Carlos Gomez

Subjects may be aware in each moment of the content of a given scene and/or internal state. However, the vivid reality of the scene is a by-product of the complex processing of external and internal information in the brain. This point is more evident in the hallucinatory phase of psychosis or during dreaming. There is complex internal processing for the recreation of certain contents which are unconscious for the subject, whilst the content is experienced, the process to arrive at the contents is not perceived at all. Therefore, an important question that naturally arises is if process and content are served by different neural mechanisms. The possibility that postsynaptic potentials arranged in an open-field configuration would be more related to the content, experienced (or not) by the subject, and transmission-transformation of information along neural networks would be related to processing would be proposed. The proposal has some important implications for clinical applications, given that depression, psychosis, anxiety, and others are experienced as defined contents or states, while more possibly the underpinnings are related to abnormal information processing. Therefore, any clinical application should be primarily directed to psychological, pharmacological, or neural stimulation modification of information processing. However, if the content is related to activation of defined neural nets, possibly defined as engrams in a broad sense, the activation of those engrams (content) would only be able to modify processing through action on the processes. A handful of psychological therapies, more or less, explicitly tacitly successfully focus on processes (i.e., cognitive therapy in psychosis) rather than on contents, while others also focus on contents (flooding therapy in anxiety). These ideas are being implicitly running from the beginning of Psychology and made explicit in the field of motivation in organizational psychology. It is important to clarify the different Physiological underpinnings of content and process, and how each intervention is more or less focused on one or the other to justify their odds for success. From an educational point of view, this topic refers to educational strategies more biased to memory (content) vs. educational strategies where the solving tasks approach (processes) is primed.

The present study focuses on a grammatical category called evidentiality. The primary meaning of evidentiality is concerned with information source. That is, it expresses whether something has been seen, heard or inferred. The aim here is to conduct a conceptual study of evidentiality in which use is made of formal tools. The fundamental intuition is that the distinction between ‘evidence’as ‘proof’and ‘evidentiality’as ‘to do with proof’is a crucial one. Evidentiality is a dynamic notion to be analysed through the use of knowledge by the agents, a knowledge in action, which involves an in-coming state and an out-coming state that is typical of the transmission of information. We propose our own approach in which the dynamics of knowledge in action is grasped in the context of a dynamic epistemic logic.

Se examina la idea de un vínculo directo entre modernización y pérdida de plausibilidad de la creencia religiosa, se explora la imagen contemporánea de la relación entre religión y racionalidad, y se muestra cómo no puede afirmarse que el avance de la ciencia conduzca a la secularización. Ante la pregunta, si la postsecularización conlleva una mutua exclusión de religión y racionalidad, se examinan las propuestas de J. Habermas y N. Wolterstorff, buscando criterios normativos para el diálogo entre racionalidades religiosas y no religiosas. The article examines the idea of a direct link between modernization and the loss of plausibility of religious belief, explores the contemporary image of the relation between religion and rationality, and shows why it is not possible to say that the advance of science leads to secularization. In view of the question regarding whether post- secularization entails the mutual exclusion of religion and rationality, it examines the proposals of J. Habermas and N. Wolterstorff, in a search for normative criteria for the dialogue between religious and non-religious rationalities

This paper attempts to delineate a kind of realism, which incorporates some anti-realistic insights regarding the perspective, situated, and historical character of our forms of knowing and being in the world, and which resonates with the basic tenets of Christian theism. The first part of the paper analyzes the challenges anti-realism poses to Christian theism, particularly regarding the role, which the doctrine of creation played in securing the correspondence theory of truth as well as the fundamental experience of God as the foundation of order and meaning. Using Heidegger’s hermeneutics in the second part, it is shown that epistemic pluralism can be made compatible with realism. Given that this form of hermeneutic realism still has problems with integrating the transcendence of God, as well as his/ her presence and action in the “world,” the notion of continuous co-creation as the basis for a pluralist realism that is amenable to Christian theism is explored in the final part.

BackgroundRespect for autonomy is a paramount principle in end-of-life ethics. Nevertheless, empirical studies show that decision-making, exclusively focused on the individual exercise of autonomy fails to align well with patients’ preferences at the end of life. The need for a more contextualized approach that meets real-life complexities experienced in end-of-life practices has been repeatedly advocated. In this regard, the notion of ‘relational autonomy’ may be a suitable alternative approach. Relational autonomy has even been advanced as a foundational notion of palliative care, shared decision-making, and advance-care planning. However, relational autonomy in end-of-life care is far from being clearly conceptualized or practically operationalized.Main bodyHere, we develop a relational account of autonomy in end-of-life care, one based on a dialogue between lived reality and conceptual thinking. We first show that the complexities of autonomy as experienced by patients and caregivers in end-of-life practices are inadequately acknowledged. Second, we critically reflect on how engaging a notion of relational autonomy can be an adequate answer to addressing these complexities. Our proposal brings into dialogue different ethical perspectives and incorporates multidimensional, socially embedded, scalar, and temporal aspects of relational theories of autonomy. We start our reflection with a case in end-of-life care, which we use as an illustration throughout our analysis.ConclusionThis article develops a relational account of autonomy, which responds to major shortcomings uncovered in the mainstream interpretation of this principle and which can be applied to end-of-life care practices.

