Bruno Mölder

Mental fictionalism is a view about folk-psychological discourse, according to which using the discourse is akin to engaging in fiction. The cognitive collapse objection to mental fictionalism holds that the formulation of the position cannot avoid using folk-psychological notions, and therefore makes mental fictionalism self-refuting. This paper argues that there is still no satisfactory response to the cognitive collapse objection. One proposed solution has the consequence that mental fictionalism cannot be expressed without contradiction. The other solution offers a promissory note to future neuroscience and turns the position into something we currently cannot fully understand. The main part of the paper focuses on Adam Toon’s pretense fictionalism, which aims to avoid cognitive collapse by providing a non-mentalist, social-normative account of pretense. I argue that such an account is not tenable, and therefore the danger of cognitive collapse still stands.

Timothy Williamson (sünd. 1955) on Wykehami loogikaprofessor Oxfordi ülikoolis ja New kolledži professorliige. Ta on Briti akadeemia, Edinburghi kuningliku ühingu ja mitme teise teaduste akadeemia välisliige. Ta on olnud The Aristotelian Society ja The Mind Association’i president. Williamson on laialdaselt tuntud oma märkimisväärse panuse poolest keele- ja loogikafilosoofiasse, metafüüsikasse, epistemoloogiasse ja metafilosoofiasse. Tema raamatute seas on Identity and Discrimination (Blackwell, 1990; parandatud väljaanne 2013), Vagueness (Routledge, 1994), Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford University Press, 2000), The Philosophy of Philosophy (Blackwell, 2007), Modal Logic as Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2013), Tetralogue: I'm Right, You're Wrong (Oxford University Press, 2015), Doing Philosophy: From Common Curiosity to Logical Reasoning (Oxford University Press, 2018) ja Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals (Oxford University Press, 2020) ning Debating the A Priori (koos Paul Boghossianiga) (Oxford University Press, 2020).Timothy Williamson pidas Tartu Ülikoolis 4.-6. septembrini 2018 Gottlob Frege loengud teoreetilises filosoofias pealkirjaga “Philosophical Methods”. Intervjuu leidis aset Tartus 6. septembril 2018.

Jennifer Nagel on Toronto Ülikooli filosoofiaprofessor. Ta on uurinud peamiselt teadmisseisundit ja meie võimet seda teiste inimeste juures ära tunda, metakognitsiooni ja vaimuseisundite omistamist. Nagel on avaldanud mitmeid mõjukaid uurimusi epistemoloogia ja vaimufilosoofia valdkondades, sealhulgas raamatu “Knowledge: A Very Short Introduction” (Oxford University Press, 2014). Töös on raamat “Recognizing Knowledge: Intuitive and Reflective Epistemology”. Jennifer Nagel pidas Tartu Ülikoolis 17.-19. septembril 2019 Gottlob Frege loengud teoreetilises filosoofias teemal “Epistemic Interaction”. Intervjuu leidis aset e-kirjade vahendusel ning valmis 4. jaanuaril 2020.

Daniel D. Hutto is the Senior Professor of Philosophical Psychology and the Head of School of Liberal Arts at the University of Wollongong. His main research area is philosophy of mind and cognitive science. He is well known for his narrative practice hypothesis about the development of folk psychology and the endorsement and development of the radically enactive approach to cognition. In his recent work, along with Glenda Satne, he has developed a version of naturalism called "relaxed naturalism". Hutto is the author of The Presence of Mind (John Benjamins, 1999), Beyond Physicalism (John Benjamins, 2000), Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; second edition 2006), Folk Psychological Narratives (MIT Press, 2008), and with Erik Myin, Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content, (MIT Press, 2013) and Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds meet Content (MIT Press, 2017). He gave the Gottlob Frege Lectures in Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Tartu on September 13-16, 2022, under the title "Why I am not an enactivist?" The interview took place in Tartu on September 16, 2022.

Adam Toon is an Associate Professor at the University of Exeter and Director of Egenis, Centre for the Study of Life Sciences. He did his PhD in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Cambridge. He works in philosophy of science and philosophy of mind, mainly investigating the idea of representations as fictions. Toon is the author of Mind as Metaphor: A Defence of Mental Fictionalism (Oxford University Press, 2023) and Models as Make-Believe: Imagination, Fiction and Scientific Representation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). He is also co-editor (with Tamás Demeter and Ted Parent) of Mental Fictionalism: Philosophical Explorations (Routledge, 2022).Adam Toon gave the Gottlob Frege Lectures in Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Tartu on December 5–7, 2023, under the title “The Story of the Mind: Cartesianism, Behaviourism, and Fictionalism”. The interview took place in Tartu on December 7, 2023.

