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450Evaluating a New Logical Argument From EvilFaith and Philosophy 38 (2): 229-244. 2021.J. L. Schellenberg, in “A New Logical Problem of Evil,” published in The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil, argues that (if God exists) God has, of necessity, a disappreciation of evil, operating at a metalevel in such a way as to give God a non-defeasible reason to rule out actualizing a world containing evil. He also argues that since God’s motive in creating the world is to share with finite beings the good that God experiences prior to creation, which is good without evil, it follow…Read more
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330God, Horrors, and Our Deepest GoodFaith and Philosophy 37 (1): 77-95. 2020.J.L. Schellenberg argues that since God, if God exists, possesses both full knowledge by acquaintance of horrific suffering and also infinite compassion, the occurrence of horrific suffering is metaphysically incompatible with the existence of God. In this paper I begin by raising doubts about Schellenberg’s assumptions about divine knowledge by acquaintance and infinite compassion. I then focus on Schellenberg’s claim that necessarily, if God exists and the deepest good of finite persons is uns…Read more
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161Prediction and Providence: Rejoinder to Almeida's ReplyIn L. Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Oxford University Press. pp. 225-235. 2013.This paper is a rejoinder to Michael Almeida's reply to my chapter "Unrestricted Actualization and Divine Providence" in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 9 (where his reply also appears).
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Unrestricted Actualization and Divine ProvidenceOxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 9 195-212. 2019.Michael Almeida, in his book "Freedom, God, and Worlds" (OUP 2012) argues that (C) Necessarily, God has available an infallible method, Unrestricted Actualization, by which God can bring about whatever undetermined events God chooses, except those which it is metaphysically or accidentally necessary that God does not bring about. I argue that we have no reason to believe either of the two premises of Almeida's main argument for (C).
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250Rightmaking and Wrongmaking Properties, Evil, and TheismIn L. Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Oxford University Press. pp. 177-202. 2013.Michael Tooley, in Plantinga & Tooley, "Knowledge of God" (Blackwell 2008) argues that, in the absence of strong evidence in favour of the existence of God, the logical probability of God's existence is extremely low. His argument focusses on rightmaking and wrongmaking properties of divine actions, and employs Carnap's inductive logic to reach his conclusion. I argue that Tooley's argument's conceptual foundations are problematic, and that his application of Carnap's inductive logic is flawed. …Read more
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10Guest Editor’s IntroductionBusiness and Professional Ethics Journal 21 (3-4): 2-4. 2002.This is a short statement about the Australiian Association for Professional and Applied Ethics, and the association's conference at which the papers in the journal were published.
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8Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for EthicsPhilosophia Christi 3 (1): 284-286. 2001.This is a review of Robert Merrihew Adams's book Finite and Infinite Goods (Oxford UP 1999), which provides an impressive theistic axiological and ethical theory.
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150Klaas Kraay . God and the Multiverse: Scientific, Philosophical and Theological Perspectives (review)European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (3): 221-225. 2017.My review summarizes the book's constituent papers, with occasional brief comments. All of the contributions are competent and interesting.
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643The ethics of shareholdingJournal of Business Ethics 37 (2). 2002.The copy provided on ths site is a late draft. It provides a philosophical argument for the view that by and large it is morally wrong to buy shares in a company that is behaving badly unless you (if necessary acting together with others) are able and willing to prevent the misbehaviour. A key lemma in my argument concerns a chain of authorisation from the shareholders to the company's board to the CEO -- one in virtue of which shareholders are ultimately responsible for major patterns of wrongd…Read more
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38God and Infinite Hierarchies of Creatable WorldsFaith and Philosophy 23 (4): 460-476. 2006.This paper has been superseded by chapter 3 of my book "God, the Best, and Evil" (OUP 2008). The chapter concerns God's choices in cases in which God has infinitely many better and better options.
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286Structures of greater good theodicies: The objection from alternative goodsSophia 37 (2): 1-17. 1998.The paper investigates how greater good theodicies are supposed to work, and argues that, in principle, appeal to greater goods can explain why God, if he exists, is justified in refraining from ensuring that there is little or no evil. (Readers interested in objections from alternative goods might also want to look at the rather different discussion of them in Section 7.11 of my book God, The Best, and Evil (OUP 2008).
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246Eyeballing evil: Some epistemic principlesPhilosophical Papers 25 (2): 127-137. 1996.The version uploaded to this site is a late draft. The paper arises both from William L. Rowe's classic 1979 discussion of the problem of evil, argues that there exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse, and also from Steven Wykstra's response, in the course of which he argues for the following Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access (CORNEA): "On the basi…Read more
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143This is a response to Richard M. Gale’s review of my book God, the Best, and Evil, Clarendon Press 2008. The review was published on-line in May 2009, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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243Perception and corrigibilityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3): 369-372. 1970.This paper, the first of mine to be published, criticizes some arguments against the logical (i.e., metaphysical) possibility that there is incorrigible knoweledge of the external world.
