Carlos Bermúdez

La interpretación heideggeriana de la “muerte de Dios” en Nietzsche entraña la esencial significación de un movimiento según el cual la metafísica llega a ser superada. Dicho movimiento se constata en las más influyentes de las filosofías modernas, sobre todo, en las filosofías de Kant y de Hegel. En palabras de Heidegger, después de Nietzsche “a la filosofía sólo le queda pervertirse y desnaturalizarse, de modo que ya no se divisan otras posibilidades para ella”. Esta superación compromete el conjunto de la historia acontecida del ser y permite descubrir en el seno de la misma metafísica su constitución onto-teológica. El texto examina la “muerte de Dios” a la luz del postulado de la onto-teología en cuanto esencia de la metafísica, y las consecuencias que de ello se derivan para el pensamiento de Dios en la filosofía contemporánea.

Legal rules are often understood in terms of exclusionary reasons, and exclusionary reasons are normally understood as reasons for action according to Raz. In this paper, I engage with the literature on the metaphysics of reasons for action and explain how exclusionary reasons can be used in different conceptions of what reasons for action are (and not only by the one defended by Joseph Raz). To do that, I proceed as follows: In the first part, and after differentiating between factual and psychological conceptions of what reasons for action are, I engage with different approaches to reasons for action as facts (such as those claiming that reasons are explanation or evidence of “oughts”, primitive facts, and value-based instrumental and non-instrumental facts) to defend that exclusionary reasons can be accommodated inside all of those factual conceptions of reasons for action. In the second part, I engage with those claiming that reasons for action are grounded in mental states (such as will, desires, beliefs, and intentions) to explore whether exclusionary reasons can work inside those psychological conceptions of what reasons for action are. As a result, by showing how exclusionary reasons can be accommodated inside different factual and psychological conceptions of what reasons for action are, I defend that exclusionary reasons are an open concept that is not conceptually linked to Raz’s conception of what reasons for action are.

Legal rules are often understood in terms of exclusionary reasons, and exclusionary reasons are normally understood as reasons for action according to R az. In this paper, I engage with the literature on the _metaphysics of reasons for action_ and explain how exclusionary reasons can be used in different conceptions of what reasons for action _are_ (and not only by the one defended by J oseph R az ). To do that, I proceed as follows: In the first part, and after differentiating between _factual_ and _psychological_ conceptions of what reasons for action are, I engage with different approaches to reasons for action as facts (such as those claiming that reasons are explanation or evidence of “oughts”, primitive facts, and value-based instrumental and non-instrumental facts) to defend that exclusionary reasons can be accommodated inside all of those _factual_ conceptions of reasons for action. In the second part, I engage with those claiming that reasons for action are grounded in mental states (such as will, desires, beliefs, and intentions) to explore whether exclusionary reasons can work inside those _psychological_ conceptions of what reasons for action are. As a result, by showing how exclusionary reasons can be accommodated inside different factual and psychological conceptions of what reasons for action are, I defend that exclusionary reasons are an open concept that is not conceptually linked to R az’s conception of what reasons for action are.