Carlo Filice

I argue in this paper that pacifism is a live moral option. I do this in four steps. First, I try to make the case that the backing of thinkers and prophets of the stature of Gandhi and Jesus lends pacifism some prima-facie moral legitimacy. Second, I try to determine what the ethical-metaphysical preconditions that would justify pacifism would have to be---and I conclude that some consequentialist soul-exposing scheme would be required. Third, I argue that such a scheme would be able to sustain pacifism against rights-based criticisms, like those advanced by Narveson. Fourth, I defend the possibility of such a required ethical-metaphysical scheme.

Against the background of widespread use and justification of violence in Christian history, this paper reviews the text of the Christian Gospels to see if the words or deeds of Jesus or his followers indicate whether Jesus taught absolute pacifism. I argue that while the evidence does not totally refute the claims of the just war tradition, the weight of the evidence corroborates the conclusion that Jesus was indeed a pacifist and that his pacifism is grounded in a particularly demanding ethical vision that has some parallels with that of the philosopher Immanuel Kant but is even more demanding. I also note that Gandhi incorporated Gospel teachings into his definitions of ahimsa and satyagraha; and that pacifist Christian groups such as Cathars, Anabaptists, and Quakers deserve credit for holding views closer to Jesus’ teachings than those of even the most well-intentioned mainstream Christian churches.

Two critics respond to Predrag Cicovacki’s book, Gandi’s Footprints. Cicovacki opens the discussion by presenting his motivations for exploring a paradox, that Gandhi’s work is widely revered but not widely emulated. Cicovacki explores a resolution to the paradox by suggesting how Gandhi’s promising visions may be followed without being imitated, especially Gandhi’s insight that we must seek spiritual grounding for life in a materialistic world. Critic Sanjay Lal affirms Cicovacki’s insight but suggests that precisely because Gandhi’s aspirations for spiritual life were profoundly transformative we should take care not to dilute them into our conventional wisdoms. Critic Carlo Filice asks how Gandhi’s commitment to unified reality could be more clearly articulated once a distinction is drawn between spirit and matter, also how Gandhi’s nonviolence could manage to embrace important exceptions. In reply to critics, Cicovacki proposes an approach to Gandhi informed by the insights of Tagore.

This paper suggests that libertarians should avail themselves of a system of natural and autonomy-friendly motivational foundations—intrinsic motives. A psyche equipped with intrinsic motives could allow for some degree of character-formation that is genuinely and robustly autonomous. Such autonomy would rest on motives that are one’s own in the most direct way: they are part of one’s natural make-up. A model with intrinsic motives can help libertarians in multiple ways: to deal with skeptics regarding the very idea of robust self-making; to explain the importance of autonomy (it helps explain how the agent can set her dominant life-goals on the basis of her own motives); to explain why an artificially induced, albeit rational, autonomy is less than genuine (it would not rely on the agent’s own motives).

I argue in this paper that pacifism is a live moral option. I do this in four steps. First, I try to make the case that the backing of thinkers and prophets of the stature of Gandhi and Jesus lends pacifism some prima-facie moral legitimacy. Second, I try to determine what the ethical-metaphysical preconditions that would justify pacifism would have to be---and I conclude that some consequentialist soul-exposing scheme would be required. Third, I argue that such a scheme would be able to sustain pacifism against rights-based criticisms, like those advanced by Narveson. Fourth, I defend the possibility of such a required ethical-metaphysical scheme.

I argue in this paper that pacifism is a live moral option. I do this in four steps. First, I try to make the case that the backing of thinkers and prophets of the stature of Gandhi and Jesus lends pacifism some prima-facie moral legitimacy. Second, I try to determine what the ethical-metaphysical preconditions that would justify pacifism would have to be---and I conclude that some consequentialist soul-exposing scheme would be required. Third, I argue that such a scheme would be able to sustain pacifism against rights-based criticisms, like those advanced by Narveson. Fourth, I defend the possibility of such a required ethical-metaphysical scheme.

This thesis attempts to show that an adequate account of human agency requires postulation of a substantial self that is intrinsically active. It proposes and defends a coherent picture of this self's relation to its states, notably, to its motives; and it tries to establish the conditions for freedom-qua-autonomy. ;It is first shown that the "action-event" distinction is real and ontologically significant. Explanations of this distinction are found to come in two types: event-causal and agent-causal. Each, in turn, is examined. ;Event-causal accounts fall into two sorts: one sort I call theories; the other I term analyses. Theories are event-causal accounts that treat the active element in action to be irreducible and unanalyzable. They locate this element in some event-type, like the volition. . Analyses, in contrast, are attempts to show that action is merely a complex of non-active events causally related in a suitable manner . Both event-causal types of accounts of action are shown to be inadequate. ;In light of the flaws of event-causal accounts, various alternative agent-causal theories are explored. Using the results of this study, a comprehensive agent-causal theory is developed and defended. This theory postulates an intrinsically active substantial self as the agent--as oneself. Defense of this notion rests in part upon a unique experiential phenomenon: that of continuous sustained causation of a lasting process. Objections to this type of theory are then addressed. There follows an account of how the self is related to its states in general, and to its motives in particular. ;The final chapter is devoted to freedom-qua-autonomy. It is argued that activeness is only a necessary condition for autonomy. A further requirement is the agent-self's 'appropriation' of the motives operative in an act. Appropriation of a motive is construed as resulting from the agent's active, reflexive participation in the motive's emergence and/or continued existence

I attempt to show that a cosmic theistic scheme that includes multiple lives as part of a benign plan for the world is likely to be the most moral scheme. It has the best chance of dealing with key aspects of the problem of evil, or of apparent cosmic injustice – particularly when compared to a single-life scheme. Its advantages have to do with the initial disparate condition of children, and with the massive nature of undeserved harm. A multiple-lives scheme is also promising for handling broader meaning of life questions. I end by replying to some common objections to multiple-lives schemes.