Recent work on moral progress has explored the causes, impediments, and possibility of moral progress. In this paper, I present a novel sketch of one significant, yet previously underexplored impediment to moral progress: the epistemic vices of business corporations (henceforth just ‘corporations’). Today, the global pervasiveness of corporations in our age of contemporary capitalism is undeniable. Yet, no philosophical analysis of how such corporations may affect moral progress currently exists…
Read moreRecent work on moral progress has explored the causes, impediments, and possibility of moral progress. In this paper, I present a novel sketch of one significant, yet previously underexplored impediment to moral progress: the epistemic vices of business corporations (henceforth just ‘corporations’). Today, the global pervasiveness of corporations in our age of contemporary capitalism is undeniable. Yet, no philosophical analysis of how such corporations may affect moral progress currently exists. Drawing on Cassam’s obstructivist theory of epistemic vice, I argue that the collective epistemic vices of corporations may pose serious epistemic impediments to the development of moral progress. I examine the moral-epistemic impacts of one type of corporate epistemic vice, epistemic malevolence, on two paradigmatic moral issues that we face today: animal rights and climate change. My core argument is that the epistemic malevolence of corporations obstructs moral progress in animal rights and climate change by obfuscating the morally relevant information and the moral norms pertaining to these domains. As a result, this sustains and exacerbates the value-action gap in animal rights and climate change.