BackgroundRespect for autonomy is a key concept in contemporary bioethics and end-of-life ethics in particular. Despite this status, an individualistic interpretation of autonomy is being challenged from the perspective of different theoretical traditions. Many authors claim that the principle of respect for autonomy needs to be reconceptualised starting from a relational viewpoint. Along these lines, the notion of relational autonomy is attracting increasing attention in medical ethics. Yet, others argue that relational autonomy needs further clarification in order to be adequately operationalised for medical practice. To this end, we examined the meaning, foundations, and uses of relational autonomy in the specific literature of end-of-life care ethics.MethodsUsing PRESS and PRISMA procedures, we conducted a systematic review of argument-based ethics publications in 8 major databases of biomedical, philosophy, and theology literature that focused on relational autonomy in end-of-life care. Full articles were screened. All included articles were critically appraised, and a synthesis was produced.ResultsFifty publications met our inclusion criteria. Twenty-eight articles were published in the last 5 years; publications were originating from 18 different countries. Results are organized according to: (a) an individualistic interpretation of autonomy; (b) critiques of this individualistic interpretation of autonomy; (c) relational autonomy as theoretically conceptualised; (d) relational autonomy as applied to clinical practice and moral judgment in end-of-life situations.ConclusionsThree main conclusions were reached. First, literature on relational autonomy tends to be more a ‘reaction against’ an individualistic interpretation of autonomy rather than be a positive concept itself. Dichotomic thinking can be overcome by a deeper development of the philosophical foundations of autonomy. Second, relational autonomy is a rich and complex concept, formulated in complementary ways from different philosophical sources. New dialogue among traditionally divergent standpoints will clarify the meaning. Third, our analysis stresses the need for dialogical developments in decision making in end-of-life situations. Integration of these three elements will likely lead to a clearer conceptualisation of relational autonomy in end-of-life care ethics. This should in turn lead to better decision-making in real-life situations.

Se trata de examinar las relaciones entre amor, ética y justicia, adoptando cuatro perspectivas complementarias: en primer lugar, se aborda la confrontación con Freud, en su enconada diatriba contra el concepto de «amor al prójimo». En segundo lugar, se plantea la confrontación con Kant, bajo la forma de la disputa entre «amor» e «imperativo». Situados así en el terreno de la ética, se consideran las relaciones entre amor y justicia, sirviéndonos ante todo de los análisis de Ricoeur, para abordar finalmente lo que podríamos denominar «el amor a los fuera de la ley», apoyándonos en algunos personajes literarios de Dostoievski.

RESUMEN Se explora críticamente el pensamiento del filósofo colombiano Jorge Aurelio Díaz acerca de la religión. En particular, se examina, por un lado, la cuestión del lugar y el papel de la religión en la modernidad, a partir de la pregunta por la racionalidad y el valor cognitivo de la creencia religiosa, y, por otro lado, la diferencia entre misticismo y religión. Se plantearán y discutirán algunos aspectos problemáticos de la manera en que Díaz comprende ambos asuntos. ABSTRACT The paper carries out a critical examination of Colombian philosopher Jorge Aurelio Díaz's philosophical thought regarding religion. Specifically, it examines the place and role of religion in modernity on the basis of the question regarding the rationality and cognitive value of religious belief, as well as the difference between mysticism and religion. The article sets forth and discusses some problematic aspects of the manner in which Díaz understands both of these issues.

Se examina la idea de un vínculo directo entre modernización y pérdida de plausibilidad de la creencia religiosa, se explora la imagen contemporánea de la relación entre religión y racionalidad, y se muestra cómo no puede afirmarse que el avance de la ciencia conduzca a la secularización. Ante la pregunta, si la postsecularización conlleva una mutua exclusión de religión y racionalidad, se examinan las propuestas de J. Habermas y N. Wolterstorff, buscando criterios normativos para el diálogo entre racionalidades religiosas y no religiosas.