Emma Borg has been a professor at the Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Studies, University of London since January 2024. Prior to that, she worked at the University of Reading starting in 1998. She completed her PhD at University College London. Borg's primary areas of research are philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and business ethics. She is the author of Minimal Semantics (Oxford University Press, 2004), Pursuing Meaning (Oxford University Press, 2012), and Acting for Reasons: In Defence of Common-Sense Psychology (Oxford University Press, 2024). Emma Borg gave the Gottlob Frege Lectures in Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Tartu from November 4-6, 2024, under the title "Reasons for Action". The interview took place in Tartu on November 6, 2024.

Mida tähendab „tähendus“? Mis on tõde? Mis asjad on olemas? Mida kujutab endast teadmine? Kuidas teadlased arutlevad? Kas teaduslikud teooriad kirjeldavad maailma? Millises vahekorras on inimese keha ja vaim? Kas Jumal on olemas ja kui on, siis missugune ta on? Milles seisneb moraalselt õige või vale käitumine? Kas moraaliväited on tõesed ja mis teeb nad tõeseks? Kuidas mõista vabadust? Milline oleks õiglane hüvede jaotus ühiskonnas? Kuidas määratleda kunsti? Need on vaid mõned näited küsimustest, mille üle filosoofid arutlevad. Käesolev õpik pakub süstemaatilist ülevaadet nüüdisaegse filosoofia peamistest valdkondadest. Lugeja saab tutvuda keelefilosoofia, vaimufilosoofia, teadusfilosoofia, religioonifilosoofia, metafüüsika, epistemoloogia, normatiivse eetika, metaeetika, kunstifilosoofia ja poliitikafilosoofia olulisemate teemadega. Õpik on välja kasvanud sissejuhatavast kursusest, mida selle autorid on Tartu Ülikoolis üheskoos õpetanud alates 2008. aastast.

There are various theoretical models of disagreement in ontology, logic, epistemology and ethics, but the practical consequences of these models have received much less attention. This special issue of ‘Trames’ aims to bridge the gap between theory and practice, examining the implications of theoretical positions for real-life disagreements. The contributions to this volume investigate the topics such as verbal disputes, moral and meta-ethical disagreements, political disagreements, the disagreement between experts, the relationship between disagreement and ignorance, epistemic self-trust, introspective disputes and the ethics of disagreement.

Folk psychology is often seen as a conceptual framework for our understanding of the mind. If so, then what does it tell us about the concept of mind? Does folk psychological vocabulary play a fundamental role in mindreading? Are folk psychological explanations autonomous? This issue is dedicated to these and other topics associated with folk psychology, mindreading and the mind, such as self-knowledge, pre-linguistic understanding of others, normativity, infant and chimpanzee mindreading, pain and emotions.

Vaimufilosoofia on filosoofia haru, mis püüab mõista ja seletada elusolendite mentaalset külge. See otsib vastuseid mitmesugustele filosoofilistele mõistatustele, mis on seotud teadvuse, mõistuse, meeltetaju ja toimimisega, ning probleemidele, mis tekivad, kui vaimunähtusi üritatakse seletada teadusliku maailmapildi raames. Kogumik sisaldab valikut autori vaimufilosoofilistest tekstidest, mis on ilmunud aastatel 1996–2023. Mitmeid tekste palistab interpretivistlik positsioon ehk lähenemine vaimule tõlgenduse kaudu.

Introspective disputes are introspectively based disputes about features of experiences. This paper addresses the question of what kinds of disagreement are exemplified in such disputes. The following kinds of disagreement are reviewed with respect to introspective disputes – verbal, metalinguistic, faultless, deep and genuine disagreements. The paper defends the conclusion that introspective debates are genuine debates that are mostly of the theoretical kind and that some such debates may also involve metalinguistic negotiation.

This paper is a reply to commentaries on "Mind Ascribed". My response is organised into three parts. In the first part I describe the relationship between folk psychology and the scientific study of the mind. The second part replies to objections to the central tenets and presuppositions of the ascription theory. I clarify the distinction between the nature and the possession of mental states and the notion of a pleonastic entity. I explain why the ascription theory is a version of interpretivism, and not a species of instrumentalism or fictionalism. I also argue that canonical ascription should not be spelled out in terms of the ideal interpreter. The third part deals with comments on miscellaneous topics such as normativity, self-knowledge, the necessity of the brain and the proper understanding of intentional patterns.

“Philosophy and Psychology of Time” comprises papers from philosophers and psychologists who work on various aspects of subjective time. In the book, the broad topic of time is examined from different aspects, divided into five parts. These main aspects are the following: the concept of time in philosophy and psychology, temporal presence, the continuity and fl ow of time in mind, the timing of experiences, and the relationship between time and intersubjectivity. This chapter introduces the volume and supplies a short overview of each contribution.

