Carlos Montemayor

¿Qué tipo de agencia es necesaria para la personalidad jurídica? ¿Cuáles son los requisitos cognitivos y racionales que los sistemas legales asumen acerca de los sujetos de la ley? ¿Cómo es que los seres humanos cumplen con estos requisitos? En trabajo previo (Cáceres y Montemayor, 2016), hemos argumentado que estas preguntas requieren un nuevo acercamiento a la teoría del derecho, basado en hallazgos recientes en ciencia cognitiva, que van más allá de tratamientos teóricos neuro-legales contemporáneos. Aquí construimos sobre esta propuesta, ahora enfocándonos en cuestiones de agencia y normatividad, incluyendo tipos de agencia que son relevantes para la epistemología social. La conclusión principal del artículo es que los muy estrictos requisitos cognitivos que se asumen sobre las capacidades explícitas de racionalidad de los agentes cognitivos, presupuestos por la ley, no sólo son incompatibles con los hallazgos en psicología, sino que un análisis sistemático de la agencia moral y epistémica también es necesario para poder entender la normatividad legal. El argumento principal es que tipos de agencia colectiva, moral y epistémica, difieren de la agencia individual, la cual también debe distinguirse como moral y epistémica. Fundamentalmente, la agencia colectiva difiere de la individual no sólo con base en diferencias con respecto a la racionalidad, sino también con base en los criterios de integración informativa. Varias consecuencias de este análisis son evaluadas, incluyendo aspectos concernientes a integración informativa para juicios y decisiones, comunicación fiable para la agencia epistémica, y la integración de consideraciones morales en el razonamiento jurídico. Una revisión comprensiva de la noción de “autonomía” es justificada por esta propuesta, en parte porque los requisitos comunes para la personalidad y autonomía jurídica son muy demandantes e inadecuados en muchos casos, y en parte porque la agencia colectiva debe tomarse en consideración como un tipo fundamental de agencia legal responsable para procesos de integración informativa. Basándonos en la distinción entre formas epistémicas y morales de razonamiento, explicamos cómo los sistemas legales necesitan de altos niveles de integración cognitiva para la responsabilidad legal a nivel colectivo.

This article presents what I call the Central Normative Proposal of Luis Villoro. This proposal is based on an interpretation of the principle of non-exclusion in ethics and epistemology. The core argument of the paper is based on a linguistic analogy that demonstrates the importance of reasonable communication for non-exclusion in epistemology, which is assumed in various theses of Villoro. A consequence of this analogy for non-exclusion in ethics is that Villoro defends basing what is reasonable on the concrete possibilities of mutual understanding, starting with asymmetries and injustices that are obfuscated or eliminated in a contractualist analysis, or one that begins with strictly egalitarian principles. This criticism is compatible with egalitarian views, but it assumes a radically different point of departure. Although various theses by Villoro are compatible with egalitarian notions, given this point of departure based on asymmetries of power his proposal should be understood based on our cognitive capacities to understand and appreciate such asymmetries. For this reason, the paper concludes with an analysis of the notion of reasonableness, which under my interpretation Villoro defines in terms of our capacities for attention, that are not reducible to beliefs or systems of beliefs. In this way, the Central Normative Proposal of Villoro depends on the convergence between truth and the dignity of the members of communities in which as matter-of-fact asymmetries exist and must be eliminated through concrete communicative efforts.

In this paper, we defend two claims. First, we argue that a notion of contextuality that has been formalized in physics and psychology is applicable to linguistic contexts. Second, we propose that this formal apparatus is philosophically significant for the epistemology of language because it imposes homogeneous rational constraints on speakers. We propose a Contextuality Principle that explains and articulates these two claims. This principle states that speakers update contextual information by significantly reducing the space of probabilities and variables in a non-commutative way. Some contexts affect other contexts not merely in terms of the information they contain, but also on the basis of their sequential order. In particular, we argue that the Contextuality by Default theory provides a formalism that helps explain the role of contextuality in rational linguistic exchanges.

In this open access book, Carlos Montemayor illuminates the development of artificial intelligence (AI) by examining our drive to live a dignified life. He uses the notions of agency and attention to consider our pursuit of what is important. His method shows how the best way to guarantee value alignment between humans and potentially intelligent machines is through attention routines that satisfy similar needs. Setting out a theoretical framework for AI Montemayor acknowledges its legal, moral, and political implications and takes into account how epistemic agency differs from moral agency. Through his insightful comparisons between human and animal intelligence, Montemayor makes it clear why adopting a need-based attention approach justifies a humanitarian framework. This is an urgent, timely argument for developing AI technologies based on international human rights agreements.

