Callum MacRae

According to a prominent strain of thought in the republican tradition, nondomination is a social ideal, in the sense that it can be enjoyed only by living in the right sort of political community with others, rather than by simply withdrawing from others altogether. This understanding has important ramifications for the way that we see nondomination's connections with other important concepts in political philosophy, such as community and independence. In this article, I argue that whether or not nondomination is a social value in this way depends upon the underlying grounds of our commitment to the ideal of nondomination. Consequently, whether or not nondomination is related to ideals like community and independence in the ways that many theorists have claimed depends upon those underlying grounds in the same way. In particular, I distinguish three different ideals of nondomination: one grounded on freedom as avoiding arbitrary dependence, one grounded on avoiding relations of inequality, and one grounded on achieving relations of equality. I argue that only the latter of these is well understood as a social ideal. I conclude with some thoughts about the implications of this argument for domination theory and its role in political philosophy.

According to a prominent account, the central normative commitments of socialism are a luck egalitarian principle of equality and a principle of community or solidarity. The model has a number of attractions. However, it appears to be vulnerable to a series of objections that have been pressed against luck egalitarian accounts of the concept of exploitation. In this paper I argue that, despite some overlooked flexibility, the exploitation objection represents a serious challenge to this model and provides a good reason to explore alternative accounts of socialism’s normative grounds.

Until recently, many theorists defined domination such that it requires unequal power, and most others held that even if domination were not defined as requiring unequal power, a requirement of unequal power would nevertheless follow from the definition of what domination is. On these views, unless there is an imbalance of power between the two parties, there can be no relation of domination. However, two prominent theorists have recently broken from this consensus, on the grounds that people can depend on one another's arbitrary or uncontrolled wills even in contexts where there is no inequality of power. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: domination theorists have a powerful reason to hold that domination cannot take place without a power imbalance. Consequently, we should only accept definitions of the concept on which domination requires unequal power.

In recent literature on the philosophical foundations of socialism a growing number of theorists have endorsed the claim that freedom as non-domination is a fundamental normative commitment undergirding socialist politics. On this sort of view, a broad range of traditional socialist claims can be explained and justified by reference to freedom as non-domination. In this paper, I argue that even if these theorists are right that opposition to domination is a core socialist normative commitment, it is not clear that that opposition is best understood in terms of a commitment to a particular conception of freedom. Instead, socialist opposition to domination can be more fruitfully understood as flowing from a commitment to a relational conception of equality, according to which relationships with a substantially egalitarian character have a special value. I argue, first, that a relational egalitarian construal of socialist opposition to domination can retain all of the benefits of the freedom as non-domination construal, and, secondly, that a relational egalitarian account will have benefits that a freedom as non-domination approach will lack. I conclude that there are still significant benefits to retaining a place for equality in our considered account of the normative foundations of socialism.

According to the Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, conscious states are just those states that are the object of a suitable higher-order thought to the effect that one is in that state. These higher-order thoughts perform this role by providing subjects with a particular type of _awareness_. However, HOT theorists have tended to offer two alternative formulations of this awareness when stating the basic claims of HOT theory. According to what I call the _state formulation_ of HOT theory, HOTs provide subjects with an awareness of _mental states_, and a mental state is conscious only if the subject is aware of that state. According to what I call the _oneself formulation_ of HOT theory, HOTs provide subjects with an awareness of _themselves as being in a mental state_, and a mental state is conscious only if the subject is aware of themselves as being in that state. In this paper I explore the dialectical significance and legitimacy of HOT theorists’ current practice of employing both formulations. I argue that there is some reason for HOT theorists to adopt the oneself formulation, rather than the state formulation. However, this appears to weaken HOT theory considerably, by abandoning the idea that when our mental states are conscious, we are aware of those states themselves. Against this objection I argue that adopting the oneself formulation does not require abandoning the basic idea lying behind the state formulation and that this is consistent with the reasons for favouring the oneself formulation.

In a recent paper in JVI, ‘An Anarchist Interpretation of Marx’s “Ability to Needs” Principle,’ Spafford has argued that: (i) the communist and anarchist traditions share an objection to a particular kind of exchange (which he calls quid pro quo exchange); (ii) the anarchist objection to quid pro quo exchange can be understood as opposition to conditional exchange; (iii) consequently, the objection motivates an opposition to conditional exchange as such (i.e. a commitment to unconditional exchange); and (iv) we can construct a normative justification of this opposition by reference to the value of freedom, given that conditional exchange offers diminish the freedom of the recipients of the offers. In this reply piece I argue that (ii) is importantly mistaken, and that consequently (iii) also fails. Although all quid pro quo exchanges are conditional exchanges, the converse does not hold, and we have reason to believe that there will be instances of conditional exchange that are unobjectionable by the lights of the traditional anarchist and communist objection to such exchange. Consequently, an opposition to all conditional exchange rules out too much. However, I will argue that a suitably modified version of (iv) may nevertheless survive the counterexamples that defeat (ii).