Cameron Alexander

This paper aims to show that a neo-Aristotelian version of capacity-first philosophy of mind is fruitfully applied to a question which is specific to philosophy of psychology, namely: What counts as an adequate explanation in psychology? Drawing on Kenny, Glock and Schellenberg, the paper argues that the neo-Aristotelian capacity view is built around a set of criteria for the classification of capacities. All capacities are classified according to (1) possession-, (2) exercise-, (3) vehicle-, (4) opportunity-, (5) enablement- and (6) successful employment- criteria. These classification criteria are used to reconstruct the process of de-intellectualizing explanations of psychological phenomena. De-intellectualization targets theoretical assumptions about the circumstances in which the various criteria for classifying capacities are satisfied. The capacity approach offers a tool for regimenting the process of de-intellectualization. It also illustrates the contrast between de-intellectualization and Dennett’s homuncular functionalism. Rather than offering nothing more than conceptual clarity for debates about the metaphysics and epistemology of mind, the neo-Aristotelian capacity view explains why de-intellectualizing explanations is a feature of adequate explanations in psychology.

According to philosophers influenced by Aristotle and Wittgenstein, it is a mistake to attribute psychological properties to objects that fail to resemble human beings in relevant respects, in particular to parts of an animal, notably its brain or parts thereof. There are two labels for this alleged mistake: mereological fallacy and homunculus fallacy. This entry reconstructs both and explains their differences. The charge that subpersonal psychology commits such fundamental errors has been subject to numerous objections, which are assessed in this entry. It also broaches areas of recent interest: the nature of explanation in cognitive neuroscience, the predictive processing framework, as well as implications for debates regarding the moral status of brain organoids.