Carina Pape

Viele moralphilosophische Konzepte haben sich aus kolonialen Legitimationsdiskursen heraus entwickelt. Um diesbezüglich Philosophie als Selbstkritik zu praktizieren, werde ich das Begriffspaar „Scham(kulturen) und Schuld(- kulturen)“ als konkretes Beispiel diskutieren und die (un)moralischen Emotionen Scham und Schuld in der deutsch- und englischsprachigen Philosophie von Immanuel Kant bis hin zur Debatte um die moral emotions kritisch beleuchten. Der diesem Begriffspaar zugrundeliegende Ethnozentrismus kann durch einen interkulturellen Polylog zwischen Nordamerika, Europa und Japan aufgedeckt werden. Der Blick auf japanische Scham- und Schuldphänomene sowie der japanische Blick auf europäische Varianten deckt eine ethnozentrische Verkürzung der europäischen Begriffe auf. Dadurch kann nicht nur das kolonialistische Konzept der „Scham- und Schuldkulturen“ korrigiert, sondern auch das eigene moralphilosophische Vokabular präzisiert werden.

In his famous essay from 1784, Kant denied that we "live in an enlightened age"; yet he claimed that we "live in an age of enlightenment". If we should answer the question if we live in an enlightened age now, we could basically give the same answer. The enlightenment as an ongoing process can be found throughout Kant's whole work. This article focuses on how the concept of enlightenment can be applied to the Kantian psychology, which marks an important change of theory of the soul within modern western metaphysics. Kant's idea of enlightenment and 'critique' will be illustrated with reference to the "Paralogisms" of the Critique of Pure Reason. Finally, an analysis of some passages of the "Paralogisms" shall demonstrate that Kant's critique of the previous metaphysical doctrine of the human soul should not be understood as a complete rejection of this doctrine; rather, Kant's critique of what is called rational psychology should be understood as a critical transformation.

The terms “race” and “sex / gender” have a specific relation to the Age of Enlightenment. Both were relevant for the new discourses of anthropology or the ‘nature of men’. Both have ‘naturalistic’ and social aspects that intersect, as the double-termed idea of “sex / gender” shows explicitly. The idea of “race” is no less complex. Both terms were topics of theoretical anthropology, but were nevertheless charged with pragmatic implications which lead to naturalistic fallacies: the equation of physical features and character traits or mental skills. Therefore, even today there is a complex intersection between both terms. Using this history of ideas first I will go back to a time before ‘races’ were invented and ‘gender’ became scientifically relevant. How did these categories of the other (from the European perspective) historically develop? What is or was their function? What kinds of (unconscious) intersections were there? I will then provide an overview of the use of the term “race” and its etymology. I will then reconstruct the development of the term “sex / gender”. Why, in which way, and by whom were they used? And how did the terms intersect from the beginning and thereby reinforce the confusion of ‘naturalistic’, scientific, social and other aspects (naturalistic fallacy)? I will focus on these questions. In so doing we can better understand the Enlightenment’s negative legacy and the sexisms and racisms of today.

Basically, indignation is the reaction to an action perceived as violating norms. I understand “norms” as rules “which are kept in deference of others”. They include moral and legal aspects, and they are socially embedded. Peter Strawson mentioned a “complicated web of attitudes and feelings which form an essential part of the moral life as we know it” and named indignation such a moral reactive attitude. I argue that indignation is not only part of a “complicated web of attitudes and feelings”. Indignation itself has a web-like structure. Both a normative context and emotions are mandatory “strings” of that web-like structure. We would not call a merely impulsive, emotional outbreak “indignation” or a ‘clinical’ judgment (such as is appropriate for a judge) “indignation”. Before we can focus on the question when or if the experience or expressions of indignation are appropriate, we have to reveal its structure. I propose to reveal this structure phenomenologically and to combine this phenomenological approach with general normative considerations. Like other phenomena of the life-world, the phenomenon of indignation is not ‘open to an immediate descriptive capture’. But through the moral, legal, and emotional aspects, which form and influence the attitude of indignation, its structure may be revealed. To illustrate indignation’s web-like structure I will use Ullmann-Margalit and Sunstein’s discussions on inequality and the normative dimension of indignation, as well as Jesse Prinz’ description of moral anger and moral disgust.

