Social interactions are often interpreted differently depending on how the individuals involved are categorized.This paper argues that the categories that guide interpretation are intersectional categories, such as “Black woman” or “White man.” Drawing on empirical work in categorization and vision science, I show that person perception typically relies on categories that are highly informative. Highly informative categories are those that guide interaction. I first argue that race or gender use…
Read moreSocial interactions are often interpreted differently depending on how the individuals involved are categorized.This paper argues that the categories that guide interpretation are intersectional categories, such as “Black woman” or “White man.” Drawing on empirical work in categorization and vision science, I show that person perception typically relies on categories that are highly informative. Highly informative categories are those that guide interaction. I first argue that race or gender used alone are not particularly informative as they do not reliably predict interactions. I then show that intersectional categories are informative, as they activate distinct stereotypes that directly guide interpretation. In advancing this argument, I aim to initiate a philosophical conversation about the structure of social perception itself. To understand and address how social perception shapes our everyday lives, we must acknowledge the intersectionality of perception. Until we do, we will fail to capture the nuance of intergroup dynamics and the means by which they might be improved.
