Gareth Evans’ causal theory of names intends to combine previous theories of reference of descriptivism and causation into a new concept he introduces called dominance. With the formation of his novel theory in three criteria, there exist unconsidered consequences. Firstly, an analysis of his theory reveals an underlying assumption about dominance in realistic scenarios. What results is another consequence and critique: his theory fails in times of split dominance or its absence, an uncertainty …
Read moreGareth Evans’ causal theory of names intends to combine previous theories of reference of descriptivism and causation into a new concept he introduces called dominance. With the formation of his novel theory in three criteria, there exist unconsidered consequences. Firstly, an analysis of his theory reveals an underlying assumption about dominance in realistic scenarios. What results is another consequence and critique: his theory fails in times of split dominance or its absence, an uncertainty for referring, where information is evenly distributed between two possible referents. Its qualitative reliance leads the theory to refer successfully in the vast majority of cases, but once the weight of descriptions and causation is equal between two referents, the theory cannot refer. However, despite dominance being ruled out as not working in his theory, it is still paradoxically sufficient for reference in split cases, just not particularly in Evans’ theory.
