Carlos Garduño

As a result of the development of artificial intelligence, the current public sphere confronts us with computer systems that neutralize identities through deepfakes. This text argues that resistance to them depends on alternative uses of technology. The tools developed by Michel Foucault can clarify these conflicts and help to conceive strategies. To demonstrate this, public spaces where authenticity becomes irrelevant will be characterized through the notion of profilicity proposed by Hans-Georg Moeller and Paul J. D’Ambrosio. Subsequently, based on Foucault’s interpretation of the Enlightenment, his analysis of the technologies of the self, and his conversation with Gilles Deleuze on the role of the intellectual, it will be specified how to maintain the project of defending autonomy, providedit is considered a technical process and the development of variable strategies.

Garduño, Carlos. Acontecimiento revolucionario y verdad. La noción de revolución en la discusión contemporánea sobre la acción política. En este texto tengo el propósito de discutir la noción de acontecimiento revolucionario en dos momentos, con el fin de mostrar su pertinencia en la discusión contemporánea sobre la acción política. En el primero revisaré la crítica de Hannah Arendt al marxismo como forma de pensamiento que reinterpreta las categorías tradicionales de jerarquización de la actividad humana y que pretende determinar el sentido del acontecimiento a través de una verdad teórica, lo cual, a juicio de la autora, condiciona su fracaso como proceso emancipador. Posteriormente, en el segundo momento, desarrollo una respuesta marxista a la postura de Arendt a partir de las críticas de Cornelius Castoriadis, Alain Badiou y Slavoj Žižek, y de los desarrollos de Badiou y Žižek sobre la vinculación entre acontecimiento y verdad.

The purpose of this text is to confront some Paul Ricoeur’s and Michel Foucault’s significant reflections on Greek tragedy, in order to discuss their interpretation of its truth and the knowledge it makes possible. Ricoeur supposes that tragedy implies a theology that, though it is not explicitly developed, points to the knowledge of the self, his conflicts with others, and even to a possible redemption. For his part, Foucault determines that in tragedies a set of discourses opposing against each other is at stake, without the possibility of overcoming their conflict in a higher knowledge. Does tragedy allows knowledge through the spectacle and the emotions aroused? Is the truth of tragedy manifested in the confrontation and intensification of passions, but cannot be developed as knowledge of the self and his reconciliation with others?

Hannah Arendt’s work is an important reference for Paul Ricœur. Her definition of power as the free action in concert of individuals within a community of equals, guaranteed by institutions, allows Ricœur to ground his reflection on the political dimension of recognition and justice. However, as I will show in this paper, such a definition is problematic, particularly because of the relation that Arendt establishes between power and authority, her decision to separate the social and the political, and her understanding of ideology, philosophy, and common sense in politics. After describing Arendt’s account of the relation between power and authority, I argue that, without rejecting the spirit of her political thought or her basic concepts, Ricœur’s reflections on the functions of ideology in his Lectures on Ideology and Utopia offer a broader but complementary vision that allows us to understand the issues that remain obscure in Arendt’s approach. Résumé: L’œuvre de Hannah Arendt constitue une référence importante pour Paul Ricœur. La définition arendtienne du pouvoir comme agir ensemble des individus au sein d’une communauté d’égaux garantie par des institutions, fournit en effet à Ricœur les bases de sa réflexion sur la dimension politique de la reconnaissance et de la justice. Cependant, cet article s’efforce de montrer qu’une telle définition est problématique, non seulement en raison de la relation qu’Arendt établit entre le pouvoir et l’autorité, mais aussi en ce qui concerne sa distinction du social et du politique, sa compréhension de l’idéologie, ainsi que sa conception de la philosophie et du sens commun dans le domaine politique. Après une analyse des thèses d’Arendt sur la relation entre le pouvoir et l’autorité, cet article soutient que, sans rejeter l’esprit de la pensée politique arendtienne et ses concepts de base, la conception ricœurienne des fonctions de l’idéologie développée dans L’idéologie et l’utopie offre une vision plus ample et plus complète qui permet d’éclairer les questions qui demeurent obscures dans l’approche de Hannah Arendt.