contingency of its being. The same is true of the sermon as well.