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1A priori knowledge : the conceptual approachIn Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology, Continuum. 2012.
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835On Putting Knowledge 'First'In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, Oxford University Press. 2017.There is a New Idea in epistemology. It goes by the name of ‘knowledge first,’ and it is particularly associated with Timothy Williamson’s book Knowledge and Its Limits. In slogan form, to put knowledge first is to treat knowledge as basic or fundamental, and to explain other states—belief, justification, maybe even content itself—in terms of knowledge, instead of vice versa. The idea has proven enormously interesting, and equally controversial. But deep foundational questions about its actual c…Read more
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26The Philosophy of FlirtingIn Fritz Allhoff, Kristie Miller & Marlene Clark (eds.), Dating ‐ Philosophy for Everyone, Wiley‐blackwell. 2010-09-24.
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6Epistemological NaturalismsIn Kelly James Clark (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism, Wiley-blackwell. 2015.Epistemological naturalism has often been taken to be inimical to a priori knowledge, armchair knowledge, and epistemic normativity. This chapter argues that the relationship between epistemological naturalism and these other commitments is in fact considerably subtler than it is widely assumed to be. The chapter begins with a brief classificatory sketch of different kinds of naturalism, then focuses on forms of naturalism that have been especially significant in epistemology. Finally, one form …Read more
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25Intuition, ‘Intuition’, Concepts and the A PrioriIn Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions, Oxford University Press Uk. 2014.This chapter attempts to put structure on some of the different philosophical uses of ‘intuition’. It argues that ‘intuition’-hood is associated with four bundles of symptoms: a commonsensicality bundle; an a prioricity and immediacy bundle, and a metaphilosophical bundle. Tentatively suggesting that the word ‘intuition’ as used by philosophers is best regarded as ambiguous, the chapter offers a much simpler view concerning the meaning of ‘intuition’ in philosophy. With some of the attacks on ‘i…Read more
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73The Truth Fairy and the Indirect Epistemic ConsequentialistIn Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement, Oxford University Press. pp. 344-360. 2020.Friends of Wright-entitlement cannot appeal to direct epistemic consequentialism (believe or accept what maximizes expected epistemic value) in order to account for the epistemic rationality of accepting Wright-entitled propositions. The tenability of direct consequentialism is undermined by the “Truth Fairy”: a powerful being who offers you great epistemic reward (in terms of true beliefs) if you accept a proposition p for which you have evidence neither for nor against. However, this chapter a…Read more
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114Liar-like paradox and object language featuresAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1). 2008.We argue that it would seem to be a mistake to blame Liar-like paradox on certain features of the object language, since the effect can be created with very minimal object languages that contain none of the usual suspects (truth-like predicates, reference to their own truth-bearers, negation, etc.).
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Naturalistic challenges to the a prioriIn Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy, Oxford University Press Uk. 2013.
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28The importance of being designated: a comment on Caret and CotnoirAnalysis 68 (3): 244-247. 2008.No Abstract
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113Metaphysical Vagueness Without Vague ObjectsThought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4): 278-283. 2018.Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams have developed a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy, via which they defend the theoretical legitimacy of vague objects. In this paper, we argue that while the Barnes–Williams theory supplies a viable account of genuine metaphysical vagueness, it cannot underwrite an account of genuinely vague objects. First we clarify the distinction between these two key theses. Then we argue that the Barnes–Williams theory of metaphysical vagueness not only fails to deliv…Read more
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67Truth in Virtue of Meaning, by Gillian Russell (review)Mind 119 (473): 232-238. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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44Knowing Our Own Hearts: Self‐Reporting and the Science of LovePhilosophical Issues 26 (1): 226-242. 2016.
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432What Is Ontological Realism?Philosophy Compass 5 (10): 880-890. 2010.The purpose of this paper is to clarify what metaontological realism, as discussed in contemporary metaontological literature, amounts to. Although metaontological debates are of relatively long standing, the terms ‘realism’ and ‘anti‐realism’ have only recently come to be regularly applied to metaontological positions. The new usage is not fully stable. This paper aims to: (1) distinguish three key claims associated with the term ‘realism’ in metaontology, and give some initial reasons why it i…Read more
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101Boghossian and Epistemic AnalyticityCroatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1): 113-127. 2008.Boghossian claims that we can acquire a priori knowledge by means of a certain form of argument, our grasp of whose premises relies on the existence of implicit definitions. I discuss an objection to his ‘analytic theory of the a priori’. The worry is that in order to employ this kind of argument we must already know its conclusion. Boghossian has responded to this type of objection in recent work, but I argue that his responses are unconvincing. Along the way, I resist Ebert’s reasons for think…Read more
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59The mystery of the disappearing diamondIn Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press. pp. 302--319. 2008.Addresses the question of why we find Fitch's knowability 'paradox' argument surprising.
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45'Addicted'? To 'Love'?Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 24 (1): 93-96. 2017.Earp et al. offer a very interesting summary of, and ethical commentary on, recent multidisciplinary research suggesting that at least some cases of what we call ‘romantic love’ involve phenomena that physically and/or psychologically resemble cases of what we call ‘addiction.’ They draw a conceptual distinction between what they call ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ concepts of addiction. On the narrow conception, only extreme, harmful, or abnormal cases of love would count as addiction. On the broad conce…Read more
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119Sleeping Beauty: A Wake-Up CallPhilosophia Mathematica 13 (2): 194-201. 2005.This note concerns a puzzle about probability which has recently caught the attention of a number of philosophers. According to the current philosophical consensus, the solution to the puzzle reveals that one can acquire new information, sufficient to change one's credences in certain events, just by having a certain experience, even though one knew all along that one would have an experience which felt exactly like this. I argue that the philosophical consensus is mistaken
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277Serious Verbal Disputes: Ontology, Metaontology, and AnalyticityJournal of Philosophy 111 (9-10): 454-469. 2014.This paper builds on some important recent work by Amie Thomasson, wherein she argues that recent disputes about the existence of ordinary objects have arisen due to eliminiativist metaphysicians’ misunderstandings. Some, she argues, are mistaken about how the language of quantification works, while others neglect the existence and significance of certain analytic entailments. Thomasson claims that once these misunderstandings are cleared away, it is trivially easy to answer existence questions …Read more
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120The nature of normativityAnalysis 69 (1): 156-166. 2009.This is a big-picture book, 2 written with a breadth of focus which I find admirable. It exhibits what's come to be known as the ‘intersubdiscplinary’ approach to philosophy, which is not restricted by traditional boundaries within the discipline but rather proceeds with an eye to all sorts of areas of philosophy where relevant arguments, results, analogies and strategies might be lurking. I approve of this way of doing philosophy; it seems to me that all too often that wheels are reinvented, or…Read more
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226Realism and IndependenceAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 42 (3). 2005.I argue that mind-independence realism should be characterised in terms of what I call 'essential', rather than 'modal', independence from our mental lives. I explore the connections between the two kinds of independence, and argue that characterizations in terms of essence respect more intuitions about what realism is, harmonize better with standard characterizations of anti-realism, and avert the threat of subversion from Blackburn's quasi-realist.
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