Can Laurens Löwe

This paper examines Aquinas's theory of dualist mental causation, that is, his theory of how human beings can efficiently cause changes in their bodies in virtue of two non-physical mental states of theirs, specifically an act of the intellect and an act of the will. It is first shown that Aquinas's hylomorphism does not lie at the heart of this theory. Rather, a relation that he calls “contact of power” (tactus virtutis) does. The remainder of the paper then investigates the nature of this relation. Since Aquinas discusses key marks of it by contrasting it with physical contact, the paper focuses on this contrast. It is argued that, for Aquinas, the human soul stands in a relation of contact of power to the body or, more precisely, a certain part of the body when it causes a change in it and is holenmerically co-located with it.

All Aristotelians subscribed to the thesis that the soul as the principle of life has many powers. But how are the powers related to the soul’s essence? It has often been argued that medieval philosophers gave two answers to this ques- tion: some took them to be necessary accidents that are distinct from the soul’s essence, whereas others simply identified them with the essence. This paper intends to show that there were alternatives to these two standard models. Peter of John Olivi argued that the powers are not accidents but substantial forms that constitute the soul’s essence. He thereby defended a strong mereological thesis, for he assumed that the powers are literally parts that make together a whole. Henry of Ghent also rejected the idea that powers are accidents. Instead, he defended the claim that a power of the soul is a whole constituted by the soul’s essence and a relation determining the essence to an act and an object. In making this claim, Henry proposed a determination thesis. The paper dis- cusses both theses in detail, looks at the arguments Olivi and Henry adduced against the two standard models, and evaluates their theories in the historical context.

This article examines Bonaventure’s account of the soul and its powers, which seeks to strike a middle path between the better-known identity and distinction views of the thirteenth century. Bonaventure contends that the powers of the soul are neither fully distinct from the soul nor completely identical to it. The article argues that Bonaventure’s view comprises four key theses. Bonaventure maintains that the soul’s powers are necessary features of the soul; that they depend on the soul; that they are in the same category as the soul; but that they belong to this category “by reduction”. The article also considers an objection to Bonaventure’s view raised by Peter John Olivi.

This book offers a novel account of Aquinas's theory of the human act. It argues that Aquinas takes a human act to be a composite of two power-exercises, where one relates to the other as form to matter. The formal component is an act of the will, and the material component is a power-exercise caused by the will, which Aquinas refers to as the 'commanded act.' The book also argues that Aquinas conceptualizes the act of free choice as a hylomorphic composite: it is, materially, an act of the will, but it inherits a form from reason. As the book aims to show, the core idea of Aquinas's hylomorphic action theory is that the exercise of one power can structure the exercise of another power, and this provides a helpful way to think of the presence of cognition in conation and of intention in bodily movement.

This paper examines Aristotle’s account of the individuation of causal powers, which dominated much of scholastic thought about powers, and argues that John Buridan rejected it. It contends that Buridan criticizes Aristotle’s account on two counts. First, he attacks Aristotle’s view that we ought to individuate powers by appeal to their respective activities. Second, Buridan objects to Aristotle’s “single-track” account, which correlates one type of power with only one type of activity. Against this, it is argued, Buridan adopts a multi-track approach, according to which a single power type may be correlated with many different types of activities. The paper claims that the basic idea of Buridan’s multi-track view is still defensible today, and can be viewed as a viable alternative to the contemporary single-track account of power individuation defended, for instance, by Jonathan Lowe.

This paper considers Thomas Aquinas’s claim that we can use certain habitus at will. Focusing on moral habitus, this claim is interpreted as a claim about the freedom human beings have with regard to their character traits: they can freely choose to act or not act according to their character traits. After giving a brief account of how, for Aquinas, character traits influence our actions via our emotions, the paper examines whether this freedom is of a libertarian or of a compatibilist kind. A libertarian reading is defended on the basis of certain remarks of Aquinas’s about the act of contrition.

Cet article présente une analyse de l’interprétation de la définition aristotélicienne du mouvement dans Physique III. 1 (201a10-11) par Thomas d’Aquin, notamment en avançant deux thèses. Premièrement, Thomas comprend le mouvement comme une actualisation de la potentialité d’être mu. Deuxièmement, nous montrons que d’après Thomas le mouvement est une entité semi-réelle, dans la mesure où le processus du mouvement est dans l’esprit de celui qui perçoit. Ces thèses nous mènent à conclure que Thomas d’Aquin ne reprend pas simplement la définition aristotélicienne du mouvement, mais qu’il la transforme.

ABSTRACTThis paper examines Thomas Aquinas’ and John Duns Scotus’ respective views on the action-passion identity thesis. This thesis, which goes back to Aristotle, states that when an agent causes a change in a patient, then the agent’s causing of the change is identical to the patient’s undergoing of said change. Action and passion are, on this view, one and the same change in the patient, albeit under two distinct descriptions. The first part of the paper considers Aquinas’ defence of this thesis. The second part discusses Scotus’ attack on this thesis. As this paper shows, Scotus argues, against Aquinas and other scholastics, that action and passion are discrete entities inhering in two distinct bearers: action in the agent and passion in the patient.

_ Source: _Volume 55, Issue 4, pp 239 - 272 According to Peter Auriol, OFM, efficient causation is a composite being consisting of items belonging to three distinct categories: a change, an action, and a passion. The change functions as the subject bearing action and passion. After presenting Aristotle’s account of action and passion, which constitutes the background to Auriol’s theory of causation, this paper considers Auriol’s interpretation of Aristotle’s account in contrast to an alternative interpretation defended by Hervaeus Natalis and William of Ockham. Finally, it shows how Auriol, on the basis of his interpretation of Aristotle, develops his own account of efficient causation as a composite being.

The focus of the article is the self-predication principle, according to which the/a such-and-such is such-and-such. We consider contemporary approaches (Frege, Russell, Meinong) to the self-predication principle, as well as fourteenth-century approaches (Burley, Ockham, Buridan). In crucial ways, the Ockham-Buridan view prefigures Russell’s view, and Burley’s view shows a striking resemblance to Meinong’s view. In short the Russell-Ockham-Buridan view holds: no existence, no truth. The Burley-Meinong view holds, in short: intelligibility suffices for truth. Both views approach self-predication in a uniform way. We were unable to find a medieval philosopher who, like Frege, approaches self-predication in a non-uniform way. We do not want to dispute that there are also considerable differences between the contemporary and the fourteenth-century approach to self-predication. Importantly, fourteenth-century accounts of self-predication rely strongly on the identity theory of predication, and this theory is not endorsed by contemporary philosophers of language. Nevertheless, some basic tenets seem to us to be clearly shared between fourteenth-century and contemporary thinkers.

This paper examines the accounts of limit decision advanced by Hervaeus Natalis and Durand of St. Pourçain in their respective discussions of the sanctification of the Blessed Virgin. Hervaeus and Durand argue, against Aristotle, that the temporal limits of certain changes, including Mary’s sanctification, should be assigned in discrete rather than continuous time. The paper first considers Hervaeus’ discussion of limit decision and argues that, for Hervaeus, a solution of temporal limits in terms of discrete time can coexist with an Aristotelian continuous time solution because Hervaeus takes continuous and discrete time to be two non-intersecting, but correlated time-series. The paper next examines Durand’s account of limit decision and argues that Durand rejects Hervaeus’ correlation assumption as well as Aristotle’s continuous time solution.