Bruno Aislã Gonçalves dos Santos

In this part of our introduction about consequentialism, we aim to offer some rudimentary notion about the evaluation of the consequences in terms of effective and expected results, the maximization and satisfactory view of the good, the role of partiality and impartiality and the kinds of aggregation, total, average and minimal. We hope, in this work divided into two parts, to have offered a satisfactory introduction to consequentialism, having presented some of the mains versions e discussions about it.

In the first part of our work, we aim to show as clearly as possible some theoretical aspects of the consequentialist theories. First of all, we will start to discuss how we can define what consequentialism is. After that, we will expose the values theory that we can operate with the consequentialist view it assumes two general forms: non-welfarist theory and welfarist theory. Lastly, we will aim to consider the variations of consequentialism. We will consider how we have to evaluate the consequences, that is, whether consequentialism has to evaluate the consequences of the acts or the rules consequences and how we can understand such evaluations.

: The practice of using drugs that promise to improve the functioning of certain brain capacities, such as memory and concentration, has intensified. Individuals considered healthy are doing indiscriminate use of such drugs in the hope of improving their study or work outcomes. From this practice comes a moral problem: is it permissible to use substances to improve cognitive performance and thus modifying the specifics brain capacities (such as memory or concentration)? To address such a problem in applied ethics, we need a normative model that can tell us what our duties are. In order to answer this problem, I am going to suggest that is reasonable to accept a consequentialist normative model that will aim to inform us whether the practice of using drugs to improve the functioning of cognitive capacities is permissible or not. Based on such a normative model and the information about the results of the use of a class of medicines - known as “nootropics” - I conclude that the use is not permissible for improvement, because such practice will bring more harm than benefits for the individuals, as consequences in long term.

Generally it is argued that the Objective List Theory cannot support an explanatory view of what well-being is because OLT cannot identify one single good-maker property that it is responsible for unifying all the element that compose well-being. Then, Objective List Theory only can be an enumerative view of well-being. In this paper, I aim hold that we may offer an explanatory view of well-being even without identify a single good-maker property that is shared by all the elements that compose well-being. I hold that the OLT is still explanatory, because it is possible to identify each good-maker property in each element that is supposed to compose the list that is responsible for defining what well-being is. In addition, I hold that in order to have a full explanation about the concept of well-being we need to keep separate two question: 1) why something is good intrinsically and; 2) How the things that are good intrinsically could benefit us. My conclusion is that we may conceive one explanatory and pluralistic list that having constitutive elements of well-being and that a good explanation of well-being should keep separating the two question listed above.