RESUMENEl presente artículo examina el análisis efectuado por La Mothe le Vayer acerca del hecho religioso y su problemática en su obra Dialogues faits à l´imitation des anciens. Desde un acusado escepticismo, presenta la religión como una construcción cultural y convencional. La filosofía, en tanto ejercicio de análisis escéptico, ofrecerá una visión de la moral y la religión alejadas por completo de toda sacralizad. Serán, sin embargo, instrumentos muy útiles para el Estado y, si se administran bien, redundarán en la cohesión social y en la pax politica.PALABRAS CLAVEESCEPTICISMO, CONVENCIÓN, RAZÓN DE ESTADOABSTRACTIn this paper we examine the analysis carried out by La Mothe le Vayer of the religious matter and its problems in his work Dialogues faits à l´imitation des anciens. From a marked scepticism, he presents religion as a cultural and conventional entity. Philosophy, as an exercise of sceptical analysis, offers a view of morality and religion totally removed from any sacredness. Both are, however, very useful instruments for the State and, when well administered, beneficial to social cohesion and pax politica.KEY WORDSSCEPTICISM, CONVENTIOM, REASON OF STATE

The relationship between socio-constructionism and Christian theology has not been sufficiently explored. This paper critically analyses some of the main insights of socio-constructionist theories and suggests that a reinterpretation of the idea of social construction from a theistic perspective can avoid the unresolved problems of its radical versions. The paper argues that an order of meaning, whose origin cannot be reduced to human action, has to be presupposed for practices of social construction to work. This resonates with the belief in God´s action in human reality.

In current Western societies, increasing numbers of people express their desire to choose when to die. Allowing people to choose the moment of their death is an ethical issue that should be embedded in sound clinical and legal frameworks. In the case of persons with dementia, it raises further ethical questions such as: Does the person have the capacity to make the choice? Is the person being coerced? Who should be involved in the decision? Is the person’s suffering untreatable? The use of Advance Euthanasia Directives (AED) is suggested as a way to deal with end-of-life wishes of persons with dementia. However, in the Netherlands—the only country in which this practice is legal—the experiences of patients, doctors, and relatives have been far from satisfactory.Our paper analyses this complex ethical challenge from a Dignity-Enhancing Care approach, starting from the Dutch experiences with AED as a case. We first consider the lived experiences of the different stakeholders, seeking out a dialogical-interpretative understanding of care. We aim to promote human dignity as a normative standard for end-of-life care practices. Three concrete proposals are then presented in which this approach can be operationalised in order to deal respectfully with the end-of-life choices of persons with dementia.

COVID-19 has turned many ethical principles and presuppositions upside down. More precisely, the principle of respect for autonomy has been shown to be ill suited to face the ethical challenges posed by the current health crisis. Individual wishes and choices have been subordinated to public interests. Patients have received trial therapies under extraordinary procedures of informed consent. The principle of respect for autonomy, at least in its mainstream interpretation, has been particularly questioned during this pandemic. Further reflection on the nature and value of autonomy is urgently needed. Relational autonomy has been proposed as an alternative account of autonomy that can more adequately respond to contemporary ethical issues in general and to a pandemic such as the one we are currently facing in particular. As relational autonomy is an emerging notion in current bioethics, it requires further consideration and development to be properly operationalized. This paper aims to show how six different philosophical branches––namely, philosophy of nature, philosophical anthropology, existential phenomenology, discourse ethics, hermeneutics, and cultural anthropology––have incorporated the category of relation throughout the twentieth century. We first delve into primary philosophical sources and then apply their insights to the specific field of medical ethics. Learning from the historical developments of other philosophical fields may provide illumination that will enable bioethics to experience a successful “relational turn”, which has been partially initiated in contemporary bioethics but not yet achieved.

Deception scholars have argued that increasing the liar’s cognitive system artificially can produce deception cues. However, if too much load is imposed the truth tellers’ performance can also be impaired. To address this issue, we designed a veracity task that incorporated a secondary task to increase cognitive load gradually. Also, because deception has been associated with activity in the inferior frontal cortex (IFC), we examined the influence of transcranial direct current stimulation of the IFC on performance. During stimulation, participants truthfully or deceptively indicated whether each of a number of statements shown on screen was true or not. Higher load decreased recall but not general compliance or response times (RTs). Truthful trials yielded higher compliance rates and faster RTs than deceptive trials except for the highest load level. Anodal right stimulation decreased compliance in truthful trials when participants were not overloaded. Truth telling was more vulnerable to cognitive load and tDCS than lying.

La «filosofía de la conciencia» constituye el paradigma fundamental de la filosofía moderna de Descartes a Kant. Dicho paradigma ha sido sometido a sucesivas críticas, en primer lugar por parte de la denominada «filosofía de la sospecha» y, más tarde, por «el giro lingu..stico», aquí considerado desde la perspectiva de la ética discursiva habermasiana. Aunque esas críticas obligan a romper la primacía y el monologismo de la «filosofía de la conciencia», no deberían llevar a olvidar el valor de la conciencia misma, por resituada que quede. Así se trata de defender siguiendo los planteamientos de, entre otros, Wellmer, Muguerza, Bilbeny o Renaut, y reconsiderando desde ese horizonte la confrontación entre Hegel y Kant, retomada en nuestros días por la existente entre comunitaristas y liberales, para, finalmente, esbozar algunas perspectivas sobre la relación entre individualismo y cosmopolitismo