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68Locke and the relativisation of identityPhilosophical Studies 27 (6). 1975.Arc there cases in which an object x is thc same F as an object y but x is not the same G as y, cvcn though x is a G? A11 aihrmativc answer will have drastic repercussions 011 0ne’s account of identity and on one’s quantification theory. For suppose that the expression ‘x is the same F as y’ can be understood as ‘x is an F and y is an F and x is identical with y’, and that ‘x is not the same G as y’ can be understood as ‘it is not the case that x is a G and y is a G and x is identical with y’. T…Read more
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259The Prospects for the Free Will DefenceFaith and Philosophy 27 (2): 142-152. 2010.My main conclusion is that the prospects for a successful Free Will Defence employing Alvin Plantinga’s basic strategy are poor. The paper explains how the Defence is supposed to work, and pays special attention both to the definition of Transworld Depravity and also to whether is is possible that God actualizes a world containing moral good.
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187Review of "God and Necessity" by Brian Leftow (review)Philosophia Christi 3 (1): 284-286. 2001.The review is a concise summary of the main line of argument Leftow advances for his highly original, detailed theistic account of the metaphysical foundations of broadly logical necessity.
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263Similarity, continuity and survivalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1). 1975.The paper defends the claim that it is metaphysically possible that continuants of at least some kinds can have life-histories that incorporate temporal gaps -- i.e., the continuants can go out of existence and then come into existence again. Opponents of this view have included Graham Nerlich and Bernard Williams, whose writings I discuss.i
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34Review of Brian Leftow, God and Necessity: Oxford University Press: Oxford 2012, ISBN 978-0-19-926335-6, hb, x + 575 pp (review)Sophia 54 (2): 227-229. 2015.The review is a summary of the main thrust of Leftow's rich and very interesting theistic account of alethic possibility and necessity.
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197The God Beyond Belief, by N. Trakakis: Book reviews (review)Religious Studies 44 (3): 363-367. 2008.
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290Hume on testimony to the miraculousSophia 11 (1): 20-25. 1972.Hume, in the Enquiry Section X Part 1, claims that ’all probability supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where one side is found to overbalance the other and to produce a degree of evidence proportioned to the superiority’. He concludes that in assessing miracle-claims one should weigh the historical testimony supporting the miracle against the testimony supporting the regularity to which it is an exception. I argue that both his premise and his conclusion are false.
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152God and the BestFaith and Philosophy 13 (3): 311-328. 1996.The paper reaches two main conclusions: Firstly, even if there are one or more possible worlds than which there are none better, God cannot actualise any of them. Secondly, if there are possible worlds which God can actualise, and than which God can actualise none better, then God must actualise one of them. The paper is neutral between compatibilist and libertarian views of creaturely freedom. The paper's main ideas have been used, with modifications, in my book "God, the Best, and Evil" (OUP 2…Read more
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1680Swinburne on the Simplicity of TheismEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2). 2011.This paper argues that (1) Richard Swinburne’s general account of the simplicity of empirical hypotheses fails because it involves a deeply problematic notion of postulating a property, while there is a wide range of hypotheses where the assessment of simplicity rests entirely on the number and kinds of postulated properties, (2) Swinburne’s main argument in ’The Christian God’ for the simplicity of theism, the one based on considerations about pure limitless intentional power, is significantly …Read more
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WATTS, G. S.: "The Revolution of Ideas" (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (n/a): 318. 1984.
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532Reply to Oppy on God, the Best and EvilSophia 50 (1): 211-219. 2011.My reply corrects one misstatement in Oppy’s summary of my book, abandons a footnote in the light of one of Oppy’s criticisms, and argues that Oppy’s other criticisms do not succeed in showing either that my claims are mistaken or that the arguments by which I supported them are defective
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269Popper on induction and independencePhilosophy of Science 44 (2): 326-331. 1977.Karl Popper, in "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" Section *vii, argues that if you find that some objecta a,b, c ... have a specific property P, then this discovery by itself does not increase the probability that some other object also has P. He concludes that there can be no effective principle of induction. My paper disproves Popper's claim, using very elementary considerations..
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53Miracles and principles of relative likelihoodInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (3). 1985.I EXAMINE VARIOUS SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES FOR WEIGHING TESTIMONY TO PAST EVENTS AND IDENTIFY ONE WHICH SEEMS TO BE BOTH TRUE AND ROUGHLY IN THE SPIRIT OF DAVID HUME’S ESSAY. I ARGUE THAT HUME FAILS TO PROVIDE GOOD REASONS FOR SAYING THAT THIS PRINCIPLE, WHEN APPLIED TO REPORTS OF MIRACLES PURPORTING TO SUPPORT RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, WILL ALWAYS LEAD US TO REJECT THE OCCURRENCE OF THE MIRACLE
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246Wiggins' defence of essentialismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 13 (4): 459-469. 1975.This paper is a critique of David Wiggins's treatment of essentialism in his book Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (Blackwell 1967). I argue in detail that he has not provided an adequate account either of the concept of a sortal term or of the concept of a substance-concept, even though both concepts play important roles in his case for essentialism. I also discuss Wiggins's views on how substance-concepts are related to judgments of identity through time.
Parkville, Victoria, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Religion |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Religion |