Der zivile Ungehorsam zählt zu jenen Konzepten der Politischen Philosophie bzw. Politischen Theorie, die relativ einheitlich bestimmt und theoretisch ausgearbeitet wurden. Zu nennen sind John Rawls, Hannah Arendt oder Jürgen Habermas. Zugleich ist diese spezielle Form politischer Partizipation stark in der Praxis verankert, aus ihr hervorgegangen. Da „neue Formen politischer Vergemeinschaftung mit den hergebrachten Kategorien einzelstaatlicher Demokratie nicht zu greifen sind“ (Niesen u.a. 2015: 162), bietet das Konzept des zivilen Ungehorsams, selbst grenzüberschreitend in mehrfacher Hinsicht, eine Alternative auf globaler Ebene. Der Vorzug dieses zivilen Ungehorsams zweiter Stufe – eines weltbürgerlichen Ungehorsams – liegt darin, dass er eben kein theoretischer Versuch ist, „hergebrachte Kategorien einzelstaatlicher Demokratien“ auf globale Probleme zu übertragen. Vielmehr stellt er, wie auch der zivile Ungehorsam generell, eine aus der Praxis heraus gewachsene Form zivilgesellschaftlicher Partizipation dar, die unabhängig von Nationalgrenzen und Pässen sowie jenseits von „Moralismus und naturrechtlicher Expertokratie“ (Niesen u.a. 2015: 161) funktioniert, wie ich im Folgenden zeigen werde.

It seems commonplace to talk about Plato and eros, but it seems peculiar to write about Immanuel Kant and sexuality. In fact, Kant’s statements about the dangers of masturbation in his On Education give the impression of a conservative and even unenlightened attitude. Yet highly progressive aspects manifest in the same text. A reasonable dealing with our »mere animal nature« does not mean its suppression. A public discussion about sexuality, ›Sexualaufklärung‹ (sex education), did not exist before the middle of the 20th century. People were mostly depicted as asexual creatures in biology teaching books. Female sexuality out of wedlock was taboo. I will show that Kant’s marital law and his aim of pedagogical enlightenment are already much more emancipated. Kant argued for certain liberties concerning sexual identity and thereby anticipated gender-theories that emerged in the later 20th century. He also argued that pedagogical enlightenment must deal with the »Ge- schlechtsneigung« (sexual attraction) explicitly. It would be dangerous not to talk about this issue, Kant warned, which nature had tried to combine »with all sorts of morality«. I will illuminate this ambivalent pedagogical concern as paradigmatic for the Enlightenment. It is inevitably bound to the complex ideas of transcendental vs. practical freedom and duty. Quite interestingly, Kant’s notion of female education centered around freedom and more specifically, autonomy, while male education foregrounded duty.

Marvel Comics legends Stan Lee and Steve Ditko first introduced Doctor Stephen Strange to the world in 1963—and his spellbinding adventures have wowed comic book fans ever since. Over fifty years later, the brilliant neurosurgeon-turned-Sorcerer Supreme has finally travelled from the pages of comics to the big screen, introducing a new generation of fans to his mind-bending mysticism and self-sacrificing heroics. In Doctor Strange and Philosophy, Mark D. White takes readers on a tour through some of the most interesting and unusual philosophical questions which surround Stephen Strange and his place in the Marvel Universe. Essays from two-dozen Philosophers Supreme illuminate how essential philosophical concepts, including existentialism, epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics, relate to the world of Doctor Strange. Fans will find answers to all their Strange questions: How does Doctor Strange reconcile his beliefs in science and magic? What does his astral self say about the relationship between mind and body? Why is he always so alone? And what does he mean when he says we’re just “tiny momentary specks within an indifferent universe”—and why was he wrong? You won’t need the Eye of Agamotto to comprehend all that is wise within. Doctor Strange and Philosophy offers comic book fans and philosophers alike the chance to dive deeper into the world of one of Marvel’s most mystical superheroes.