This book is an edited collection of papers from international experts in philosophy and psychology concerned with time. The collection aims to bridge the gap between these disciplines by focussing on five key themes and providing philosophical and psychological perspectives on each theme. The first theme is the concept of time. The discussion ranges from the folk concept of time to the notion of time in logic, philosophy and psychology. The second theme concerns the notion of present in the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and psychology. The third theme relates to continuity and flow of time in mind. One of the key questions in this section is how the apparent temporal continuity of conscious experience relates to the possibly discrete character of underlying neural processes. The fourth theme is the timing of experiences, with a focus on the perception of simultaneity and illusions of temporal order. Such effects are treated as test cases for hypotheses about the relationship between the subjective temporal order of experience and the objective order of neural events. The fifth and the final theme of the volume is time and intersubjectivity. This section examines the role of time in interpersonal coordination and in the development of social skills. The collection will appeal to both psychologists and philosophers, but also to researchers from other disciplines who seek an accessible overview of the research on time in psychology and philosophy.

Tänapäeval peetakse tähenduse, sisu ja vaimu normatiivsust sageli takistuseks nende naturaliseerimisele. Samas saab normatiivsust ennast mõista mitmel moel. Artikli eesmärgiks on tutvustada väitlusi normatiivsuse üle. Rõhutatakse, et normatiivsuse filosoofilises analüüsis on oluline vältida 'normatiivsuse' mitmemõttelisust ning et tuleb teha vahet eri nähtuste normatiivsusel. Tuuakse esile olulisemad normatiivsuse määratlemise viisid ning vaadeldakse, kuidas tuleks mõista tähenduse ja intentsionaalsuse konstitutiivset normatiivsust. Filosoofiliselt on iseäranis oluline selline normatiivsus, mis on niihästi kategooriline, ettekirjutuslik kui konstitutiivne. Artiklis vaadeldud käsitluste suhtes näidatakse, et väited sedalaadi normatiivsuse esinemise kohta tähenduse ja intentsionaalsuse vallas pole põhjendatud.   It has become increasingly common to invoke the normativity of meaning, content and mind as an obstacle to their naturalisation. At the same time, one can understand normativity itself in various ways. The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the debate about the nature and the scope of normativity. It is emphasised that it is important to prevent the ambiguity of 'normativity' and that it is crucial to distinguish between the normativity of different phenomena. The paper covers the most important characterisations of normativity and concentrates on the alleged normativity of meaning and intentionality. The normativity that has a philosophical import is categorical, prescriptive and constitutive. With respect to the accounts scrutinised in this paper, it is argued that there are no good reasons to claim that meaning and intentionality are normative in this sense

An explanatory gap ensues when the truths constituting the explanans do not entail the explanandum. Attempts to give a physicalist account of consciousness seem to generate an explanatory gap, which is special in the following psychological sense. In other cases, it is possible to bridge or close the gap by regimenting or eliminating the respective concepts. In the case of consciousness, however, there is a pervasive intuition that the gap remains even when one works out a notion of consciousness that allows the entailment of truths about consciousness from physical premises. The intuition is expressed by the sense that something essential about consciousness is left out from any such conceptual regimentation. This paper defends the view that this intuition is generated by the way our experiences are given to us. Every experience has a component that is not captured by any specification. The gap intuition is due to this ineffable component in experiences. Since conscious experiences are partly ineffable, it seems that no account of consciousness captures conscious experiences entirely and so would develop the intuition that something has been left out. An alternative explanation to the gap intuition is provided by the “phenomenal concepts’ strategy”. According to this strategy, it is the peculiar nature of phenomenal concepts that feeds the intuition. The main problem with such an approach is that phenomenal concepts are more coarse-grained than the experiences themselves and thus their application still does not entail what it is like to have a particular phenomenal experience.

This book provides a thoroughly worked out and systematic presentation of an interpretivist position in the philosophy of mind, of the view that having mental properties is a matter of interpretation. Bruno Mölder elaborates and defends a particular version of interpretivism, the ascription theory, which explicates the possession of mental states with contents in terms of their canonical ascribability, and shows how it can withstand various philosophical challenges. Apart from a defence of the ascription theory from the objections commonly directed against interpretivism, the book provides a critical analysis of major alternative accounts of mental state possession as well as the interpretivist ideas originating from Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett. The viability of the approach is demonstrated by showing how one can treat mental causation as well as the faculties closely connected with consciousness -- perception and the awareness of one’s own mental states -- in the interpretivist framework