The scientific investigation of consciousness generates new findings at a rapid pace. We argue that we need a novel theoretical framework, which we call the ALARM theory of consciousness, in order to account for all central observations. According to this theory, we need to distinguish two levels of consciousness, namely basic arousal and general alertness. Basic arousal functions as a specific alarm system, keeping a biological organism alive under sudden intense threats, and general alertness enables flexible learning and behavioural strategies. This two-level theory of consciousness helps us to account for (i) recent discoveries of subcortical brain activities with a central role of thalamic processes, (ii) observations of differences in the behavioural repertoire of non-human animals indicating two types of conscious experiences. Furthermore, the framework enables us (iii) to unify the neural evidence for the relevance of subcortical processes, on the one hand, and of cortico-cortical loops, on the other, and finally (iv) to clarify the evolutionary and actual functional role of conscious experiences.

This paper examines Guillermo Lariguet’s paper ‘Analytical Legal Philosophy Reloaded,’ offering two interpretations of the ‘reloading’ project. The paper argues that a naturalistic reading of the project is unmotivated and that a more promising way of interpreting Lariguet’s proposal is in terms of a rather ambitious methodological agenda, which is analogous to the broadly encompassing methodological criticism envisioned by Jürgen Habermas in some of his work, which centers on communicative action. This ‘reasonableness’ proposal, as I shall call it, is a plea to invigorate and enrich not just legal philosophy, but philosophical discourse in general, and shows that the reloading of legal philosophy cannot be understood as a project that originates only from within legal philosophy.Resumen:En este trabajo se examina el ensayo de Guillermo Lariguet intitulado “Analytical Legal Philosophy Reloaded”, y se ofrecen dos interpretaciones de su proyecto de “renovar” la filosofía analítica del derecho. En primer lugar se sostiene que una lectura naturalista del proyecto es injustificada, y que la vía más prometedora de interpretar su propuesta es en términos una agenda metodológica más ambiciosa, la cual es análoga al criticismo metodológico exhaustivo imaginado por Jürgen Habermas en algunos de sus trabajos, en los que centra su acción comunicativa. La “razonabilidad” de la propuesta, como la denomino, es una invitación a revitalizar y enriquecer no sólo la filosofía jurídica, sino el discurso filosófico en general; además muestra que la “renovación” de la filosofía del derecho no puede ser entendida como un proyecto que se origine única- mente desde el interior de la filosofía jurídica.

In this paper I critically assess a proposal called ‘Universal Moral Grammar’ and its implications for legal theory. I explain its relevance with respect to Natural Law approaches to legislation and our moral capacity. I present objections to this proposal and offer behavioral evidence concerning its plausibility as a scientific theory of moral competence. An important conclusion of the article is that lawyers and legal theorist have now the responsibility to look beyond their field, and start taking a more proactive role in the interdisciplinary study of social behavior.Resumen:En este artículo se discute una propuesta denominada “Gramática moral universal” y sus implicaciones para la teoría del derecho. El autor explica la relevancia de esta propuesta en relación con los enfoques iusnaturalistas sobre la legislación y la capacidad moral. A su vez, el estudio presenta diversas objeciones a esta propuesta y ofrece evidencia conductual relativa a su plausibilidad como una teoría científica de la competencia moral. Una conclusión importante del artículo, según el autor, es que los juristas y los abogados contemporáneos tienen la responsabilidad de ir más allá de su propio campo y de empezar a tomar un papel más activo en el estudio interdisciplinario de la conducta social.

The passage of time pertains to the dynamic happening of anticipated future events merging into a present actuality and subsequently becoming the past. Philosophers and scientists alike often endorse the view that the passage of time is an illusion. Here we instead account for the phenomenology of time passage as a real psycho-biological phenomenon. We argue that the experience of time passage has a real and measurable basis as it arises from an internal generative model for anticipating upcoming events. The experience of passage is not merely a representation by a passive recipient of sensory stimulation but is generated by predictive processes of the brain and proactive sensorimotor activity of the whole body. Although some philosophical approaches to time consider some psycho-biological evidence, the biological basis of the passage of time has not been examined in detail from a thorough scientific perspective. This paper proposes to remedy this omission.

The Study of Time XVI: Time's Urgency celebrates the 50th anniversary of the International Society for the Study of Time. It includes a keynote speech by renowned physicist Julian Barbour, a dialogue between British author David Mitchell, Katie Paterson and ISST's previous president Paul Harris. The volume is divided into dialogues and papers that directly address the issue of urgency and time scales from various disciplines. This book offers a unique perspective on the contemporary status of the interdisciplinary study of time. It will open new paths of inquiry for different approaches to the important issues of narrative structure and urgency. These are themes that are becoming increasingly relevant during our times.

