Cameron Alexander

This paper aims to show that a neo-Aristotelian version of capacity-first philosophy of mind is fruitfully applied to a question which is specific to philosophy of psychology, namely: What counts as an adequate explanation in psychology? Drawing on Kenny, Glock and Schellenberg, the paper argues that the neo-Aristotelian capacity view is built around a set of criteria for the classification of capacities. All capacities are classified according to (1) possession-, (2) exercise-, (3) vehicle-, (4) opportunity-, (5) enablement- and (6) successful employment- criteria. These classification criteria are used to reconstruct the process of de-intellectualizing explanations of psychological phenomena. De-intellectualization targets theoretical assumptions about the circumstances in which the various criteria for classifying capacities are satisfied. The capacity approach offers a tool for regimenting the process of de-intellectualization. It also illustrates the contrast between de-intellectualization and Dennett’s homuncular functionalism. Rather than offering nothing more than conceptual clarity for debates about the metaphysics and epistemology of mind, the neo-Aristotelian capacity view explains why de-intellectualizing explanations is a feature of adequate explanations in psychology.

According to philosophers influenced by Aristotle and Wittgenstein, it is a mistake to attribute psychological properties to objects that fail to resemble human beings in relevant respects, in particular to parts of an animal, notably its brain or parts thereof. There are two labels for this alleged mistake: mereological fallacy and homunculus fallacy. This entry reconstructs both and explains their differences. The charge that subpersonal psychology commits such fundamental errors has been subject to numerous objections, which are assessed in this entry. It also broaches areas of recent interest: the nature of explanation in cognitive neuroscience, the predictive processing framework, as well as implications for debates regarding the moral status of brain organoids.

The 4E approach in (philosophy of) cognitive science—based on ideas that the mind is embodied, embedded, extended, and enacted—is so diverse that it defies straightforward explanation. This paper considers the most ecumenical explanation of the extant concept of the 4E approach. Purported explanations of 4E based on contested definitions of cognition, contrasts with non-4E approaches, or essential and unifying features (including embodiment) either fail to capture the correct extension for the concept of 4E or lead to incoherence. The incoherence is generated by a failure to abide by several desiderata for non-revisionist conceptual explanations: informativeness, non-contentiousness, and identification of any unifying features if they exist. By contrast, a family resemblance conception of 4E constrained by ties of historical influence satisfies these desiderata. The 4E approach should be understood as a set of family resemblances of overlapping ideas, hypotheses, theories and conceptual frameworks about the mind, as well as methods for its study. The family resemblances span several dimensions, including but not limited to a rejection of dualism, non-representational explanations of the mind, phenomenological methods, the importance of embodiment, a dynamical systems perspective, and an evolutionary perspective on the mind. This family resemblance conception is complemented by a historical dimension: the concept of 4E cognitive science emerged in the period following the cognitive revolution of the 1950s. The advantages of this explanation are that it abides by the established use of ‘4E’, explains 4E’s apparent diversity, and warns against reductive explanations.

Understanding the origins of human social cognition is a central challenge in contemporary science. In recent decades, the idea of a ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) has emerged as the most popular way of explaining unique features of human social cognition. This default view has been progressively undermined by research on ‘implicit’ ToM, which suggests that relevant precursor abilities may already be present in preverbal human infants and great apes. However, this area of research suffers from conceptual difficulties and empirical limitations, including explanatory circularity, over-intellectualisation, and inconsistent empirical replication. Our article breaks new ground by adapting ‘script theory’ for application to both linguistic and non-linguistic agents. It thereby provides a new theoretical framework able to resolve the aforementioned issues, generate novel predictions, and provide a plausible account of how individuals make sense of the behaviour of others. Script theory is based on the premise that pre-verbal infants and great apes are capable of basic forms of agency-detection and non-mentalistic goal understanding, allowing individuals to form event-schemata that are then used to make sense of the behaviour of others. We show how script theory circumvents fundamental problems created by ToM-based frameworks, explains patterns of inconsistent replication, and offers important novel predictions regarding how humans and other animals understand and predict the behaviour of others.