• Game theory and Ethics
    with Christopher Morris
    In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Metaphysics Research Lab. 2004.
  •  35
    Social Conventions: From Language to Law
    Philosophical Review 123 (2): 247-250. 2014.
  •  157
    Conventions and moral norms: The legacy of Lewis
    Topoi 27 (1-2): 73-86. 2008.
    David Lewis’ Convention has been a major source of inspiration for philosophers and social scientists alike for the analysis of norms. In this essay, I demonstrate its usefulness for the analysis of some moral norms. At the same time, conventionalism with regards to moral norms has attracted sustained criticism. I discuss three major strands of criticism and propose how these can be met. First, I discuss the criticism that Lewis conventions analyze norms in situations with no conflict of interes…Read more
  •  85
    Reasons and Intentions (edited book)
    Ashgate. 2007.
    Addressing the question of the relation between intentions and action, the considerations which make an intention rational and how this translates into our ...
  • Functie en autoriteit van morele normen. Rationele-keuzetheorie en ethiek
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 94 (1). 2002.
  •  9
    Spinoza en het Onstaan van de Staat
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 82 252. 1990.
  •  6
    No Title available: Reviews
    Economics and Philosophy 15 (1): 144-152. 1999.
  •  138
    Consequentialism and rational choice: Lessons from the Allais paradox
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1). 2008.
    This paper investigates the relation between consequentialism, as conceived of in moral theory, and standard expected utility theory. I argue that there is a close connection between the two. I show furthermore that consequentialism is not neutral with regard to the values of the agent. Consequentialism, as well as standard expected utility theory, is incompatible with the recognition of considerations that depend on what could have been the case, such as regret and disappointment. I conclude th…Read more
  •  526
    Rational self-commitment
    In Fabienne Peter & Hans Bernhard Schmidt (eds.), rationality and commitment, Oxford University Press. 2007.
    Abstract: The standard picture of rationality requires that the agent acts so as to realize her most preferred alternative in the light of her own desires and beliefs. However, there are circumstances where such an agent can predict that she will act against her preferences. The story of Ulysses and the Sirens is the paradigmatic example of such cases. In those circumstances the orthodoxy requires the agent to be ‘sophisticated’. That is to say, she should take into account her expected future c…Read more
  •  108
    Rational Choice Virtues
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (5): 541-559. 2010.
    In this essay, I review some results that suggest that rational choice theory has interesting things to say about the virtues. In particular, I argue that rational choice theory can show, first, the role of certain virtues in a game-theoretic analysis of norms. Secondly, that it is useful in the characterization of these virtues. Finally, I discuss how rational choice theory can be brought to bear upon the justification of these virtues by showing how they contribute to a flourishing life. I do …Read more
  •  114
    Game theory and ethics
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
    Game theory is the systematic study of interdependent rational choice. It should be distinguished from decision theory, the systematic study of individual (practical and epistemic) choice in parametric contexts (i.e., where the agent is choosing or deliberating independently of other agents). Decision theory has several applications to ethics (see Dreier 2004; Mele and Rawlings 2004). Game theory may be used to explain, to predict, and to evaluate human behavior in contexts where the outcome of …Read more
  •  3
    Book Review (review)
    Economics and Philosophy 15 (1): 144-152. 1999.
  •  37
    The Authority of Norms
    American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3). 2007.
  •  4
    No Title available: Reviews
    Economics and Philosophy 26 (2): 258-264. 2010.
  •  55
    Consequentialism, rationality and the relevant description of outcomes
    Economics and Philosophy 17 (2): 181-205. 2001.
    Instrumental rationality requires that an agent selects those actions that give her the best outcomes. This is the principle of consequentialism. It may be that it is not the only requirement of this form of rationality. Considerations other than the outcomes may enter the picture as well. However, the outcome(s) of an action always play a role in determining its rationality. Seen in this light consequentialism is a minimum requirement of instrumental rationality. Therefore, any theory that trie…Read more
  •  7
    Book Review (review)
    Economics and Philosophy 17 (1): 121-145. 2001.
  •  7
    1. Ulysses and the Sirens
    In Fabienne Peter (ed.), Rationality and Commitment, Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 150. 2007.
  •  66
    On the Normativity of Intentions
    Topoi 33 (1): 87-101. 2014.
    Suppose you intend now to φ at some future time t. However, when t has come you do not φ. Something has gone wrong. This failing is not just a causal but also a normative failing. This raises the question how to characterize this failing. I discuss three alternative views. On the first view, the fact that you do not execute your intention to φ is blameworthy only if the balance of reasons pointed to φ-ing. The fact that you intended to φ does not add to the reasons for φ-ing at t. On the second …Read more
  •  64
    Introduction: Practical reasoning and normativity
    Philosophical Explorations 12 (3): 223-225. 2009.
    This volume brings together previously unpublished papers by leading scholars that deal with the theme of practical reasoning and normativity. The volume includes contributions by Michael Bratman, Donald Bruckner, David Enoch, Elijah Millgram, Andrew Reisner, François and Laura Schroeter, Mark Schroeder, and William White.