Carla Spielmann

Emerging from a critique of traditional conceptions of knowledge, particularly their claims to universality and neutrality, Standpoint Epistemology foregrounds the socio-political situatedness of the knowing subject, thereby integrating ethical concerns into epistemic and epistemological practice. Its insistence on taking subjective perspectives seriously in processes of conceptualizing and evaluating knowledge has, however, provoked accusations of epistemic relativism. In response to such allegations, Sandra Harding introduced the concept of Strong Objectivity, arguing that Standpoint Epistemology, far from lapsing into epistemic relativism, actually produces more objective knowledge. Strong Objectivity rests on the idea of strong reflexivity, understood as the capacity for critical self-reflection exercised within, and through, a heterogeneous community of epistemic subjects. In this paper, I argue that Harding, along with those who have defended her position, lacks a sufficiently robust account of critical reflection, one that would be compatible with the feminist commitment to social constructionism regarding the epistemic subject. Consequently, their response to the charge of relativism remains unconvincing. More recent attempts to clarify the possibility and function of critical reflection within Standpoint Epistemology also fail to adequately address this crucial issue of reflexivity.