Michail M. Bachtin, der durch die Entwicklung der literaturwissenschaftlichen Paradigmen der Dialogizität und Polyphonie Berühmtheit erlangte, wurde noch nicht ausreichend als Vertreter der ihrerseits vernachlässigten russischen Philosophie wahrgenommen. Bereits in den philosophischen Fragmenten des Frühwerks bilden Dialog und Vielfalt den roten Faden. Unter der Prämisse seines dynamisch-organischen Menschenbildes ist der Mensch dort am vollkommensten, wo ihm ein anderer antwortet. Bachtins Frühwerk ist ein mutiges, aber nicht leicht zugängliches Plädoyer für eine menschliche Einheit in der Vielfalt und Vielfalt in der Einheit, das historisch und systematisch interpretiert und erschlossen wird. Die Phänomene Liebe und Tod veranschaulichen dieses Modell gegenseitiger Anerkennung, das vielfältige interdisziplinäre Anknüpfungspunkte bietet.

Die Aufklärung wurde als historische Denkbewegung oft kritisiert, ihre (vermeintliche) Dialektik aufgedeckt und die Kluft zwischen ihren ursprünglichen Zielen und ihren Konsequenzen angesichts der Kriege und Krisen des 20. Jahrhunderts beschrieben. Trotz dieser Kritik sind Begriff und Epoche der Aufklärung nach wie vor von großer gesellschaftlicher Bedeutung. Grundforderungen der Aufklärung wie Freiheit, Öffentlichkeit, überprüfbares Wissen, Mündigkeit, Emanzipation und Selbstreflexion stellen eine fortwährende Herausforderung dar. Noch heute liefert sie Impulse für demokratische Bewegungen. Und auch (wissenschafts-)didaktisch erscheint sie zeitlos: Moderne Begriffe wie Brainstorming, Mindmapping und Networking, die innovativ, demokratisch und neu wirken, gehen auf Grundideen des selbstständigen und zugleich gemeinsamen Denkens und Arbeitens zurück, die bereits ein wichtiges Anliegen der Spätaufklärung waren. Die Beiträge des vorliegenden Bandes reichen von der historischen Einordnung der jeweiligen Disziplin in Bezug zur Epoche der Aufklärung bis hin zu Spezialfragen aus den Bereichen Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Pädagogik, Hochschulpolitik, Philosophie und Philosophiegeschichte, Medizinethik, Patient/-inneninformation und ärztliche Verantwortung, Rechtswissenschaft und -geschichte, Theologie, Post-Colonial Studies und Interkulturalität, Friedensforschung und Sexualaufklärung.

Mikhail Bakhtin aimed to invent a phenomenology of the self-experience and of the experience of the other in his early work. In order to realize such a phenomenology he combined different approaches he called idealism and materialism / naturalism. The first one he linked to Edmund Husserl, but did hardly name him directly concerning his phenomenology. Does this intersubjective phenomenology give a hint that Bakhtin used Husserlian ideas more than considered yet? Or did they both invent similar ideas independently from each other? Both thinkers dealt with the issue of intersubjectivity. Husserl judged statements on other psycho-physical realities as metaphysics in the Logical Investigations II, but in his Ideas I he described the others as enhancing one’s experience through their “experiential surpluses”. In the same way Bakhtin described the unique perspective of the other as a mandatory and valuable part of the world of the act in his Philosophy of the Act and his investigations on Author and Hero. In order to understand the influence of Husserl’s phenomenology for Bakhtin’s early philosophy we need to take a look closer at those contentual parallels as well as some paraphrases yet unnoticed. This gives hint for the question if for Bakhtin Husserl was more than just a name dropped. In this article I reconstructed the relations between both thinkers and answered the question if the dating of Bakhtin’s early work until 1928 has to be re-considered.