Camila Lobo

No collection of essays is ever complete. The one presented here is no exception and, I dare say, perhaps it is incomplete in a rather singular way. It is a collection of philosophical and feminist essays, or philosophical essays about feminism, or feminist essays about philosophy, if the distinction is in any way discernible. An excursion, therefore, in feminist philosophy, that travels along some of its most significant paths―from epistemology, to ontology, to ethics, to the revision of the philosophical canon itself―which creates new trails―and this is certainly one of the most surprising aspects of this volume―but leaves many others unexplored. Necessarily. Like all philosophical thought, feminist philosophy is, by definition, an open, critical field that simultaneously contains within itself the capacity to branch out ad infinitum and return to itself in an exercise of self-reflection. For this reason, the main purpose of this special issue of Forma de Vida is, in the first place, to accompany the reader on a journey through some of the possibilities created by the association of philosophy with feminism―its variants and variations.

Num sentido comum, o pensamento dogmático e/ou ideológico pode ser entendido como uma degeneração de formas de pensamento religioso e/ou político. Neste artigo, argumento que a filosofia tardia de Ludwig Wittgenstein permite fazer sentido desta ideia através das noções de “imagem do mundo” e de “dobradiças”, que explicam o modo como as nossas práticas racionais decorrem contra o pano de fundo de determinados compromissos não-epistémicos. Porque o valor de tais compromissos é dado pela sua capacidade de promover a agência racional, o pensamento dogmático e/ou ideológico distingue-se categorialmente de outras formas de pensamento religioso e/ou político e é condenável filosoficamente. En un sentido común, el pensamiento dogmático y/o ideológico puede entenderse como una degeneración del pensamiento religioso y/o político. En este artículo, sostengo que la filosofía tardía de Ludwig Wittgenstein nos permite dar sentido a esta idea a través de las nociones de "imagen del mundo" y "goznes", que explican cómo nuestras prácticas racionales tienen lugar con el telón de fondo de ciertos compromisos no-epistémicos. Dado que el valor de tales compromisos viene dado por su capacidad de promover la agencia racional, el pensamiento dogmático y/o ideológico se distingue categorialmente de otras formas de pensamiento religioso y/o político y es filosóficamente condenable.

Miranda Fricker’s account of what is involved in cases of hermeneutical injustice has been criticised for neglecting the existence of alternative hermeneutical resources developed by non-dominant groups and consequently overlooking its members’ cognitive agency. I argue that this critical strand might be extended to consider what I call “uncontroversial cases of hermeneutical injustice”, i.e. cases in which no alternative resources are available, but marginalized subjects can still be said to resist dominant interpretations of their experiences. Following Alice Crary, I trace the limitations of Fricker’s original account of hermeneutical injustice back to her reliance on a neutral conception of reason and argue that widening the realm of rationality to accommodate affective responses authorizes a revaluation of marginalized subjects’ agency under ideological systems. To illustrate this point, I indicate that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s reflections on hinges present a notion of objectivity that serves liberatory projects and might guide a more adequate response to cases of hermeneutical injustice.