A possible solution is offered to help resolve the “two times problem” regarding the veridical and illusory nature of time. First it is recognized that the flow of time is part of a wider array of temporal experiences referred to as manifest time, all of which need to be reconciled. Then, an information gathering and utilizing system model is used as a basis for a view of manifest time. The model IGUS robot of Hartle that solves the “unique present” debate is enhanced with veridical and illusory components of not only the flow of time but also the larger entity of manifest time, providing a dualistic IGUS robot that represents all of the important temporal experiences. Based upon a variety of prior experiments, that view suggests that the veridical system is a reflection of accepted spacetime cosmologies and through natural selection begets the illusory system for functional purposes. Thus, there are not two opposing times, one outside and one inside the cranium. There is just one fundamental physical time which the brain developed, now possesses and is itself sufficient for adaption but then enhances. The illusory system is intended to provide a more satisfying experience of physical time, and better adaptive behavior. Future experiments to verify that view are provided. With a complete veridical system of temporal experiences there may be less need to reify certain temporal experiences so that the two times problem is less of a problem and more of a phenomenon.

This paper explores aspects of GPT-3 that have been discussed as harbingers of artificial general intelligence and, in particular, linguistic intelligence. After introducing key features of GPT-3 and assessing its performance in the light of the conversational standards set by Alan Turing in his seminal paper from 1950, the paper elucidates the difference between clever automation and genuine linguistic intelligence. A central theme of this discussion on genuine conversational intelligence is that members of a linguistic community never merely respond “algorithmically” to queries through a selective kind of pattern recognition, because they must also jointly attend and act with other speakers in order to count as genuinely intelligent and trustworthy. This presents a challenge for systems like GPT-3, because representing the world in a way that makes conversational common ground salient is an essentially collective task that we can only achieve jointly with other speakers. Thus, the main difficulty for any artificially intelligent model of conversation is to account for the communicational intentions and motivations of a speaker through joint attention. These joint motivations and intentions seem to be completely absent from the standard way in which systems like GPT-3 and other artificial intelligent systems work. This is not merely a theoretical issue. Since GPT-3 and future iterations of similar systems will likely be available for commercial use through application programming interfaces, caution is needed regarding the risks created by these systems, which pass for “intelligent” but have no genuine communicational intentions, and can thereby produce fake and unreliable linguistic exchanges.

What are the limits of the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the relational aspects of medical and nursing care? There has been a lot of recent work and applications showing the promise and efficiency of AI in clinical medicine, both at the research and treatment levels. Many of the obstacles discussed in the literature are technical in character, regarding how to improve and optimize current practices in clinical medicine and also how to develop better data bases for optimal parameter adjustments and predictive algorithms. This paper argues that there are also in principle obstacles to the application of AI in clinical medicine and care where empathy is important, and that these problems cannot be solved with any of the technical and theoretical approaches that shape the current application of AI in specific areas of clinical medicine in which care for patients is fundamental. This is important, because it generates specific risks that may be overlooked otherwise, and it justifies the necessity of human monitoring and emotional intervention in clinical medicine. Consequently, difficult issues concerning moral and legal responsibility may ensue if these in principle problems are ignored.

This commentary focuses on the importance of attention skills in the development of universal associative learning, and it explains why the centrality of attention in UAL presents a considerable difficulty for the UAL approach. Attentional abilities are not just developmentally related to UAL but are in fact explanatory of UAL. The main problem is that all the types of attention involved in UAL can be dissociated from consciousness. This means that while attention skills for UAL might be necessary for consciousness, they are not sufficient because they can all occur unconsciously. Thus, the possibility that UAL capacities might not be sufficient for consciousness cannot be eliminated, thereby challenging the key claim of the UAL approach.

We’ve seen a significant increase in the attention AI research is receiving this past decade, in large part due to some of the impressive feats of machine learning, particularly deep learning. This has resulted in something of a hype in the ability of AI’s in tackling various issues. The aim of the current essay is to examine the speculative questions “what would it mean for systems to transition from merely intelligently executing a task to knowledgably executing a task?” and “what is the relation between consciousness and intelligence, such that specific evaluations about conscious AI might be made?” We offer what we hope is a roadmap for how to navigate asking these questions and a route forward in understanding how AI goes from intelligence to knowledge and potentially to some types of consciousness.

