Carl Hildebrand

This paper responds to the dilemma of affective injustice by distinguishing between three forms of anger and recommending a model of virtuous anger the expression of which is consistent with the productive pursuit of justice. It argues that anger may in the first instance be either passive or active, that is, a passive affective register and morally inert experience, or something that is manifest in action towards other agents. Active anger may then be grounded in moral norms, or not. Anger that is properly grounded and guided by morality is consistent with virtuous agency and the productive pursuit of moral ends. In constructing this model of anger we draw inspiration from the Kantian account of virtue. We argue that this model provides a sound structure for morally productive anger while remaining vigilant towards anger’s darker possibilities. To demonstrate the comparative strength of this model, we outline some challenges with the idea of apt anger, arguing that moral norms and constraints are better suited to guide our evaluation of anger. We apply this model to educational settings, where we argue that it is beneficial to channel anger through moral norms, rather than attempt to calibrate its proper magnitude. All things considered, the moral status of anger is equivocal: it can both aid and hinder the pursuit of justice, so it is best to take a cautious while permissive stance towards its use in our common life.

ABSTRACT A duty to address loneliness raises questions about the nature of friendship, particularly whether relationships formed to address loneliness can be considered genuine friendships. Philosophers including Michael Stocker, Kieren Setiya, and David Velleman suggest that true friendship arises primarily out of regard for the other in the absence of goals external to that. This paper, however, argues that friendships formed out of duty or self-interest, such as the need for connection, need not be deemed inferior. Drawing on Kant’s notion of a duty of friendship, I challenge Stocker’s critique that acting for ends undermines the authenticity of friendship. I argue that goals and duties can coexist with genuine concern in acts of friendship, offering a more inclusive understanding of human relationships. This supports the language of rights and duties related to loneliness while providing a normative-psychological framework for fostering meaningful connections. While friendship is not primarily goal-oriented, the presence of goals and duties does not negate its authenticity.

Zohny et al provide a proof of concept for large language model (LLM)-patient communication in medical decision-making, discussing some of the risks and potential downsides of implementing this technology. However, removing human healthcare professionals (HCPs) from medical decision-making carries further risks they do not discuss. These include risks that a conscientious HCP with appropriate training can address, including (1) diminished situational autonomy due to pressure from family members or loved ones, (2) barriers to autonomy due to the situational inflexibility of LLMs and (3) diminished comfort and trust due to lack of human empathy. While the central moral focus in the implementation of this technology should be patient consent and the process that supports it, the dehumanisation of medical decision-making risks broader negative effects on both patients and HCPs, some of which are also discussed in this article. These concerns should be addressed to minimise the harm and maximise the good that LLMs can do to enhance patient decision-making.

People have often thought that Kant left no room for compassion in the virtuous life, because virtue for him is about doing the right thing when you don't feel like it. However, compassion is an important virtue in Kantian ethics, where it is understood as a form of moral cognition grounded in a commitment to act for the good of others. Though this means that the Kantian virtue of compassion is primarily intellectual in nature, contrary to what people have thought, the virtuous person can experience great feelings of compassion, affection and pleasure. And yet, these feelings are not strictly necessary for someone to have the virtue. For this reason, some, for example neurodiverse, agents who would not qualify as virtuous on the Aristotelian picture do qualify as virtuous on the Kantian picture. This expands the traditional virtue label in a good way.

Kant’s rational religion has been described as a failure because his idea of redemption contains contradictory appeals to human responsibility and divine assistance. For example, John Hare has argued that Kant cannot explain how human beings can bridge a moral gap between an ideal state of virtue and an imperfect disposition. In this paper, I defend Kant from this criticism, arguing that his rational religion is coherent: human agency and divine assistance may each contribute to redemption without inconsistency. I argue that divine grace may be operative for Kant through the gradual process of character formation, in addition to the instantaneous change of heart, providing an alternative explanation of how the moral gap may be bridged. I compare this account with Erasmus’s account of free will and divine grace, arguing that each account employs a similar strategy and structure to explain the operation of grace. Though Kant’s position is not identical with historical (orthodox) Christianity, he holds that reason is necessarily religious in orientation and must remain open to the possibility that divine grace is necessary for moral improvement.

The standard account of Kantian moral weakness fails to provide a psychologically realistic account of moral improvement. It assumes that moral strength is simply a matter of volitional resolve and weakness is a lack of resolve. This leaves the path to moral improvement unclear. In this paper, I reconstruct an alternative character-based account of Kantian moral weakness and strength. On this account, moral strength is the possession of sympathy and self-knowledge, key practical-epistemic virtues from Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue, and moral weakness is a lack of these virtues. This identifies moral strength with a high degree of development, integrity, or fitness in one’s character, and not merely an ability to somehow try harder. It also resolves an exegetical puzzle concerning the change of heart in Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.