There is a long standing debate as to whether or not time is ‘real’ or illusory, and whether or not human time is a direct reflection of physical time. Differing spacetime cosmologies have opposing views. Exactly what human time entails has, in our opinion, led to the failure to resolve this ‘two times’ problem. To help resolve this issue we propose a dualistic model of human time in which each component has both an illusory and non-illusory aspect. With the dualistic model we are able to provide experimental tests for all of the human time assertions of 10 chosen spacetime cosmologies. The illusory aspect of the ‘present,’ i.e. a ‘unique present’ was confirmed. An information gathering and utilizing system was constructed using a virtual reality apparatus allowing the observer to experientially roam back and forth along the worldline ad lib. The phenomenon of ‘change’ was experimentally found to be illusory at high frequency observation and non-illusory at low frequency observation, the latter phenomenon coinciding with ‘change’ referred to in the ‘Order of Time’ and ‘Relativity Refounded’ views. Additional experiments are presented indicating that both motion and temporality are dualistic. In sum, the dualistic model of human time allows for the existence of both illusory and non-illusory aspects of human time that are not in conflict with one another. It also provides experimental evidence for various spacetime cosmological assertions regarding human time.

The connection between quantum physics and the mind has been debated for almost a hundred years. There are several proposals as to how quantum effects might be relevant to understanding consciousness, including von Neumann’s Consciousness Causes Collapse interpretation (CCC), Penrose’s Orchestrated objective reduction (Orch OR), Atmanspacher quantum emergence theory, or Vitiello’s field theory. In this paper, we examine the CCC, in particular Stapp’s theory of interaction of mind and matter, and discuss how this imposes constraints to possible brain structures. We then argue that those constraints may allow us to identify a possible locus of the interaction between mind and matter, if CCC is true.

Any theory of information needs to comply with what we call the implementation, formalization, and representation constraints. These constraints are justified by basic considerations concerning scientific modelling and methodology. In the first part of this paper, we argue that the implementation and formalization constraints cannot be satisfied because the relation between Shannon information and IIT must be clarified. In the second part of the paper, we focus on the representation constraint. We argue that IIT cannot succeed in satisfying this constraint for semantic contents without offering models for concepts, conceptual roles, and context sensitivity. In the final part of the paper, further complications are raised with respect to the distinction between consciousness and attention, which apply more specifically to the representation constraint. We conclude with some recommendations as to how IIT may succeed in solving these problems, highlighting the advantages and enormous potential of IIT as a scientific theory.

This edited volume examines aspects of the mind/consciousness that are relevant to the interpretations of quantum mechanics. In it, an international group of contributors focus on the possible connections between quantum mechanics and consciousness. They look at how consciousness can help us with quantum mechanics as well as how quantum mechanics can contribute to our understanding of consciousness. For example, what do different interpretations aimed at solving the measurement problem in quantum mechanics tell us about the nature of consciousness, such as von Neumann's interpretation? Each interpretation has, associated to it, a corresponding metaphysical framework that helps us think about possible “models” of consciousness. Alternatively, what does the nature of consciousness tell us about the role of the observer and time reversibility in the measurement process? The book features 20 papers on contemporary approaches to quanta and mind. It brings together the work of scholars from different disciplines with diverse views on the connections between quanta and mind, ranging from those who are supportive of a link between consciousness and quantum physics to those who are very skeptical of such link. Coverage includes such topics as free will in a quantum world, contextuality and causality, mind and matter interaction, quantum panpsychism, the quantum and quantum-like brain, and the role of time in brain-mind dynamics.

The relationship between attention and consciousness is one that is crucial for understanding perception and different types of conscious experience, and we commend this analysis of the topic by Pitts, Lutsyshyna, and Hillyard (2018). We have also examined this relationship closely (e.g., Montemayor & Haladjian, 2015) and would like to point out a few potential contradictions in the Pitts et al. paper that require clarification, particularly in the attempt to reconcile aspects of recurrent processing theory (RPT) with global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT). This commentary addresses these points and introduces other considerations important for this topic.

The prevailing view about our memory skills is that they serve a complex epistemic function. I shall call this the “monistic view.” Instead of a monistic, exclusively epistemic approach, I propose a transactional view. On this approach, autobiographical memory is irreducible to the epistemic functions of episodic memory because of its essentially moral and empathic character. I argue that this transactional view provides a more plausible and integral account of memory capacities in humans, based on theoretical and empirical reasons. Memory, on this account, plays two distinctive roles. The episodic memory system satisfies epistemic needs and is valuable because it is a source of justification for beliefs about the past. Autobiographical memory satisfies moral and narrative-autonoetic needs, and is valuable because it is a source of personally meaningful and insightful experiences about our past. Unlike autobiographical memory, episodic memory is only weakly autonoetic. The relation between these two roles of memory is captured by the tension between a narrative and an accurate report.